Judge William A. Crowfoot, Case Number: 23AHCV02553, Date: 2024-11-15 Tentative Ruling

Judge: William A. Crowfoot, Case: 23AHCV02553, Date: 2024-11-15 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff Elizabeth Diaz Perez (“Plaintiff”) moves for an order compelling defendant American Honda Motor Co. (“Defendant”) to serve further responses to Requests for Production of Documents, Set Two, Nos. 1 through 78. Plaintiff alleges that on March 26, 2022, she purchased a 2022 Acura TLX (“Subject Vehicle”), which subsequently exhibited defects and nonconformities, including electrical, structural, transmission, and suspension system defects. (Compl., ¶¶ 8, 10.)

RFP Nos. 1, 7, and 8 demand documents relating to Defendant’s policies, procedures, guidelines, or documents used in determining whether a vehicle is eligible for a vehicle repurchase under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. Defendant has already provided a Code-compliant response because it states that it has made a diligent search and reasonable inquiry in an effort to comply with these requests and but that no responsive document have ever existed in their possession, custody, or control. Defendant states that determinations to repurchase or replace vehicles under the Act “are evaluated in good faith on a case-by-case basis.” The Court cannot compel Defendant to produce documents that do not exist. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to compel a further response to RFP Nos. 1, 7 and 8 is DENIED.

RFP No. 9 demands all documents reflecting Defendant’s plans, policies, procedures, programs, or measures, since 2011, for “achieving any of [its] warranty buyback reduction goals.” Defendant asserted various objections on the grounds of relevance and that Plaintiff fails to describe with reasonable particularity the documents or categories of documents sought. These objections lack merit because any documents, policies, and procedures related to Defendant’s obligations under the Song-Beverly Act are relevant to determining whether Defendant is subject to a civil penalty for willfully failing to repurchase or replace Plaintiff’s vehicle. Therefore, the motion is GRANTED as to RFP No. 9.

RFP No. 2 demands “All DOCUMENTS regarding the SUBJECT VEHICLE that are within [Defendant’s] Customer Relations Center.” Defendant objects to this demand as duplicative of Plaintiff’s RFP No. 1, to which it previously provided a response. Plaintiff does not address this argument. Accordingly, the motion to compel is DENIED as to RFP No. 2.

RFP No. 3 demands documents regarding “any service, warranty, and other DOCUMENTS that relate to, or may relate to, the alleged defect in the SUBJECT VEHICLE, that [Defendant] issued to any dealer, regional or zone offices, fleet purchasers, or other entities.” This request is overly broad and does not define the term “alleged defect”. It is also vaguely unintelligible as phrased. The motion is DENIED as to RFP No. 3.

RFP No. 4 requests Defendant’s recall policy and procedure but Plaintiff fails to establish good cause for the production of these documents as there are no facts showing that Defendant’s recall policies and procedure are at issue. The motion is DENIED as to RFP No. 4.

For RFP No. 5, Plaintiff demands all documents, including live telephone call records, audio records, tape recordings, voice messaging records, caller message recordings, digital voice recordings, interactive voice response unit (IVR/VRV) recordings, unified messaging files, and computer-based voice mail files between Defendant and its authorized dealers regarding the subject vehicle. Defendant states it is unable to comply with this request as no responsive documents have ever existed. As for Plaintiff’s request for telephone call recordings, Defendant states that even if they existed at one point, they have been discarded in the ordinary course of business and no longer exist. Therefore, the response is already Code-compliant and there is no further response needed. The motion is DENIED as to RFP No. 5.

RFP No. 6 requests Defendant’s document retention policy from 2011 to the present, including retention policies for electronic data communications. Defendant has already agreed to produce all responsive documents, including its document retention policy, in whole. Therefore, the motion is DENIED as to RFP No. 6.

Plaintiff claims that her RFP Nos. 10 through 32 pertain to Defendant´s internal investigations of the “Electrical Defects” exhibited in the subject vehicle. The term “Electrical Defects” is defined as “such defects which result in symptoms including: defects leading to battery replacement; defects resulting in defective master lighting control unit; defects requiring the replacement of master lighting control unit; defects causing front window to not respond to window switch; defects causing a defective master window switch; defects causing window switch to intermittently not send power through the switch; defects causing an inoperative puddle light; defects leading to driver’s side puddle light replacement; defects resulting interior lighting strip not illuminating; defects requiring master lighting control unit to be replaced; defects causing the fuel indicator to malfunction; defects causing A/C to not blow cold air; and/or other similar concerns identified in the repair history for the SUBJECT VEHICLE.”

