Judge: William A. Crowfoot, Case: 23AHCV02148, Date: 2023-11-08 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23AHCV02148    Hearing Date: November 8, 2023    Dept: 3

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - NORTHEAST DISTRICT

I.            INTRODUCTION

On September 15, 2023, plaintiff City of Temple City (“Plaintiff”) filed this complaint for injunctive and other equitable relief against defendant Guirong Chen (“Defendant”) asserting causes of action for public nuisance and public nuisance per se. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant is operating or allowing the operation of an unpermitted short-term rental at the property located at 6059 Golden West Avenue, Temple City, California 91780 (the “Property”). Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant has violated various other sections of the Temple City Municipal Code (“TCMC”) including, but not limited to, installation of artificial turf, unpermitted construction, and the planting of fig trees without prior approval. On October 12, 2023, Plaintiff filed this motion for a preliminary injunction enjoining Defendant and his agents, employees, servants, successors, or assigns, or anyone acting on his behalf or in concert with him, from: (1) using, occupying, or maintaining the Subject Property in a manner that violates the TCMC and (2) using, listing, renting, or advertising the Subject Property for short-term rental activity. Plaintiff further requests that Defendant, within 10 days of service of the preliminary injunction order, cancel all future reservations for the Subject Property as a short-term rental and remove all advertising, whether via the Internet or otherwise, of the Subject Property as a short-term rental. The motion is unopposed.

II.          LEGAL STANDARD

The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo pending final resolution upon a trial. (See Scaringe v. J.C.C. Enterprises, Inc. (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1536.) The status quo has been defined to mean the last actual peaceable, uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy. (14859 Moorpark Homeowner’s Assn. v. VRT Corp. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1396. 1402.) Preliminary injunctive relief requires the use of competent evidence to create a sufficient factual showing on the grounds for relief. (See, e.g., ReadyLink Healthcare v. Cotton (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1016; Ancora-Citronelle Corp. v. Green (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 146, 150.) The burden of proof is on the plaintiff as moving party. (O’Connell v. Superior Court (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1452, 1481.)  The decision to grant a preliminary injunction generally lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. (Thornton v. Carlson (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1249, 1255.)

A violation of a valid ordinance may be enjoined. (City of Stockton v. Frisbie & Latta (1928) 93 Cal.App. 277, 289–290; City of San Mateo v. Hardy (1944) 64 Cal.App.2d 794, 796; County of San Diego v. Carlstrom (1961) 196 Cal.App.2d 485, 491.) Where a governmental entity seeks to enjoin the alleged violation of an ordinance or statute that specifically provides for injunctive relief, the governmental entity need only establish that it is “reasonably probable” that it will prevail on the merits. (IT Corp. v. County of Imperial (1983) 35 Cal.3d 63, 71.) Once the governmental entity has done so, there is a rebuttable presumption that the potential harm to the public outweighs the potential harm to the defendant. (Id. at p. 72.) In other words, the Court must presume that the harm the plaintiff would suffer if the requested injunctive relief is denied outweighs any harm the defendant might suffer if the injunction is issued, unless the defendant can demonstrate grave or irreparable harm. (Ibid.)

III.        DISCUSSION

Plaintiff asserts causes of action for public nuisance and public nuisance per se. When a law expressly declares something to be a nuisance, the mere existence of that condition is a nuisance per se and no inquiry beyond its existence is necessary to establish the nuisance. (Beck Development Co. v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1206–1207; City of Costa Mesa v. Soffer (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 378, 382.) No proof of a harmful effect is necessary where the conditions violate a law. (See McClatchy v. Laguna Lands2 Ltd. (1917) 32 Cal.App. 718, 725). The declaration of Eric So, a building and code inspector employed by Plaintiff, includes photos of the various violations of the TCMC found on the Subject Property, screenshots of short-term rental listings on Airbnb, and copies of the multiple citations issued to Plaintiff for the foregoing violations. Based on the submitted evidence, Plaintiff has established that it is reasonably probable that it will prevail on the merits. Furthermore, as Defendant did not oppose the motion, Defendant has not shown that they will suffer grave irreparable harm. Accordingly, Plaintiff has met its burden to show that a preliminary injunction should issue.

IV.         CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction is granted.

Dated this 8th day of November, 2023

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.