Judge William A. Crowfoot, Case Number: 23AHCV00927, Date: 2025-02-07 Tentative Ruling

Judge: William A. Crowfoot, Case: 23AHCV00927, Date: 2025-02-07 Tentative Ruling

On April 26, 2023, plaintiff Natalie Marie Diaz (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against the People of the State of California, acting by and through the Department of Transportation (“Caltrans”) asserting a cause of action for dangerous condition of public property. Plaintiff alleges that on July 7, 2022, she sustained injuries when the vehicle in which she was a passenger veered off the westbound Interstate 210 (“SR-210”), down an embankment, and collided with one of numerous large trees located on the embankment (“Subject Location”). (Compl., ¶¶ 10-11.)

On November 22, 2024, Caltrans filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the design immunity provisions of Government Code sections 830.4, 830.6, and 830.8 applied. Caltrans also argues that there was no failure to warn under Tansavatdi v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 639.

On January 28, 2025, Caltrans filed a notice of errata. On January 31, 2025, Caltrans filed its reply papers as well as evidentiary objections to Plaintiff’s evidence.

In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, courts must apply a three-step analysis: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent’s claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue.” (Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.) A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) “Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) The plaintiff may not merely rely on allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists, but instead, “shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action.” (Ibid.)

Plaintiff’s objections are not submitted separately as required by CRC 3.1354 but improperly embedded in her separate statement. Regardless, Plaintiff’s objections to the Declaration of Connie Fletes and Christian Engelmann are rooted in the inadvertent omission of “2024” in the signature date in the Declaration of Connie Fletes. These objections are OVERRULED because Caltrans filed a notice of errata on January 28, 2025, along with a corrected declaration with the proper signature date.

Because the Court finds that Caltrans failed to meet its moving burden, it does not need to rule on Caltrans’ objections to Plaintiff’s evidence. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (q).)

Design immunity is an affirmative defense. (Grenier v. City of Irwindale (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 931, 939-940.) Government Code section 830.6 provides, in part: “Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable under this chapter for an injury caused by the plan or design of a construction of, or an improvement to, public property where such plan or design has been approved in advance of the construction or improvement by the legislative body of the public entity or by some other body or employee exercising discretionary authority to give such approval or where such plan or design is prepared in conformity with standards previously so approved, if the trial or appellate court determines that there is any substantial evidence upon the basis of which (a) a reasonable public employee could have adopted the plan or design or the standards therefor or (b) a reasonable legislative body or other body or employee could have approved the plan or design or the standards therefor.”

A public entity claiming design immunity pursuant to Government Code section 830.6 must establish: (1) a causal relationship between the plan or design and the accident; (2) discretionary approval of the plan or design prior to construction, or that the plan or design was prepared in conformity with standards previously so approved; and (3) substantial evidence supporting the reasonableness of the plan or design. (Cornette v. Department of Transportation (2001) 26 Cal.4th 63, 68-69.) “The rationale for design immunity is to prevent a jury from second-guessing the decision of a public entity by reviewing the identical questions of risk that had previously been considered by the government officers who adopted or approved the plan or design. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 69.)

The first question is whether there is undisputed evidence that the accident was caused by a design defect, and not some other cause. (Grenier, supra, 57 Cal.App.4th at p. 940.) The public entity may rely on the allegations of the complaint to establish causation. (Alvis v. County of Ventura (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 536, 550 [citing Fuller v. Dept. of Transp. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1109, 1114.)

Here, Plaintiffs alleged that “[t]he existence of an adjacent embankment with a non-recoverable slope, i.e., a slope of such a grade that an operator of an errant motor vehicle cannot regain control of vehicle [sic], having large trees in close proximity to the edge of a roadway with a posted speed limit of sixty-five miles per hour constituted a dangerous condition.” (Compl., ¶. 14.) “As a direct and proximate result of said dangerous condition, [Plaintiff] has suffered severe personal injuries and incurred significant losses and damages.” (Compl., ¶ 31.)

Plaintiff alleges Caltrans “failed to remediate or otherwise protect against said dangerous condition, e.g., by installing a guardrail or other barrier.” (Compl., ¶ 18.) Therefore, this element is satisfied.

The second element of design immunity is whether there was approval for the plan or design prior to construction. Discretionary approval “simply means approval in advance of construction by the legislative body or officer exercising discretionary authority.” (Gonzales v. City of Atwater (2016) 6 Cal.App.4th 929, 947 [citing Grenier, supra, 57 Cal.App.4th at p. 940.) A witness may testify as an expert as to the customs and practices the public entity’s discretionary design review and approval, despite lack of personal involvement in the review process, based on later acquired knowledge. (Alvarez v. State of California (1999) 79 Cal.App.4th 720, 732.) “[A] detailed plan, drawn up by a competent engineering firm, and approved by the city council in the exercise of its discretionary authority, is certainly persuasive evidence of both elements of prior approval and reasonableness for purposes of the design immunity defense.” (Ramirez v. City of Redondo Beach (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 515, 526.)

Here, Caltrans submits the Declaration of Christian Engelmann, a registered civil and traffic engineer, who was employed by Caltrans from 1999 to 2016 and now works as a consultant/expert witness. (Def.’s Ex. 1, ¶¶ 2-3, 7-9.) Engelemann reviewed various project plans and states that the geometry of the roadway and slope of the roadway embankment at the Subject Location were constructed in 1968 pursuant to design plans approved in 1966; the geometry and slope have not been altered since. (UMF Nos. 4-5; Engelmann Decl., ¶¶ 17-18.) Then, Engelmann claims, in 1972, trees were planted along the embankment at the Subject Location, but no geometric features were altered. (UMF No. 5; Engelmann Decl., ¶ 19.) In 1973, guardrails were installed in various locations along the SR-210 corridor, but not at the Subject Location. (UMF No. 5; Engelmann Decl., ¶ 20.) Caltrans submits project plans bearing an “As Built Plans” stamp, which, Englemann explains, indicates that the project was built in conformity with them. (Engelmann Decl., ¶¶ 27, 32, 36.) The plans were also signed and approved by engineers which reflects their approval of the designs. (Engelmann Decl., ¶¶ 25-26, 30-31, 34-35.)

The Court notes (as does Plaintiff), that the project plans for the landscape planting are incomplete. Caltrans submitted the title sheet, the plant list with its plant specifications, and a sheet depicting plans for the irrigation system, but no “planting plans”, which would be Sheet Nos. 3-17, were included. (Def.’s Ex. 6.) Design immunity does not immunize decisions that were not made. (Cameron v. State of California (1972) 7 Cal.3d 318, 326.) Therefore, the injury-producing feature must have been part of the approved plan. (Grenier, supra, 57 Cal.App.4th at p. 941.)

Here, without evidence that the placement of the tree involved in the collision was planned and approved, Caltrans’ reliance on the design immunity fails. Caltrans did not separately seek summary adjudication of their design immunity as applied to separate causal issues of the embankment, trees, and absence of a guardrail, therefore, because the burden to show that the desigin immunity applied to the tree involved in the collision was not met, Caltrans’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED.

William A. Crowfoot

Judge of the Superior Court

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court’s website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.