Judge: William A. Crowfoot, Case: 23AHCV00077, Date: 2024-12-20 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23AHCV00077 Hearing Date: December 20, 2024 Dept: 3
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - NORTHEAST
DISTRICT
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Plaintiff(s), vs. Defendant(s). |
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[TENTATIVE]
ORDER RE: Dept.
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a.m. |
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I.
INTRODUCTION
On January 11, 2023, plaintiffs Alan
Chung Wah Tang (“Tang”) and Hou Chung Man (“Man”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”)
filed this complaint to domesticate a foreign judgment against Lee Siu Fung,
Siegfried (“Defendant”). Plaintiffs bring this action in their capacity as the
Joint and Several Trustees in Bankruptcy of the Property of the Bankrupt. On
March 22, 2023, Plaintiffs filed the operative First Amended Complaint to
domesticate three sets of tax assessed legal costs, totaling HK$6,080,000 plus
accrued interest (collectively, the “Hong Kong Judgments”). (FAC, ¶ 7.)
Plaintiffs allege that on or about January 18, 2001, Defendant filed for
bankruptcy relief under the laws of Hong Kong. (FAC, ¶ 5.) On or about
September 19, 2002, Plaintiffs were appointed as “Joint and Several Trustees in
Bankruptcy of Defendant’s Hong Kong bankruptcy estate.” (FAC, ¶ 6.) The Hong
Kong Judgments arose out of post-bankruptcy litigation between Plaintiffs and
Defendant. (FAC, ¶ 8.)
On August 16, 2024, Plaintiffs filed
this motion for summary judgment.
II.
LEGAL
STANDARD
A moving plaintiff meets their burden
on summary judgment by proving each element entitling the party to judgment on
that cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1).) The burden then
shifts to the defendant or cross-defendant to show that a triable issue of one
or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or defense thereto. A
party may also move for summary adjudication “as to . . . one or more
affirmative defenses . . . if the party contends…that there is no merit to an
affirmative defense as to a cause of action[.]” (Code Civ. Proc. § 437, subd.
(f)(1).) On such a motion, the plaintiff bears the initial burden to show there
is no triable issue of material fact as to the defense and that they are
entitled to judgment on the defense as a matter of law. (See’s Candy Shops,
Inc. v. Superior Court (2012) 210 Cal. App. 4th 889, 900.) To meet that
initial burden, the “plaintiff must negate an essential element of the defense,
or establish the defendant does not possess and cannot reasonably obtain
evidence needed to support the defense.” (Id.) If the plaintiff’s moving
papers “establish a prima facie showing that justifies a [ruling] in the
[plaintiff’s] favor, the burden then shifts to the [defendant] to make a prima
facie showing of the existence of a triable material factual issue.” (Id.
[quoting Rehmani v. Superior Court (2012) 204 Cal. App. 4th 945, 950].)
III.
REQUEST
FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
The Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Request
for Judicial Notice and takes notice of the three foreign laws identified in
the request as well as copies of the Hong Kong Judgments.
The Court DENIES Defendant’s Request
for Judicial Notice on the grounds of relevance.
IV.
EVIDENTIARY
OBJECTIONS
The Court rules on objections to
evidence material to its disposition of the motion as follows:
Plaintiff’s Objections to the
Declaration of Siu Fung Siegfried Lee:
Objection Nos. 1-9, 12: Overruled.
V.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs assert a single cause of
action seeking to domesticate the Hong Kong Judgments pursuant to the Uniform
Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act, Code of Civil Procedure
section 1713, et seq. (“the Act”). The Act applies to a foreign-country
judgment to the extent that it grants or denies recovery of a sum of money and,
under the law of the foreign country where rendered, is final, conclusive, and
enforceable. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1715, subd. (a).) The Act does not apply to a
judgment for taxes, fines or penalties, or judgments rendered in connection
with domestic relations. (Id., subd. (b).) A party seeking recognition
of a foreign-country judgment has the burden of establishing that it is
entitled to recognition. (Id., subd. (c).) Once the party seeking
recognition meets his burden of establishing recognition of the foreign-country
judgment, the burden shifts to the party resisting recognition to establish one
of the grounds for non-recognition stated in Code Civ. Proc. § 1716 subdivision
(b) or (c) exists. (Hyundai Securities Co., Ltd. v. Lee (2015) 232
Cal.App.4th, 1385, 1386 [“The party seeking recognition of a foreign-country
money judgment has the burden to establish entitlement to recognition under the
Act, while the party resisting recognition has the burden of establishing a
specified ground for nonrecognition”].) A foreign-country judgment shall not be
recognized if any of the grounds identified in Code of Civil Procedure section
1716 apply.
