Judge William A. Crowfoot, Case Number: 23AHCV01048, Date: 2023-10-03 Tentative Ruling

Judge: William A. Crowfoot, Case: 23AHCV01048, Date: 2023-10-03 Tentative Ruling

On May 9, 2023, plaintiff Jane Doe (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against defendants SF Markets, LLC dba Sprouts Farmers Market (“Sprouts”) and George Mares (“Mares”) for violations of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”) and Labor Code, including hostile work environment, quid pro quo sexual harassment, retaliation, gender discrimination, and failure to prevent discrimination, harassment, and retaliation.

On September 6, 2023, Sprouts filed this motion for an order compelling Plaintiff to arbitrate her claims.

A party may file a petition to compel arbitration where “an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists” and “a party to the agreement refuses to arbitrate that controversy.” (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2.) “[W]hen a petition to compel arbitration is filed and accompanied by prima facie evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate the controversy, the court itself must determine whether the agreement exists and, if any defense to its enforcement is raised, whether it is enforceable. Because the existence of the agreement is a statutory prerequisite to granting the petition, the petitioner bears the burden of proving its existence by a preponderance of the evidence. If the party opposing the petition raises a defense to enforcement ... that party bears the burden of producing evidence of, and proving by a preponderance of the evidence, any fact necessary to the defense.” (Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413–414.) In these summary proceedings, the trial court sits as a trier of fact, weighing all the affidavits, declarations, and other documentary evidence, as well as oral testimony received at the court's discretion, to reach a final determination.” (Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 972.)

Sprouts claims that an arbitration agreement was provided to Plaintiff in 2012 as part of her application process. (Hartline Decl., Ex. 1, ¶ 4.) The document, which is undated, is entitled “Mutual Binding Arbitration Agreement” (herein, “Agreement”) and is attached to the declaration of Brandon Hartline, Sprouts’ Human Resources Manager. It states, in pertinent part:

This Agreement to arbitrate covers all complaints, charges, claims, controversies, disputes, courts, or causes of action of any nature (collectively, “claims”), whether based in contract, tort, equity, or other legal theory, and whether arising under any federal, state, or local statute, law ordinance, or regulation, or under the common law, that are now in existence or that may exist in the future, arising out of or related to Team Member’s employment with Sprouts and/or the termination thereof.”

(Hartline Decl., Ex. 1, ¶ 4.) The Agreement applies to claims for discrimination, harassment, or retaliation, including harassment or discrimination based on sex and gender, in addition to claims for violation of any federal, state, or other governmental law, statute, regulation, or ordinance. (Id.) Sprouts argues that Plaintiff’s claims within the scope of the Agreement and that they are not barred by the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act because they arose before March 3, 2022.

Because Plaintiff filed this action under a pseudonym, Sprouts filed a copy of the Agreement that has the signature of the “Team Member” redacted. (Hartline Decl., Ex. 1, p. 5.) While the redacted signature would ordinarily affect whether Sprouts has met its initial burden to allege the existence of an arbitration agreement, Plaintiff attached an unredacted copy of the document to her own declaration in opposition to this motion. (Pltf. Decl., Ex. A.) The document purports to bear her signature; therefore, Sprouts has met initial burden and the burden shifts to Plaintiff to identify a factual dispute as to the authenticity of the signature. (Espejo v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1060 [defendants met initial burden by attaching a copy of the purported arbitration agreement bearing employee’s electronic signature].) If Plaintiff submits sufficient evidence to create a factual dispute, the burden ships back onto Sprouts, who retains the ultimate burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, the authenticity of the signature.

In her opposition brief, Plaintiff emphasizes that the Agreement is undated and declares that she does not recall receiving the Agreement as part of her hiring process in 2012 or signing it. Plaintiff also declares that the signature on the Agreement does not resemble her own and that she does not recognize it. Plaintiff’s counsel adds that Sprout’s representative, Nancy LaMons, did not start working for Sprouts until 2014, and argues that this casts further doubt on Hartline’s assertion that the Agreement was given to Plaintiff as part of her onboarding process in 2012. (Astbury Decl., ¶¶ 6-7.) Plaintiff’s counsel also states that the Agreement was not produced in response to his request for Plaintiff’s personnel file; instead, a different 2-page document (also titled “Mutual Binding Arbitration Agreement”), dated April 24, 2012, was included. (Astbury Decl., ¶¶ 2-5; Ex. A.)

On reply, Sprouts argues that Plaintiff’s declaration that she does not recognize her signature is insufficient to create a factual dispute. Sprouts argues that whether Plaintiff can recall signing the Agreement is of no significance because her loss of memory has no impact on whether she actually signed the Agreement or that the signature on the Agreement is forged. The Court agrees and notes that Plaintiff does not unequivocally state under penalty of perjury that the signature on the Agreement is not hers; only that she does not recognize it. To the extent that Plaintiff asserts that the signature on the Agreement does not “resemble” her signature on her declaration, this is an opinion and the Court, as the finder of fact, disagrees with Plaintiff’s assessment.

And, even if Plaintiff sufficiently created a factual dispute as to the authenticity of her signature, Sprouts still meets its ultimate burden to establish an agreement to arbitrate by the preponderance of the evidence. In reply, Sprouts files a 92-page declaration with 7 exhibits consisting of 82 pages of documents from Plaintiff’s personnel file including corrective action forms, witness statements, vacation requests, job/pay change documents, missed punch forms, and performance evaluations. Many of these documents bear Plaintiff’s signature and the signatures on them are virtually identical to the one on the Agreement.

In light of the foregoing, Sprouts’ motion is GRANTED. The action is stayed until the completion of arbitration. The Court sets a status conference re: arbitration for _________ at 8:30 a.m. in Department 3 of the Alhambra Courthouse.

William A. Crowfoot

Judge of the Superior Court

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.