Judge: William A. Crowfoot, Case: 23AHCV01897, Date: 2024-01-04 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23AHCV01897 Hearing Date: January 4, 2024 Dept: 3
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - NORTHEAST
DISTRICT
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Plaintiff(s), vs. Defendant(s). |
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[TENTATIVE]
ORDER RE: Dept.
3 January
4, 2024 |
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I.
INTRODUCTION
On August 21, 2023, plaintiff Shaina
Smith (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against her former employer, defendant
Inter-Con Security Systems (“Defendant”), alleging wrongful termination in
violation of public policy, retaliation, various violations of the Labor Code, and
unfair competition pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 17200.
On September 21, 2023, Defendant filed
this motion to compel Plaintiff to arbitrate her claims, and to stay the action
pending completion of arbitration.
II.
LEGAL
STANDARD
When
seeking to compel arbitration of a plaintiff’s claims, the defendant must
allege the existence of an agreement to arbitrate. (Condee v. Longwood
Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 219.) The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to
prove the falsity of the agreement. (Ibid.) After the Court determines
that an agreement to arbitrate exists, it then considers objections to its
enforceability. (Ibid.) The
Court must grant a petition to compel arbitration unless the defendant has
waived the right to compel arbitration or if there are grounds to revoke the
arbitration agreement. (Ibid.; Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2.) Under
California law and the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), an arbitration
agreement may be invalid based upon grounds applicable to any contract,
including unconscionability, fraud, duress, and public policy. (Sanchez v.
Western Pizza Enterprises, Inc. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 154, 165-166.)
III.
DISCUSSION
To meet its initial burden, Defendant
attaches an arbitration agreement to the declaration of its assistant general
counsel of litigation, Caitlin R. Johnson. The agreement states that
arbitration will be used “as the sole and exclusive means to resolve all
disputes that may arise out of or be related to [Plaintiff’s] employment,
including but not limited to the termination of [her] employment and [her]
compensation.” (Johnson Decl., Ex. 1, ¶ 1.) Defendant contends that Plaintiff
electronically signed this agreement and the agreement attached to Johnson’s
declaration is dated June 12, 2019.
Defendant also preemptively addresses
any claim from Plaintiff that she does not recall signing an electronic
agreement. Defendant’s assistant general counsel of litigation declares that
she has working knowledge of the process by which candidates for employment
apply for positions and complete their onboarding. (Johnson Decl., ¶ 8.) She
states that Defendant uses a third party cloud-based service, Taleo, for
employees to complete their onboarding and that employees set up accounts by
creating a username and private password via Taleo’s secure website. (Johnson
Decl., ¶ 9.) Defendant delivered the agreement to Plaintiff through the Taleo
platform and Plaintiff subsequently logged into her password-protected account
to review and electronically sign the agreement. (Johnson Decl., ¶ 10.) Taleo
then created a unique “Esign ID” for the electronic signature and added a
header to each page identifying Plaintiff’s name, the Esign ID, and date of
signing. (Ibid.)
Plaintiff did not submit an opposition
brief, but instead filed an untimely declaration in which she states that she
was first hired to work as an onsite security guard on November 26, 2014.
(Smith Decl., ¶ 2.) Plaintiff avers that she submitted a written job
application and there was no mention of an arbitration clause in the job
application. (Smith Decl., ¶¶ 3-4.) She states that she has no recollection or
knowledge of ever signing the arbitration agreement, and that during her
training, no one ever mentioned anything regarding an arbitration agreement.
(Smith Decl., ¶¶ 4-9.) She also requests the Court deny the motion on the
grounds that she was never given the opportunity to discuss or negotiate the
arbitration agreement. (Smith Decl., ¶¶ 10-11.)
When a plaintiff does not recall
signing or agreeing to an electronic agreement, the defendant has the burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that an electronic signature or
acceptance is authentic, i.e., that it was the act of the plaintiff. (Ruiz
v. Moss Bros. Auto Group, Inc. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836, 846.) “[A] party
may establish that the electronic signature was ‘the act of the person’ by
presenting evidence that a unique login and password known only to that person
was required to affix the electronic signature, along with evidence detailing
the procedures the person had to follow to electronically sign the document and
the accompanying security precautions.” (Bannister v. Marinidence Opco, LLC
(2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 541, 545.)
The Court finds that the preponderance
of the evidence shows that Plaintiff was the individual who signed the
arbitration agreement. Although Plaintiff declares that she was hired in 2014,
she alleges in her complaint that she was hired in or around June 2019, which
corresponds with the date identified on the signed arbitration agreement, and Plaintiff
does not explain the discrepancy between the allegation in her complaint and
her subsequent declaration. (Compl., ¶ 16.)
Additionally, the Court finds no
grounds for invalidating the agreement. Although Plaintiff implies that the
agreement is unconscionable as a contract of adhesion, she does not claim that
the arbitration agreement is substantively unconscionable. In order for an
arbitration agreement to be unenforceable as unconscionable, both procedural
and substantive unconscionability must be present. (Armendariz v. Foundation
Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 114.)
IV.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the motion to compel
arbitration is GRANTED. The action is stayed pending the completion of
arbitration. A status conference regarding arbitration is set for June 4, 2024
at 8:30 a.m. in Department 3 at Alhambra Courthouse. Five court days before, the parties are to
file a joint report regarding the status of arbitration.
Dated
this
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William A.
Crowfoot Judge of the Superior Court |
Parties who intend to submit on this
tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating
intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided
on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit
on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may
nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a
submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others
might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from
the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no
appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the
tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.