Judge William A. Crowfoot, Case Number: 23AHCV01274, Date: 2024-04-12 Tentative Ruling

Judge: William A. Crowfoot, Case: 23AHCV01274, Date: 2024-04-12 Tentative Ruling

On December 20, 2023, Plaintiff Yawlin Candace Chen a.k.a. Candace Chen (“Plaintiff”) filed this application for default judgment. Plaintiff requests a permanent injunction as a remedy for her defamation claim against defendant Ly Mai Chau aka Chau Ly Mai (“Defendant”). Defendant, who was formerly Plaintiff’s sister-in-law, allegedly said that Plaintiff was illegally holding Defendant in Plaintiff’s residence and withholding the address of the residence from Defendant in order to isolate Defendant as if Plaintiff were a criminal kidnapper. (Compl., ¶ 14.) Defendant also allegedly stated that Plaintiff was forcing her to babysit and care for Plaintiff’s children as if Plaintiff were a criminal that perpetrated the illegal act of involuntary servitude. (Compl., ¶ 14.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant made these statements to Defendant’s aunt and uncle and that Defendant also “made libelous statements on her social media, via chat messages, and via text messages to others.” (Compl., ¶¶ 14-15.)

Plaintiff alleges that these statements were not true and that Defendant’s allegations were an attempt to claim abuse and obtain a green card without Plaintiff’s brother. (Compl., ¶¶ 16-17.) Defendant was allegedly given her own key to Plaintiff’s residence and entered and exited Plaintiff’s residence at will. (Compl., ¶ 16.) Defendant also used public transportation. (Ibid.) Defendant also owned a California Real ID that she kept in her own handbag which listed the address of Plaintiff’s address, and Plaintiff’s address was also on the mail and packages that were “routinely left out in the open where [Defendant] could see.” (Compl., ¶ 17.) Defendant also owned her own cell phone and table which she used daily, and had access to credit cards and cash. (Ibid.) Additionally, Plaintiff did not want Defendant to care for her children and declined Defendant’s requests to interact with her children until the eldest child was 1.5 years old. (Compl., ¶ 18.) Plaintiff also took precautionary steps to ensure that Defendant was never allowed to be lone with, feed, or bathe the children due to her concern for their safety. (Ibid.)

A defendant's failure to answer a complaint has the same effect as an express admission of the matters well pleaded in the complaint. (Steven M. Garber & Associates v. Eskandarian (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 813, 823) Because the default confesses those properly pleaded facts, plaintiff has no responsibility to provide the court with sufficient evidence to prove them—they are treated as true for purposes of obtaining a default judgment. (Ostling v. Loring (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1731, 1746). Here, Plaintiff asserts a claim for defamation. The elements of a defamation claim are (1) a publication that is (2) false, (3) defamatory, (4) unprivileged, and (5) has a natural tendency to injure or causes special damage. (See Wong v. Tai Jing (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1354, 1369.) Based on the allegations of the Complaint, and as set forth above, Plaintiff has adequately pleaded a claim for defamation. The Court proceeds to address her request for a permanent injunction.

The California Supreme Court has held that, following a trial at which it is determined that the defendant defamed the plaintiff, the court may issue an injunction prohibiting the defendant from repeating the statements determined to be defamatory. (Balboa Island Village Inn, Inc. v. Lemen (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1141, 1155–1156, as modified (Apr. 26, 2007).) However, Supreme Court also emphasized that any injunction must be narrowly drawn. Plaintiff’s proposed judgment is overly broad in that it orders Defendant to: (1) remove each and every defamatory statement published by her about [Plaintiff] on social media and from anywhere else they appear on the internet within 5 days after being served with this Judgment. The proposed judgment also states that Defendant “is further enjoined from publishing or causing to be published any defamatory statements of [Plaintiff].” (Proposed Judgment, p. 2.) Plaintiff fails to define what constitutes a “defamatory statement” in the proposed judgment (and any such definition would be limited to the statements alleged in the Complaint). Additionally, Plaintiff’s brief requests injunctive relief “prohibiting [Defendant] and her employees, partners, principals, agents, affiliates, co-conspirators, alter-egos, subsidiaries, aliases, and/or consultants of the other defendants from publishing or causing to be published any defamatory statements of [Plaintiff].” Like in Balboa Island, there is no evidence that anyone other than Defendant defamed Plaintiff, or that Defendant is likely to induce others to do so in the future. (See Balboa Island, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1160.) Therefore, any requested injunction must apply only to Defendant personally. Last, as the Supreme Court in Balboa Island specified, the proposed injunction must not prevent Defendant from presenting her grievances to government officials. (Id. at p. 1161.)

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s application for default judgment is DENIED without prejudice.

William A. Crowfoot

Judge of the Superior Court

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.