Judge William A. Crowfoot, Case Number: 23AHCV01408, Date: 2025-01-07 Tentative Ruling

Judge: William A. Crowfoot, Case: 23AHCV01408, Date: 2025-01-07 Tentative Ruling

On June 20, 2023, plaintiff Eddie A. Ochoa (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against defendant General Motors, LLC (“Defendant”). The operative Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) was filed on May 29, 2024. Plaintiff asserts claims for violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (“SBA”) as well as fraudulent concealment arising from his purchase of a 2019 Chevrolet Cruze (“Vehicle”) on or about March 1, 2019. Plaintiff alleges that the Vehicle suffers issues with the “engine and/or cooling system” (the “Cooling System Defect”) and that Defendant wrongfully failed to disclose the existence of the Cooling System Defect at the time of sale. (SAC, ¶ 8.) The Cooling System Defect results in “an engine coolant leak from the water pump, water pump weep reservoir, and/or water pump shaft seal” and will cause vehicles to “experience reduced cooling performance, engine overheating, coolant odor, reduced engine power, stalling, and/or total engine failure.” (SAC, ¶ 23.)

On July 24, 2024, Defendant filed a demurrer and motion to strike. Defendant demurs only to the Fifth Cause of Action for fraudulent concealment on the ground that it is time-barred and fails to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action. Defendant moves to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages.

A demurrer may be brought if insufficient facts are stated to support the cause of action asserted. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).) A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the pleadings and will be sustained only where the pleading is defective on its face. (City of Atascadero v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 445, 459.) “We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. We accept the factual allegations of the complaint as true and also consider matters which may be judicially noticed. [Citation.]” (Mitchell v. California Department of Public Health (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1000, 1007; Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 604 [“the facts alleged in the pleading are deemed to be true, however improbable they may be”].) Allegations are to be liberally construed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 452.) In construing the allegations, the court is to give effect to specific factual allegations that may modify or limit inconsistent general or conclusory allegations. (Financial Corporation of America v. Wilburn (1987) 189 Cal.App.3rd 764, 769.)

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1).) The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782 [“Matter in a pleading which is not essential to the claim is surplusage; probative facts are surplusage and may be stricken out or disregarded”].) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with California law, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (b).) An immaterial or irrelevant allegation is one that is not essential to the statement of a claim or defense; is neither pertinent to nor supported by an otherwise sufficient claim or defense; or a demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.10, subd. (b).) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437.)

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s fraud claim is barred by the 3-year statute of limitations because he bought the Vehicle on March 1, 2019, but did not file the complaint until June 20, 2023. Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot invoke the delayed discovery rule because he fails to plead facts showing that he was “not negligent in failing to make the discovery sooner”. (Demurrer, p. 5.)

The plaintiff bears the burden of pleading and proving belated discovery of a cause of action. (Investors Equity Life Holding Co. v. Schmidt (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1519, 1533.) More specifically, to overcome an apparent limitations bar on demurrer, the plaintiff claiming delayed discovery of the facts constituting the cause of action has the burden of setting forth pleaded facts to show “(1) the time and manner of discovery and (2) the inability to have made earlier discovery despite reasonable diligence. The burden is on the plaintiff to show diligence, and conclusory allegations will not withstand demurrer.” (Czajkowski v. Haskell & White, LLP (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 166, 174–175 [internal citations omitted].)

Here, Plaintiff only provides conclusory allegations regarding his discovery of Defendant’s alleged fraudulent concealment. Plaintiff alleges that “discovered Defendant’s wrongful conduct . . . shortly before the filling of the complaint, as the Vehicle continued to exhibit symptoms of the defects following Defendant’s unsuccessful attempts to repair them” on two occasions in June and July of 2020 (SAC ¶¶ 40-41, 44.) Plaintiff alleges that he continued to experience symptoms of the Vehicle’s defects after these unsuccessful attempts to repair the Vehicle, but he does not describe the continuing symptoms nor does he allege facts demonstrating the “time and manner” of his discovery; the word “shortly” is not meaningful. (SAC, ¶ 43.) Information regarding Plaintiff’s own discovery and determination of the true facts regarding the defective nature of the Vehicle is well within his own knowledge and therefore, Plaintiff cannot argue that this may only be determined through discovery. (See Opp., p. 4-5.)

Plaintiff also does not explain why he could not have discovered the alleged fraud earlier. He alleges that “Defendant (and its agents, representatives, officers, directors, employees, affiliates, and/or dealerships) concealed the Transmission Defect, minimized the scope, cause, and dangers of the Defect with inadequate TSBs and/or Recalls, and refused to investigate, address, and remedy the Defect as it pertains to all affected vehicles as set forth herein.” (SAC, ¶ 51.) Plaintiff additionally claims that “Defendant blamed the symptoms of the Transmission Defect on other issues and not the actual defect itself and purported to be able to repair the transmission.” (SAC, ¶ 52.) The references to a “Transmission Defect” appear to be in error, but even if the allegations correctly referred to the “Cooling Defect” at issue, they are too conclusory and do not include sufficient facts showing why Plaintiff could not have discovered the alleged fraud sooner with reasonable diligence.

As for Plaintiff’s reliance on the repair doctrine, class action tolling rule, or equitable tolling rule, Defendant argues, and the Court agrees, that they are also unavailing. The repair doctrine applies to toll the statute of limitations for Plaintiff’s claims which are based on warranty, not fraud. (Civ. Code, § 1793.1(a)(2).) The class action tolling period from August 11, 2014 to December 6, 2016, is wholly inapplicable where Plaintiff alleges he purchased his Vehicle on March 1, 2019 – long after that tolling period expired. Also, for purposes of equitable tolling, absent a fiduciary relationship, nondisclosure of essential facts is not fraudulent concealment of those facts and affirmative deceptive conduct is required. (Long v. Walt Disney Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 868, 874.) Plaintiff’s allegations are far too boilerplate and conclusory to establish any affirmative deceptive conduct. (SAC, ¶¶ 50-53.)

In light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that the Fifth Cause of Action for fraudulent concealment is time-barred. Defendant’s demurrer is SUSTAINED.

Defendant moves to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages on the ground that the SBA does not allow Plaintiff to recover both a civil penalty as well as punitive damages. Defendant cites to Troensegaard v. Silvercrest Industries, Inc. (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 218, 228, which rejected the plaintiff’s attempt to recover punitive damages could be recovered in addition to a civil penalty imposed under Civil Code section 1794(c) for willful violations of the SBA.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to plead both remedies in the Complaint. But Plaintiff only selectively quotes multiple cases which are inapposite or not binding. For instance, in Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1256, the court permitted the plaintiffs to seek punitive damages and statutory penalties for wiretapping and eavesdropping. In Brilliant v. Tiffin Motor Homes (2010 N.D. Cal.) 2010 WL 2721531, the district court did not hold that the SBA allowed for punitive damages, but instead noted that in another federal case, Romo v. FFG Insurance Company (C.D.Cal. 2005) 397 F.Supp.2d 1237, that the parties did not dispute that punitive damages were recoverable under the SBA. However, the Romo court only stated that the SBA’s civil penalties were analogous to punitive damages for purposes of determining whether the federal court had subject matter jurisdiction.

Given that Plaintiff has already been afforded leave to amend to address the statute of limitations, Defendant’s demurrer is SUSTAINED without leave to amend and Defendant’s motion to strike is GRANTED without leave to amend.

William A. Crowfoot

Judge of the Superior Court

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.