Judge: William A. Crowfoot, Case: 23AHCV01436, Date: 2025-03-28 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23AHCV01436 Hearing Date: March 28, 2025 Dept: 3
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - NORTHEAST
DISTRICT
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Plaintiff(s), vs. CIAM
S.P.A., et al., Defendant(s). |
) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) |
[TENTATIVE]
ORDER RE: MOTION FOR DETERMINATION OF GOOD FAITH SETTLEMENT Dept.
3 8:30
a.m. March
28, 2025 |
I.
INTRODUCTION
On June 23, 2023, plaintiffs Jiandong
Wang and Xia Li (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), individually and as successors in
interest to Xu Wang (“Wang”) filed this action against defendants Ciam S.p.A.
(“CIAM”), AE Holdings, USA, LLC (“AE”), and Advanced Gourmet Equipment &
Design, LLC (“Advanced Gourmet”). Plaintiffs allege that Wang, a 25-year old
man, died from compression asphyxia caused by a defective refrigerated bakery
display case after his chest and body were caught between a motorized li and
stationary cabinet (“Product”). CIAM allegedly designed, manufactured, and sold
the display case and AE and Advanced Gourmet were CIAM’s authorized sellers of
the Product in the United States.
AE and Advanced Gourmet (collectively,
“Defendant Distributors”) have settled with Plaintiffs in exchange for their
policy limits of $6,000,000. The settlement is conditioned on a court’s
determination that it was made in good faith. Therefore, on February 24, 2025,
Defendant Distributors filed this motion for a determination of good faith
settlement.
CIAM filed an opposition brief on March
17, 2025.
Plaintiffs filed a reply brief on March
20, 2025.
Defendant Distributors filed a reply
brief on March 21, 2025.
II.
LEGAL
STANDARD.
If a settlement is made in good faith,
the Court “shall bar any other joint tortfeasor or co-obligor from any further
claims against the settling tortfeasor . . . for equitable comparative
contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative
negligence or comparative fault.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6, subd. (c).) “A
determination as to the good faith of a settlement, within the meaning of
section 877.6, necessarily requires the trial court to examine and weigh a
number of relevant factors, one of the most important of which is the settling
party’s proportionate liability. In making such examination, the court must
look at the state of the evidence as it exists at the time the motion for a
good faith determination is heard. [Citation.] If . . . there is no substantial
evidence to support a critical assumption as to the nature and extent of a
settling defendant’s liability, then a determination of good faith based upon
such assumption is an abuse of discretion.” (Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc.
v. Superior Court (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 864, 871; L.C. Rudd & Son,
Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 742, 750 [“It is the burden of
the settling parties to explain to the court and to all other parties the
evidentiary basis for any allocations and valuations made sufficient to
demonstrate that a reasonable allocation was made”].)
The non-settling tortfeasors or
obligors bear the burden of demonstrating the absence of good faith in the
settlement. (Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6, subd. (d).) To demonstrate a lack of
good faith, the non-settling party must show that the settlement is so far “out
of the ballpark” as to be inconsistent with the equitable objectives of Section
877.6. (Nutrition Now, Inc. v. Superior Court (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th
209, 213.) The Court will typically consider: (1) the plaintiff’s (roughly)
approximated total recovery; (2) the settlor’s share of liability; (3) the size
of the settlement at issue; (4) the distribution of settlement proceeds among
plaintiffs; (5) the usual discount value when plaintiffs settle before trial;
the settlor’s financial condition and insurance policy limits; and (6) whether
there is evidence of “collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the
interests of nonsettling defendants.” (Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde
& Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, 499.) These factors will be
evaluated accordingly to what information is available at the time of
settlement. (Ibid.)
III.
DISCUSSION
Defendant Distributors argue that the
standard for good faith has been met because the settlement amount of $6
million is reasonable in light of Plaintiffs’ potential total recovery and
Defendant Distributors’ proportionate liability. Defendant Distributors provide
the search results for verdicts and settlements relating to wrongful death and
products liability actions involving accidents with industrial machines,
particularly fatal crushing accidents; these results show potential recoveries
of $4.5 million to $30 million. Defendant Distributors argue that the policy
limits settlement of $6 million is not only within the ballpark of Plaintiffs’
potential recovery at trial, but also recognizes that they have no or little
liability. Defendant Distributors did not design, manufacture, install,
service, or provide instructions for the Product. (Motion, Hall Decl., ¶¶ A, 1,
4.) They merely sold it to Yu Cake Bakery and it was used daily for three
years. (Motion, pp. 15-17.) Accordingly, their liability is based entirely on
their status as sellers of the Product and there is no evidence for any basis
for separate liability on their part.
Defendant Distributors also argue that
there is no collusion or fraud and that the settlement was entered into good
faith after negotiations in an adversarial setting. (Motion, p. 18-19.) At the
time the settlement was reached, CIAM was the only known non-settling party and
efforts to arrange an early global mediation were unsuccessful when CIAM’s
insurance carrier, Groupama Assicuazioni S.p.A (“Groupama”), denied coverage to
CIAM. After mediation failed to go forward, Plaintiffs made a policy limits
demand and Defendant Distributors agreed to pay the policy limits of $6 million
after evaluating the following:
1.
Wang’s
documented promises to support Plaintiffs, including a lengthy poem in Chinese
with an English translation in which Wang expresses admiration for his father,
his desire to make his father proud of him, his duty to take care of the family,
and his resolution to go to college and study English to that end.
2.
The Chinese cultural tradition of filial piety
which expects children to care for and support their parents in old age.
3.
The
fact that Wang, born in 1997, was his parents' only child as a result of
China's one-child policy.
4.
Security
camera footage of Wang being slowly squeezed to death and collapsing to the
floor and descriptions of his discolored and marred flesh as described in
police and coroner reports.
5.
Photographs
of Wang's mother at his funeral in a state of extreme distress, being supported
and restrained by family members.
6.
The
Product was the only one of its type in North America and had been disposed of,
rendering it extremely difficult to defend CIAM’s design and manufacturing,
notwithstanding Defendant Distributor’s exposure to strict liability for the
alleged defects.
7.
Confidential
discussions with litigation consultants.
(Motion, pp. 10-11; Flaherty Decl., ¶¶ 4-11, 14.)
While
Defendant Distributors would be settling Plaintiffs’ claims, their
cross-complaint against CIAM and Groupama, as well as Yu Cake Bakery (Wang’s
employer and owner/operator of the Product), for indemnity and apportionment of
fault would proceed because Hanover Insurance Company, the insurance carrier
for Defendant Distributors, is subrogated to their claims in the amount.
In opposition, CIAM argues that
Defendant Distributors’ motion is defective because there is no evidence
supporting their contentions of no liability. CIAM also argues that Defendant
Distributors and Plaintiffs have colluded to impede its litigation goals
because CIAM attempted to remove the case to federal court but Defendant
Distributors supported Plaintiffs’ successful efforts to remand the case to
state court. CIAM emphasizes that this support for remand is “incredibly
unusual” because Defendant Distributors did not provide a reason opposing
removal. (Motion, p. 3.) CIAM also refers to a letter in which Defendant
Distributors’ counsel told Plaintiff’s counsel that they would “fully cooperate
and coordinate litigation efforts” and claims that Plaintiffs delayed serving
Defendant Distributors so that they could oppose CIAM’s attempts to remove the
action and cause CIAM to incur attorney fees.
(Motion, p. 12.) CIAM also claims that Defendant Distributors and
Plaintiffs have an agreement to divide any recovery from CIAM between them,
which improperly encourages continued litigation. CIAM also states that in
discovery, it determined that Hanover made the decision to settle the matter
and complains that Defendant Distributor’s person most knowledgeable only testified
that they were advised by their lawyers and insurance company that they “didn’t
have a chance of winning in California.” (Opp., p. 9.) CIAM further claims it
was denied information relevant to the Motion because Hanover refused to
produce documents and answer questions in deposition.
Both Plaintiffs and Defendant
Distributors filed replies addressing CIAM’s claims for collusion and lack of
good faith. First, they point out that liability for Defendant Distributors’ is
limited because courts have refused to impose strict liability on businesses in
the chain of production and marketing if the facts did not establish a
sufficient causative relationship or connection to satisfy the policies
underlying the strict liability doctrine. Second, they cite to the Cal-OSHA
Investigation Summary as the evidence that would be presented to describe
Wang’s injuries and conditions and considered in the settlement process. Third,
they emphasize that Plaintiffs’ policy demand was time-limited and there would
have been potential exposure if the offer was rejected and the policy was
opened. Fourth, Defendant Distributors state that Hanover, their insurance
company, has the power to settle the case pursuant to their insurance policy.
Fifth, Defendant Distributors claim that remand would have occurred even
without their support because CIAM did not explain their absence and did not
reach out before removing the case. Sixth, Defendant Distributors address the
purported stonewalling and emphasize that CIAM’s questioning and request for
productions violated the Code of Civil Procedure’s requirements for subpoenas
for personal records as well as the attorney-client privilege.
Ultimately,
CIAM fails to provide any evidence that a $6 million settlement amount is “out
of the ballpark” in light of the facts showing limited wrongdoing by Defendant
Distributors and the evidence of other similar verdicts and settlements. And,
as Plaintiffs point out, the defect in the Product was in its design because
the placement of the button which activates the motorized lid of the Product
was in a position where it was most likely to be accidentally triggered by
someone who had to lean into the case to clean it. (Plaintiff’s Reply, pp.
3-4.) Plaintiffs further argue that there were also no warnings of the crush
hazard posed by this product and a simple mechanical device that could have
incorporated into the design to prevent the lid from closing while someone was
cleaning it or a plastic cover to prevent the button from being accidentally
activated.
Last, there is no evidence of
collusion. Plaintiffs explain that their attorney asked CIAM’s counsel if the
policy limits would be tendered to be divided pursuant to their agreement to
make a joint policy limits demand and consequently “open” the policy. (Plaintiffs’
Reply, p. 9.) The discussion between Plaintiffs and Defendant Distributor’s
counsel regarding cooperation concerned “basic cooperation . . . for the
purpose of obtaining a finding of good faith settlement and supporting
[Defendant Distributors]’ ability to recover what was paid as a result of
CIAM’s refusal to participate in the settlement process.” (Defs.’ Reply, pp.
10-11.)
IV.
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, the motion
for determination of good faith settlement is GRANTED.
Moving party to give notice.
Dated
this 28th day of March 2025
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William A. Crowfoot Judge
of the Superior Court |
Parties who intend to submit on this
tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating
intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided
on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit
on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may
nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a
submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others
might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from
the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no
appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative
as the final order or place the motion off calendar.