Judge William A. Crowfoot, Case Number: 23AHCV01423, Date: 2024-12-31 Tentative Ruling

Judge: William A. Crowfoot, Case: 23AHCV01423, Date: 2024-12-31 Tentative Ruling

On December 16, 2024, defendants AHMC Healthcare, Inc., AHMC Monterey Park Hospital LP, AHMC Garfield Medical Center LP, AHMC Greater El Monte Community Hospital LP, AHMC Anaheim Regional Medical Center LP, AHMC San Gabriel Valley Medical Center, AHMC Seton Medical Center LLC, and AHMC Whittier Hospital Medical Center LP (collectively, “Defendants”) applied ex parte for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and for an order to show cause regarding a preliminary injunction staying the arbitration in Chantall Ramirez v. AHMC Monterey Park Hospital LP, AAA Case No. 01-0003-6368 (“Ramirez Arbitration”), which pertains to the individual claims asserted by plaintiff Chantall Ramirez (“Plaintiff”) for violations of Labor Code sections 226, 226.7, 512, and Sections 11 and 12 of the Industrial Welfare Commission’s Wage Orders 4 and/or 5, and Plaintiff’s individual claim for civil penalties for violations of Labor Code sections 2698, et seq. (Fishman Decl., ¶ 4.)

Plaintiff opposes the ex parte application on the grounds that the arbitrator has sole authority to hear (and decide) the issue of a stay. (Opp., p. 2.) The mutual arbitration agreement, attached as Exhibit 1 to the Declaration of Jeffrey F. Bollinger, states that “any and all claims and disputes that arise out of or are related in any way to [Plaintiff’s] employment or the termination of [her] employment with AHMC” shall be submitted to “final and binding arbitration.” (Bollinger Decl., Ex. 1, p. 119.) “[F]inal and binding arbitration will be the sole and exclusive remedy for any claim or dispute against AHMC Healthcare Inc. or any of its affiliated hospitals, facilities, companies or entities, and any of their employees, officers, directors, Medical Staff, physicians or agents.” (Ibid.) There is no carve-out for seeking provisional remedies in a court of law.

In a supplemental brief, Defendants argue that the right to seek injunctive relief cannot be waived by an arbitration agreement. Defendants cite to McGill v. Citibank, N.A. (2017) 2 Cal.5th 945, but as Plaintiff points out in her supplemental brief, McGill is factually and procedurally inapposite because it addresses the nonwaivable “statutory right to seek public injunctive relief under the UCL, the CLRA, or the false advertising law.” McGill distinguished public injunctive relief from “[r]elief that has the primary purpose or effect of redressing or preventing injury to an individual plaintiff—or to a group of individuals similarly situated to the plaintiff.” (McGill, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 955.) Defendant also argues that Roberts v. Packard, Packard & Johnson (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 822, supports the proposition that the Court retains jurisdiction in this specific instance to provide injunctive relief. However, Roberts outlines “several specific instances” where jurisdiction may be exercised, such as when an arbitrator is not granted general law discovery powers, or where there is a need “for judicial assistance in moving the arbitration forward”, or when the party is dissatisfied with the award of the arbitrator. (Roberts, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at pp. 841-842.) In fact, in Roberts, the specific issue was the award of attorney fees. Additionally, Defendants’ citation to Labor Code section 2699(e)(1) is unavailing because it only establishes that the Court has the same discretion as the Labor and Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”) to award injunctive relief without any discussion of the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction to do so while arbitration is pending.

The Court agrees with Plaintiff’s assertion that while Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.8 applies to Defendants’ request for a TRO, Defendants have not shown that provisional relief is warranted. Section 1281.8 states that a party to a pending arbitration proceeding may apply to the court for a provisional remedy “only upon the ground that the award to which the applicant may be entitled may be rendered ineffectual without provisional relief.” Defendants have not shown that such grounds exist. Whether a stay is granted does not render “ineffectual” the relief that Defendants would obtain if they eventually prevail in arbitration. While Defendants would certainly incur costs in proceeding with the arbitration, Defendants do not provide any authority for their proposition that such costs rise to the level of irreparable harm justifying a TRO.

The ex parte application for a TRO and OSC re: preliminary injunction is DENIED.

William A. Crowfoot

Judge of the Superior Court

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.