Judge William A. Crowfoot, Case Number: 23AHCV00927, Date: 2023-09-25 Tentative Ruling

Judge: William A. Crowfoot, Case: 23AHCV00927, Date: 2023-09-25 Tentative Ruling

On April 26, 2023, plaintiff Natalie Marie Diaz (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against defendants Danielle Brittany Vafa (“Vafa”), the State of California, acting by and through the Department of Transportation (“State”), the County of Los Angeles, and City of Monrovia asserting causes of action for general negligence and dangerous condition of public property.

Plaintiff alleges that on July 7, 2022, she was a passenger in Vafa’s vehicle and traveling westbound on Interstate 210. As the two approached the intersection of Interstate 210 and Monterey Avenue, Vafa veered in a northerly direction off the roadway, which had no guardrail or other barrier, and down an adjacent embankment with numerous large trees less than 40 feet from the edge of the roadway. Vafa’s vehicle crashed into one of the trees located on the embankment and Plaintiff suffered multiple injuries including an open fracture of her left femur, avulsion of her left knee, a fracture of her right medial orbital wall and floor, a nasal fracture, and facial lacerations.

The State filed an answer on June 5, 2023, and after obtaining leave of court, filed a cross-complaint against Vafa on September 27, 2023. In the meantime, on September 26, 2023, Vafa filed a notice of settlement and a motion for determination of good faith settlement pursuant to CCP 877.6. On October 23, 2023, the State filed an opposition brief in response to Vafa’s motion. Vafa filed a reply brief on October 27, 2023.

On November 3, 2023, the Court continued the hearing on Vafa’s motion to allow the State to have an opportunity to conduct further discovery regarding Vafa’s financial assets. On December 28, 2023, Vafa filed a supplemental brief. The State filed an opposition brief on January 10, 2024. Vafa filed a response to this opposition brief on January 17, 2024.

If a settlement entered into by less than all joint tortfeasors or co-obligors is made in good faith, the Court “shall bar any other joint tortfeasor or co-obligor from any further claims against the settling tortfeasor . . . for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6, subd. (c).) “A determination as to the good faith of a settlement, within the meaning of section 877.6, necessarily requires the trial court to examine and weigh a number of relevant factors, one of the most important of which is the settling party’s proportionate liability. In making such examination, the court must look at the state of the evidence as it exists at the time the motion for a good faith determination is heard. [Citation.] If . . . there is no substantial evidence to support a critical assumption as to the nature and extent of a settling defendant’s liability, then a determination of good faith based upon such assumption is an abuse of discretion.” (Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc. v. Superior Court (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 864, 871; L.C. Rudd & Son, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 742, 750.)

On a motion for determination of good faith settlement, the non-settling tortfeasors or obligors bear the burden of demonstrating the absence of good faith in the settlement. (Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6, subd. (d).) To demonstrate a lack of good faith, the non-settling party must show that the settlement is so far “out of the ballpark” as to be inconsistent with the equitable objectives of Section 877.6. (Nutrition Now, Inc. v. Superior Court (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 209, 213.) The Court will typically consider: (1) the plaintiff’s (roughly) approximated total recovery; (2) the settlor’s share of liability; (3) the size of the settlement at issue; (4) the distribution of settlement proceeds among plaintiffs; (5) the usual discount value when plaintiffs settle before trial; the settlor’s financial condition and insurance policy limits; and (6) whether there is evidence of “collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of nonsettling defendants.” (Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, 499.) These factors will be evaluated accordingly to what information is available at the time of settlement. (Ibid.)

Plaintiff has agreed to settle her claims against Vafa for the full insurance policy limit of $500,000. Vafa argues that this amount is “within the ballpark” because she has no assets and this was the sole insurance policy in force providing coverage for Vafa and the vehicle. (Schmid v. Superior Court (1998) 205 Cal.App.3d 1244, 1245 [good faith found where defendant pays limit of insurance policy and has no other assets].) Vafa declares the following:

“I have not, nor has anyone on my behalf, transferred to any other person any assets (including cash in whatever form held) over $100,000 since the July 7, 2022, collision. I do not own any assets (including cash in whatever form held, equity, stocks, bonds, real estate, notes, etc.) worth $100,000 or more.” (Kingston Decl., Ex. A, ¶ 11.)

In Vafa’s supplemental brief, Vafa cites to the investigating officer’s report which concluded that Vafa was not at fault for the subject accident, but rather a semitruck making an unsafe lane change to the right and colliding into Vafa’s vehicle. Vafa also includes an excerpt from her deposition transcript. On November 6, 2023, counsel for the State had an opportunity to question Vafa about the events leading up to the accident and Vafa’s assets.

In its initial opposition brief, the State argued that motion should be denied because the settlement is disproportionately low compared to Vafa’s alleged liability. In its supplemental brief, the State maintains that the settlement amount of $500,000 is disproportionately low compared with Plaintiff’s request for $30 million in her statement of damages. The State also requests another continuance for further discovery which is supposed to be due late January.

The Court already granted the State’s previous request for a 90-day continuance to conduct discovery regarding the good faith of the settlement and it appears that the State has had the opportunity to depose Vafa, making written discovery redundant. No evidence has been presented which would show that the settlement is in bad faith. Although the State refers to Plaintiff’s statement of damages to approximate the value of Plaintiff’s claims, a plaintiff’s rough approximated total recovery is based on information known at the time of settlement. (Dole Food Company, Inc. v. Superior Court (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 894, 904 [“a plaintiff’s claims for damages are not determinative in finding good faith; rather the court is called upon ‘to make a rough approximation’ of what the plaintiff would actually recover’ . . . with the evaluation being made ‘on the basis of information available at the time of settlement”].)

“In order to encourage settlement, it is quite proper for a settling defendant to pay less than his proportionate share of the anticipated damages. What is required is simply that the settlement not be grossly disproportionate to the settlor’s fair share.” (Abbott Ford, Inc. v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 858, 874-875.) Here, as of October 31, 2023, Plaintiff’s medical expenses total around $240,000. Vafa’s $500,000 insurance policy limit is nearly twice the amount of Plaintiff’s special damages. Therefore, the Court cannot conclude that the settlement is “grossly disproportionate” to Vafa’s fair share.

William A. Crowfoot

Judge of the Superior Court

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.