Judge: William A. Crowfoot, Case: 23AHCV01201, Date: 2024-11-15 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23AHCV01201    Hearing Date: November 15, 2024    Dept: 3

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - NORTHEAST DISTRICT

I.            INTRODUCTION

On May 30, 2023, plaintiff Renyong Dong (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against defendants City of Monterey Park (“Defendant”) and East West Bank alleging causes of action for negligence, premises liability, dangerous condition of public property, and public employee liability pursuant to Government Code section 840.2. Plaintiff alleges that on or about December 13, 2022, she tripped on an uneven walkway connecting the sidewalk to a parking lot. (Compl., ¶ 8.)

On June 30, 2023, Plaintiff dismissed the cause of action for public employee liability, leaving only the cause of action for dangerous condition of public property against Defendant.

On August 6, 2024, Defendant filed this motion for summary judgment/summary adjudication. The motion is unopposed.

II.          LEGAL STANDARD

In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, courts must apply a three-step analysis: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent’s claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue.” (Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.) A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) “Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) The plaintiff may not merely rely on allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists, but instead, “shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action.” (Ibid.) “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)

III.        DISCUSSION

To hold a public entity liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition, a plaintiff must prove (1) that the property was a dangerous condition at the time of the injury, (2) that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, (3) that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and (4) that either a negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition or the public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition and sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition. (Gov. Code, § 835.)

A condition is not a dangerous condition if, viewing the evidence most favorably to the plaintiff, the risk created by the condition was of such a minor, trivial or insignificant nature in view of the surrounding circumstances that no reasonable person would conclude that the condition created a substantial risk of injury when used with due care in a manner in which it was reasonably foreseeable that it would be used. (Gov. Code, § 830.2.) A claim alleging a dangerous condition of public property must “specify in what manner the condition constituted a dangerous condition” and “a plaintiff’s allegations, and ultimately the evidence, must establish a physical deficiency in the property itself.” (Mixon v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 124, 131.) “To establish a qualifying condition, the plaintiff must point to at least one ‘physical characteristic’ of the property.” (Cole v. Town of Los Gatos (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 749, 759.) A dangerous condition exists where the property is “physically damaged, deteriorated, or defective in such a way as to foreseeably endanger those using the property, or possesses a physical characteristic in its design, location, features or relationship to its surroundings that endanger users. (Mixon, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at p. 131.) The existence of a dangerous condition is ordinarily a question of fact but can be decided as a matter if law if reasonable minds can come to only one conclusion.  (Id. at p. 148.)

Here, Plaintiff alleges that on December 13, 2022, at approximately 3:00 p.m., she tripped and fell on an uneven brick area located at or near East West Bank at 228 West Garvey Ave., Monterey Park. (Defendant’s Undisputed Material Fact (“UMF”) No. 2.) On May 31, 2024, Plaintiff specified at her deposition the location where she fell by marking a photograph. (UMF Nos. 11-12.) On August 5, 2024, Defendant’s Public Works Manager, Christopher Reyes (“Reyes”), inspected the area marked, and measured and photographed the areas identified by Plaintiff at the time of her deposition. (UMF No. 13.) Reyes declares that the height differential in the areas marked by Plaintiff ranged from three-quarters of an inch to one-and-a-quarter-inch tall. (Index, Ex. L, ¶ 15.) Reyes also declares that there were no complaints or requests for repair of the sidewalk at 228 Garvey Avenue in the 10 years prior to Plaintiff’s incident. (Ex. L, ¶ 7.) The first notice received by Defendant about any alleged defect in the sidewalk was in February 2023 when Plaintiff served her tort claim. (Ex. L, ¶ 8.)

Given the size of the height differential between the sidewalk and the walkway where Plaintiff tripped, as well as the lack of other complaints or requests for repair on that block, Defendant has met its moving burden to show that Plaintiff cannot establish that a dangerous condition existed. (See Graves v. Roman (1952) 113 Cal.App.2d 584, 586 [difference in elevation between adjoining sections of sidewalk from one-fourth inch to one inch is minor and trivial].) Since Plaintiff did not oppose this motion, Plaintiff necessarily fails to raise a triable issue of material fact.

IV.    CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, the motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

Moving party to give notice. 

Dated this 15th day of November 2024

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter.  Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue.  If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.