Even if Plaintiff crafted this definition using Defendant’s repair orders, it exceeds the scope of the defects alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint, which are limited to an “inoperative driver side puddle light”, a light strip that would not turn on, and the driver’s and passenger’s side windows’ failure to respond when using the driver’s control switch. (Compl., ¶¶ 13-16.) There is no allegation about the battery or air conditioning.

Furthermore, in response to RFP Nos. 10 to 14, 16, 22-25, 27-30, 32, Defendant states that no responsive documents have ever existed. Plaintiff argues that this claim is disingenuous but provides no evidence for her assertion. (Reply, pp. 1-2.) Plaintiff claim that investigations are required before technical service bulletins are issued, but there is no evidence that any TSBs have been issue for Plaintiff’s alleged defects. Plaintiff also refers to an investigation opened by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, but that investigation concerns the “Forward Collision Avoidance System”, which is unrelated to any of the alleged defects with Plaintiff’s vehicle. Also, for RFP No. 18 and 19, Defendant has already agreed to produce TREAD warranty submissions. Therefore, the motion is DENIED as to RFP Nos. 10-14, 16, 18-19, 22-25, 27-30, and 32.

Next, documents relating to complaints from other customers or agencies, as sought in RFP Nos. 15, 17, 20, 21, and 26 are discoverable insofar as they are complaints about the same defects alleged by Plaintiff in her Complaint in vehicles of the same year, make, and model, sold in California. Therefore, a further response is ordered from Defendant for RFP Nos. 15, 17, 20-21, and 26, in accordance with those limitations. With respect to RFP No. 32, the Court will also order production of internal investigations and analyses of the alleged defects in vehicles of the same year, make, and model, which were sold in California. No emails need to be searched or produced.

Plaintiff’s RFP No. 31 is overbroad and unintelligible in requesting all documents “related to any electronic mail . . . .which in any way relate to ELECTRICAL DEFECTS in vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the Subject Vehicle.” The motion to compel is DENIED as to RFP No. 31.

RFP Nos. 33 through 55 relate to “STRUCTURAL DEFECTS”, which is defined as “defects which result in symptoms including: defects causing center console leather cover to wrinkle; defects leading to the replacement of the center console cover; defects requiring chips on passenger side rear door to be painted: and/or other similar concerns identified in the repair history for the SUBJECT VEHICLE.” Like Plaintiff’s definition of “Electrical Defect”, the term “Structural Defect” is far too broad and includes symptoms which were not alleged in her Complaint. Plaintiff only alleges that her Subject Vehicle “presented defects relating to cosmetic damage to the center console.” Therefore, defects relating to paint are irrelevant, as is Plaintiff’s “catch-all” term for “other similar concerns” identified in the Subject Vehicle’s repair history.

Defendant stated it was unable to comply with RFP Nos. 33 through 37, 39, 45-48, 50-53, and 55. No further response is required.

As for RFP Nos. 38, 40, 43, 44, 49, and 55, the Court reiterates that customer complaints, internal investigations, internal analyses, and reports are discoverable insofar as they are complaints about the same defects alleged by Plaintiff in her Complaint in vehicles of the same year, make, and model, sold in California. No emails need to be searched or produced.

The motion is DENIED as to RFP No. 54 because it is overbroad and unintelligible like RFP No. 31. The motion is also DENIED as to RFP Nos. 41 and 42 because Defendant has agreed to produce TREAD warranty submissions.

This last category of RFPs relate to “TRANSMISSION DEFECTS”, which is defined to include “defects causing a popping noise when placing the vehicle in reverse; defects causing clunking sound when shifting gears from park to reverse/drive; and/or other similar concerns identified in the repair history for the SUBJECT VEHICLE.”

The motion is DENIED as to RFP Nos. 55-60, 62, 68-71, 73-76, and 78. The motion is DENIED as to RFP No. 77 because it is overbroad and unintelligible like RFP Nos. 31 and 54. The motion is also DENIED as to RFP Nos. 64 and 65 because Defendant has agreed to produce TREAD warranty submissions.

As for RFP Nos. 61, 63, 66, 67, 72, the motion to compel a further response is GRANTED in part so that customer complaints, internal investigations, internal analyses, and reports are discoverable insofar as they are complaints about the same defects alleged by Plaintiff in her Complaint in vehicles of the same year, make, and model, sold in California. No emails need to be searched or produced.

Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED in part as to RFP Nos. 9,15, 17, 20-21, 26, 32 ,38, 40, 43-44, 49, 55, 61, 63, 66-67, and 72. The motion is otherwise denied. No sanctions are imposed.

William A. Crowfoot

Judge of the Superior Court

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.