Judge William A. Crowfoot, Case Number: 23AHCV00232, Date: 2023-05-19 Tentative Ruling

Judge: William A. Crowfoot, Case: 23AHCV00232, Date: 2023-05-19 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff BE 830 Lake, LLC (“Plaintiff”) moves for an order awarding attorney fees as the prevailing party in this unlawful detainer action. This action arises from the failure to pay rent by defendant East Coast Foods, Inc. dba Roscoe’s House of Chicken & Waffles (“Defendant”). Plaintiff argues it is entitled to a fee award in the sum of $195,266, which includes the fees incurred in making this motion.

A prevailing party is entitled to recover costs, which can include attorney’s fees, as a matter of right. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1032, subd. (a)(4); 1033.5, subd. (a)(10).) This right may arise out of contract, statute or law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (a)(10).) Additionally, a party prevailing on an action on a contract is entitled to attorney fees if the contract contains an attorney’s fees provision. (Civ. Code, § 1717, subd. (a).)

The most common method for calculating reasonable attorneys’ fees begins with the “lodestar” approach which is calculated as¿“the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” (Margolin v. Regional Planning Com. (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 999, 1004-1005.) “California courts have consistently held that a computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys’ fee award.” (Id.) The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work. (Id. at 1004.)¿ The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided. (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49; PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.App 4th 1084, 1095.)

Plaintiff is entitled to the award of attorney fees as the prevailing party pursuant to a contractual agreement. Section 31 of the Lease underlying this action provides that the prevailing party in an action or proceeding involving the Premises shall be entitled to reasonable attorney fees. (Lombardi Decl., Ex. 1.) In addition, Plaintiff, as the lessor, “shall be entitled to attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses incurred in the preparation and service of notices of Default and consultations in connection therewith, whether or not a legal action is subsequently commenced in connection with such Default or resulting breach.” (Ibid.)

As a threshold matter, the Court addresses Defendant’s time-wasting argument that the judgment entered on June 30, 2023, bars Plaintiff from seeking attorneys’ fees. (Opp., p. 5.) The Court’s signed judgment removed placeholders for the award of fees, because at that time no motion for attorneys’ fees or costs had been filed (as clearly contemplated by the deleted placeholders), and the Court did not bar Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees. The Court thus proceeds to analyze the merits of Defendant’s opposition.

Defendant argues that the fees sought by Plaintiff were not “reasonably incurred” by Plaintiff because the bills were addressed to non-party Black Equities LLC. However, as explained in Plaintiff’s reply brief, Black Equities is the “sole manager” and an owner of Plaintiff. (Reply, p. 2.) In this capacity, Black Equities was invoiced for, and paid, Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees. (Ibid.) Plaintiff is not precluded from recovering attorneys’ fees even if it did not have a personal obligation to pay for legal services; the ultimate payor of the fees is immaterial. (See Sonoma Land Trust v. Thompson (2021) 63 al.App.5th 978, 984; Nemecek & Cole v. Horn (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 641, 653.)

Next, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s counsel did not establish that their billing rates correspond to the prevailing rates in southern California for attorneys with similar experience engaged in unlawful detainer work. Defendant’s demand for additional evidence is meritless. (Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 156 (awarding attorneys’ fees based solely on “unrebutted declarations”); Davis v. City of San Diego (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 893, 903 (rejecting argument the court should have “required [the party seeking attorneys’ fees] to present evidence beyond its counsel’s declaration sufficient to show its ‘requested rates’ were ‘in line with those prevailing in the community for similar service by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation”).) Here, attorney Thomas Lombardi declares that he billed at an hourly rate of $620 in 2022 and $675 in 2023, which was discounted from his usual hourly rate of $870 in 2022 and $925 in 2023. Lombardi’s practice focuses on real estate litigation and he has experience litigating novel issues concerning the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on commercial lease obligations. He provides a summary of tasks performed each month from June 2022 to August 2023 by each of his staff to show that the total billed to Plaintiff is $195,266. Attorney Matthew Anderson had an effective billing rate of $675 per hour, which is discounted from his normal hourly rate of $825. Anderson is a commercial litigation associate who, like Lombardi, has experience litigating issues concerning the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on commercial lease obligations. Anderson has been practicing for 9 years and spent 105 hours on work almost exclusively dedicated to Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and the instant motion. Another litigation associate, Jesse Hogin, billed 13 hours to his matter on legal research and discovery drafting, at an hourly rate of $550 in 2022 and $620 in 2023. Hogin has been a litigator for two years and has clerked for 3 years for different federal judges. Staci Steadman, a research services manager, dedicated approximately 4 hours to this matter and had an hourly billing rate of $360 in 2022 and $370 in 2023. Steadman has 25 years of experience working as a research librarian at law firms. Based on these descriptions, the Court finds no objection with the hourly rates claimed by Plaintiff’s counsel.

In addition, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s counsel’s billed amount should be reduced by $91,161 because time entries were purportedly duplicative and fees incurred during he “grace period” for rent payment under Pasadena Ordinance 7392 should not be allowed. The Court partially agrees with Defendant’s assessment that some of the work was duplicative or excessive. Specifically, with respect to pre-litigation tasks, Plaintiff’s counsel spent 13 hours amounting to a total of $14,913.50 to investigate and analyze the claims, draft correspondence and facilitate settlement discussions, and prepare the pleadings and notice to pay or quit. (Motion, p. 3.) This work amounts to about $1,147.19 per hour, which is unreasonably high in light of the previously-listed hourly rates. Accordingly, the Court reduces the fees recoverable for this preparatory work to an hourly rate of $620, for a total $8,060. The Court rejects Defendant’s argument that the case was “straightforward.” Defendant raised multiple arguments regarding the impact of COVID-19 moratoriums that were novel and required extensive accounting to rebut. Even the summary judgment motion required supplemental briefing and two hearings.

Last, Defendant asks the Court to consider the fact that it is subject to a bankruptcy reorganization plan. However, the authorities cited are factually inapposite as they concern different statutory causes of action and individual (not corporate) plaintiffs.

Plaintiff’s motion for fees is GRANTED subject to a $8,060 reduction for a total fee award of $187,206.

William A. Crowfoot

Judge of the Superior Court

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.