Plaintiff argues that the Hong Kong
Judgments should be recognized because they (1) grant a recovery of a sum of
money, (2) are final, conclusive, and enforceable in the country where they
originated, (3) are not for taxes, a fine or other penalty, or in connection
with domestic relations. (Motion, p. 2.)
It is undisputed that between June 2020
and February 2021, the Hong Kong Court ordered Defendant to pay three sets of
tax assessed legal costs for principal sums totaling HK $6,080,000 plus accrued
interest at the prevailing Hong Kong judgment rates. (UMF No. 1.) Therefore, it
is undisputed that the Hong Kong Judgments seek recovery of a sum of money. (UMF
No. 4.) Although Defendant disputes that the sum payable and owed totals
HK$9,588,882, Defendant’s argument is simply that one of the allocaturs does
not state that interest accrues, without providing any evidence that the amount
claimed by Plaintiff is incorrect. (Response to UMF No. 6.)
Next, Plaintiff argues that the Hong
Kong Judgments are final, conclusive, and enforceable because they were stamped
with the Hong Kong Court’s seal in 2020 and 2021 and have never been appealed.
(UMF Nos. 2-3, Tang Decl., ¶ 5.) Plaintiff cites to Civil Procedure Law of the
People’s Republic of China, Article 155, which states, “Judgments and rulings
made by the Supreme People’s Court, and judgments and rulings that may not be
appealed against according to the law or that have not been appealed against
within the prescribed time limit, shall be legally effective.” (RJN, ¶ 3.)
Plaintiff also cites to Hong Kong laws stating that notices of appeal must be
issued within 14 days after the judgment, order or decision appealed against
was given or made.” (RJN, ¶ 1.) Applications for review of a taxing master’s
decisions must be made within 14 days after the conclusion of the taxation
proceedings in which the taxing master’s decision was made. (RJN, ¶ 2.)
Third, Plaintiff argues that the Hong
Kong Judgments are not for taxes, fines, or penalties, or related to domestic
relations. (Tang Decl., ¶ 5.) Tang declares that they arise from
post-bankruptcy litigation between Plaintiffs and Defendant. (Ibid.)
In opposition, Defendant mainly
contends that the Hong Kong Judgments are orders, not judgments to be
domesticated. (Response to UMF Nos. 2-9.) This argument is unavailing because Defendant
does not identify any conflicting law or contend that the laws cited are
inapplicable. Defendant offers no evidence or authority explaining how the Hong
Kong Judgments are not “the final determination of the rights of the parties in
an action or proceeding.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 557.) Defendant’s distinction
between a “judgment” and an “order” as simply two different words is
insufficient to raise a triable issue of material fact regarding the finality
of the Hong Kong Court’s determination.
Next, Defendant argues that the Hong
Kong court lacked jurisdiction over him and that he was denied due process.
Defendant declares that he is a British citizen and left Hong Kong in August
2016 and moved to California. (Lee Decl., ¶ 2.) He states he does not own any
property in Hong Kong and has not set foot in Hong Kong since at least when
COVID started, which was in January of 2020. (Lee Decl., ¶ 2.) Defendant states
he did not make any appearances or sign any documents in the Hong Kong cases
from 2020 and was not served with process. (Lee Decl., ¶ 3.)
However, on reply, Plaintiffs argue
that Defendant’s declaration fails to raise a triable issue of fact regarding
the validity of the Hong Kong Judgments because Defendant instigated the
proceedings that resulted in those Judgments. Court documents from the
underlying case, HCB345 of 2001, show that Defendant was represented by a
solicitor, David Y.Y. Fung & Co. (“DYYF”) during those proceedings. (Supp.
Tang Decl., ¶¶ 4-7, Exs. A-D.) Plaintiffs’ attorneys in the Hong Kong Action,
ONC Lawyers, also declare that they served DYYF as the solicitors on records
for Defendant with court documents in the underlying action. (Tung Decl., ¶¶ 3-8.)
Therefore, whether Defendant personally signed letters or appeared in person in
those proceedings is insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact regarding
the issues of jurisdiction and due process.
VI.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s
motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
Dated
this
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William A.
Crowfoot Judge of the Superior Court |
Parties who intend to submit on this
tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating
intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided
on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit
on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may
nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a
submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others
might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from
the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no
appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the
tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.