Judge: William A. Crowfoot, