Judge William A. Crowfoot, Case Number: 23AHCV01678, Date: 2024-03-05 Tentative Ruling

Judge: William A. Crowfoot, Case: 23AHCV01678, Date: 2024-03-05 Tentative Ruling

On July 24, 2023, plaintiffs Emilio Antonio and Zayra Santiago (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed this action against defendant General Motors LLC (“Defendant”). Plaintiffs allege that on February 27, 2021, they acquired a 2020 Chevrolet Bolt (the “Subject Vehicle”). (Compl., ¶¶ 7, 9.) Plaintiff alleges that the Subject Vehicle was represented as safe and functional for normal use which is false because “the batteries may ignite when they are either fully charged or fall below seventy (70) miles remaining mileage” and the car “cannot be parked inside overnight due to fire risk.” (Compl., ¶ 16.) In 2021, Defendant issued a recall notice for the Subject Vehicle stating that the vehicle’s charge should not exceed 90%, the battery should not fall below 70 miles remaining, and the vehicle should not be parked indoors overnight. (Compl., ¶ 18.)

On January 16, 2024, Defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings as to Plaintiffs’ Fourth and Fifth Cause of Action for fraudulent concealment and violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200 (“UCL claim”).

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 438, the court may grant a defendant’s motion for judgment on a pleading on several grounds, including the ground that the pleading “does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (c)(1)(B)(ii).) “The grounds for motion provided for in this section shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (d).) "The standard for granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings is essentially the same as that applicable to a general demurrer, that is, under the state of the pleadings, together with matters that may be judicially noticed, it appears that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Schabarum v. California Legislature (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1216.) The court treats the complaint as “admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Schonfeldt v. State of California (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1465.)

The elements of fraud are: (1) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (2) knowledge of falsity (scienter); (3) intent to defraud or induce reliance; (4) justifiable reliance; and (5) damages. (See Civil Code §1709.) “In California, fraud must be pled specifically; general and conclusory allegations do not suffice.” (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645.) “[E]very element of a cause of action for fraud must be alleged both factually and specifically[.]” (Cooper v. Equity Gen. Insurance (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 1252, 1262.) However, an exception exists, by which less specificity is required when, due to the nature of the allegations, the defendant possesses more facts of the fraudulent act than the plaintiff. (Committee On Children's Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 217.)

Here, Plaintiffs’ fraud claim is based on: (1) affirmative misrepresentations regarding the Subject Vehicle’s range capability as well as (2) concealment of facts relating to the mileage range and battery safety. With respect to Plaintiffs’ claim for affirmative misrepresentations of the Subject Vehicle’s range capability, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant affirmatively misrepresented that the Subject Vehicle was environmentally friendly and capable of long-range use, which was false because the lithium-ion battery caused the vehicle to overheat during prolonged use, resulting in a substantial reduction in the range capability of the vehicle. (Compl., ¶ 69.) With respect to Plaintiffs’ claim for fraudulent concealment, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant concealed the fact that the Bolt could not achieve its expected range of 259 miles and that Plaintiffs would only be able to charge the vehicle to 90% and use the vehicle only if the use did not exceed 70 miles remaining. (Compl., ¶ 75.)

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ claim for affirmative misrepresentation fails because they did not plead fraud with the requisite level of particularity. The Court agrees. Plaintiffs did not identify any specific GM employee or any interactions they had, the authority of that employee to speak on Defendant’s behalf, nor did they allege what representations were reviewed or relied upon by Plaintiffs, or to whom those representations were made. (Motion, p. 8.) Plaintiffs fail to allege facts supporting the allegation that Defendant intended to defraud Plaintiffs.

Defendant also argues that a misrepresentation cannot be based on an advertisement of EPA range estimates. Defendant relies on Gray v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. (9th Circ. 2014) 554 Fed. Appx. 608, 609, in which the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court’s dismissal of a complaint, stating that “California law does not recognize a cause of action for publicizing EPA fuel economy estimates and omitting explanation” and that the manufacturer had no duty to “disclose certain information known to it which conflicted with the EPA estimates.” However, the holding in Gray was limited because the plaintiff only asserted a UCL claim and a fraudulent concealment claim; it did not involve claims of affirmative misrepresentation; nevertheless, the theory of affirmative misrepresentation fails for lack of specificity as discussed above.

In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that the claim about the long-range capabilities of the Subject Vehicle were made independently of the EPA’s estimated mileage range and involves issues of safety due to representations about charging the battery to full capacity. (Opp., p. 2.) Moreover, Plaintiffs argue in their opposition brief that a claim for affirmative misrepresentation can be pleaded with particularity and that leave to amend should be granted. Plaintiffs argue that Defendant first became aware of issues with the battery in the Bolt vehicles in December 2016 and implemented a “Bolt EV High Voltage Battery Exchange and Internal Parts Process” to replace defective batteries. (Opp., p. 2.) Plaintiffs claim that Defendant became aware of a battery fire in March 2019 and in October 2019, its employee, Adam Piper, was made available to answer questions stating that the maximum range of the Bolt was available on a 100% charge despite knowing that charging the battery to full capacity posed a fire risk. (Opp., p. 2.) Plaintiffs contend that by August 2020, Defendant was aware of at least 12 fires involving the Bolt and in October 2020, the National Highway Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) opened an investigation into the Bolt. Plaintiffs argue that Defendant’s continued marketing of the Bolt as an affordable, safe, long-range vehicle, constituted affirmative misrepresentations.

However, Plaintiffs fail to show that they individually relied on those marketing statements or any specific affirmative misrepresentations, thus failing to show how amendment is possible. Plaintiffs only generally state that they relied on Defendant’s website and representations from the dealership, without identifying those particular representations. The Court also notes that Plaintiffs’ opposition brief refers to a letter received by “Plaintiff” from Defendant’s vice-president, Steve Hill, which promised “her” a replacement a battery and “duped” her into keeping the vehicle. (Opp., p. 3.) The next two paragraphs refer to “Plaintiff” in the singular and with “she/her” pronouns, even though there are two plaintiffs in this case. Therefore, it appears that this part of the brief does not address the facts of this particular case and the Court disregards this portion of the opposition brief.

Based on the foregoing, the motion for judgment on the pleadings with respect to the Fourth Cause of Action is GRANTED.

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs fail to identify any underlying statutory violation or unfair conduct. Plaintiffs do not address this argument and the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have conceded the matter. Accordingly, the motion for judgment on the pleadings on the Fifth Cause of Action is GRANTED.

Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted in its entirety without leave to amend.

William A. Crowfoot

Judge of the Superior Court

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.