Judge William A. Crowfoot, Case Number: 23AHCV01683, Date: 2024-04-15 Tentative Ruling

Judge: William A. Crowfoot, Case: 23AHCV01683, Date: 2024-04-15 Tentative Ruling

On July 24, 2023, plaintiff Shannon Huerta (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against defendants Los Angeles County Development Authority (“Defendant”) and Keandre Butler (“Butler”). On November 8, 2023, Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) asserting six causes of action relating to her employment with Defendant and subsequent resignation. These causes of action include gender discrimination, retaliation pursuant to the Fair Housing and Employment Act (“FEHA”), retaliation pursuant to Labor Code section 1102.5, sexual harassment and failure to prevent sexual harassment, and wrongful termination/constructive termination in violation of public policy and FEHA.

On December 12, 2023, Defendant filed this demurrer to Plaintiff’s Third Cause of Action for retaliation pursuant to Labor Code section 1102.5 and Plaintiff’s Sixth Cause of Action for wrongful termination/constructive termination in violation of public policy and FEHA. Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ claims are barred for failure to comply with the Government Claims Act. Defendant also argues that it is immune from a claim for wrongful/constructive termination in violation of public policy and FEHA as a government entity.

Defendant also moves to strike Plaintiff’s requests for punitive damages on the grounds that it is statutorily immune from punitive damages.

A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the pleadings and will be sustained only where the pleading is defective on its face. (City of Atascadero v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 445, 459.) “We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. We accept the factual allegations of the complaint as true and also consider matters which may be judicially noticed. [Citation.]” (Mitchell v. California Department of Public Health (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1000, 1007; Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 604 [“the facts alleged in the pleading are deemed to be true, however improbable they may be”].) Allegations are to be liberally construed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 452.) In construing the allegations, the court is to give effect to specific factual allegations that may modify or limit inconsistent general or conclusory allegations. (Financial Corporation of America v. Wilburn (1987) 189 Cal.App.3rd 764, 769.)

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1).) The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782 [“Matter in a pleading which is not essential to the claim is surplusage; probative facts are surplusage and may be stricken out or disregarded”].) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with California law, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (b).) An immaterial or irrelevant allegation is one that is not essential to the statement of a claim or defense; is neither pertinent to nor supported by an otherwise sufficient claim or defense; or a demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.10, subd. (b).) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437.)

Prior to filing a suit against a public entity, a plaintiff must comply with the Government Claims Act, which states, in part: “no suit for money or damages may be brought against a public entity on a cause of action for which a claim is required to be presented . . . until a written claim therefor has been presented to the public entity and has been acted upon by the board, or has been deemed to have been rejected by the board . . .” (Gov. Code, § 945.4.) The “failure to allege facts demonstrating or excusing compliance with the claim presentation requirement subjects a claim against a public entity to a demurrer for failure to state a cause of action.” (State of California v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1237.)

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claims are barred because she does not allege that she complied with the claim presentation requirements of the Government Claims Act. In opposition, Plaintiff states that she was not required to file such a claim and was only required to file a complaint with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing. Plaintiff cites to Garcia v. Los Angeles Unified School District (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 701 for this proposition but her reliance is misplaced. (Opp., p. 5.) The Garcia court held that only a claim brought under FEHA is exempt from the claim presentation requirements of the Government Claims Act. (Garcia, supra, 173 Cal.App.3d at p. 710-711.) The causes of action attacked by Defendant are not brought pursuant to FEHA; they are claims pursuant to Labor Code section 1102.5 and a common law claim for wrongful/constructive termination. Therefore, the Defendant’s grounds for demurring are sound. Plaintiff was required to allege compliance or reasons to be excused from the claims presentation requirement. For this reason, Defendant’s demurrer in its entirety is SUSTAINED.

The Court additionally expresses agreement with Defendant’s second argument against the Sixth Cause of Action, which is a common law claim. Government Code section 815 abolishes common law tort liability for public entities. (Miklosy v. Regents of the Univ. of California (2008) 44 Cal.4th 876, 899.) A claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy is also known as a Tameny claim. In Miklosy, the California Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs’ common law Tameny claims were invalid even if they were predicated on different statutes. (Miklosy, supra, 898-899.) The Supreme Court plainly stated that “[Government Code] section 715 bars Tameny actions against public entities.” (Id. at p. 900.) Therefore, the Miklosy plaintiffs were limited to the statutory claims.

Because the Court sustains the demurrer, Defendant’s motion to strike Plaintiff’s request for statutory penalties and interest is MOOT. Plaintiff only requests statutory penalties under her Third Cause of Action under Labor Code section 1102.5; this claim, as discussed above, is barred by her failure to comply with the Government Claims Act.

Defendant moves to strike Plaintiff’s reference to punitive damages. Plaintiff concedes that the claims of punitive damages are an oversight. Therefore, Defendant’s motion to strike the request for punitive damages is GRANTED.

Plaintiff requests leave to amend the FAC. However, the time to submit a claim expired a year after accrual of the claim. (Gov. Code, § 911.2.) Therefore, it does not appear that Plaintiff can successfully amend the allegations to plead compliance with the Government Claims Act. Also, as stated above, a public entity is immune from a common law claim for wrongful/constructive termination in violation of public policy. Therefore, Defendant’s demurrer is SUSTAINED in its entirety.

William A. Crowfoot

Judge of the Superior Court

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.