Judge: William A. Crowfoot, Case: 23AHCV01897, Date: 2024-01-04 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23AHCV01897    Hearing Date: January 4, 2024    Dept: 3

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - NORTHEAST DISTRICT

 

SHAINA SMITH,

                   Plaintiff(s),

          vs.

 

INTER-CON SECURITY SYSTEMS, INC.,

 

                   Defendant(s).

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     CASE NO.:  23AHCV01897

 

[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION

 

Dept. 3

8:30 a.m.

January 4, 2024

 

 

 

 

I.            INTRODUCTION

On August 21, 2023, plaintiff Shaina Smith (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against her former employer, defendant Inter-Con Security Systems (“Defendant”), alleging wrongful termination in violation of public policy, retaliation, various violations of the Labor Code, and unfair competition pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 17200.

On September 21, 2023, Defendant filed this motion to compel Plaintiff to arbitrate her claims, and to stay the action pending completion of arbitration.

II.          LEGAL STANDARD

When seeking to compel arbitration of a plaintiff’s claims, the defendant must allege the existence of an agreement to arbitrate. (Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 219.)  The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to prove the falsity of the agreement. (Ibid.) After the Court determines that an agreement to arbitrate exists, it then considers objections to its enforceability. (Ibid.) The Court must grant a petition to compel arbitration unless the defendant has waived the right to compel arbitration or if there are grounds to revoke the arbitration agreement. (Ibid.; Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2.) Under California law and the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), an arbitration agreement may be invalid based upon grounds applicable to any contract, including unconscionability, fraud, duress, and public policy. (Sanchez v. Western Pizza Enterprises, Inc. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 154, 165-166.)

III.        DISCUSSION

To meet its initial burden, Defendant attaches an arbitration agreement to the declaration of its assistant general counsel of litigation, Caitlin R. Johnson. The agreement states that arbitration will be used “as the sole and exclusive means to resolve all disputes that may arise out of or be related to [Plaintiff’s] employment, including but not limited to the termination of [her] employment and [her] compensation.” (Johnson Decl., Ex. 1, ¶ 1.) Defendant contends that Plaintiff electronically signed this agreement and the agreement attached to Johnson’s declaration is dated June 12, 2019.

Defendant also preemptively addresses any claim from Plaintiff that she does not recall signing an electronic agreement. Defendant’s assistant general counsel of litigation declares that she has working knowledge of the process by which candidates for employment apply for positions and complete their onboarding. (Johnson Decl., ¶ 8.) She states that Defendant uses a third party cloud-based service, Taleo, for employees to complete their onboarding and that employees set up accounts by creating a username and private password via Taleo’s secure website. (Johnson Decl., ¶ 9.) Defendant delivered the agreement to Plaintiff through the Taleo platform and Plaintiff subsequently logged into her password-protected account to review and electronically sign the agreement. (Johnson Decl., ¶ 10.) Taleo then created a unique “Esign ID” for the electronic signature and added a header to each page identifying Plaintiff’s name, the Esign ID, and date of signing. (Ibid.)

Plaintiff did not submit an opposition brief, but instead filed an untimely declaration in which she states that she was first hired to work as an onsite security guard on November 26, 2014. (Smith Decl., ¶ 2.) Plaintiff avers that she submitted a written job application and there was no mention of an arbitration clause in the job application. (Smith Decl., ¶¶ 3-4.) She states that she has no recollection or knowledge of ever signing the arbitration agreement, and that during her training, no one ever mentioned anything regarding an arbitration agreement. (Smith Decl., ¶¶ 4-9.) She also requests the Court deny the motion on the grounds that she was never given the opportunity to discuss or negotiate the arbitration agreement. (Smith Decl., ¶¶ 10-11.)

When a plaintiff does not recall signing or agreeing to an electronic agreement, the defendant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that an electronic signature or acceptance is authentic, i.e., that it was the act of the plaintiff. (Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Group, Inc. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836, 846.) “[A] party may establish that the electronic signature was ‘the act of the person’ by presenting evidence that a unique login and password known only to that person was required to affix the electronic signature, along with evidence detailing the procedures the person had to follow to electronically sign the document and the accompanying security precautions.” (Bannister v. Marinidence Opco, LLC (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 541, 545.)

The Court finds that the preponderance of the evidence shows that Plaintiff was the individual who signed the arbitration agreement. Although Plaintiff declares that she was hired in 2014, she alleges in her complaint that she was hired in or around June 2019, which corresponds with the date identified on the signed arbitration agreement, and Plaintiff does not explain the discrepancy between the allegation in her complaint and her subsequent declaration. (Compl., ¶ 16.)

Additionally, the Court finds no grounds for invalidating the agreement. Although Plaintiff implies that the agreement is unconscionable as a contract of adhesion, she does not claim that the arbitration agreement is substantively unconscionable. In order for an arbitration agreement to be unenforceable as unconscionable, both procedural and substantive unconscionability must be present. (Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 114.)

IV.         CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the motion to compel arbitration is GRANTED. The action is stayed pending the completion of arbitration. A status conference regarding arbitration is set for June 4, 2024 at 8:30 a.m. in Department 3 at Alhambra Courthouse.  Five court days before, the parties are to file a joint report regarding the status of arbitration.

Dated this 4th day of January, 2024

 

 

 

 

       William A. Crowfoot

Judge of the Superior Court

 

 

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.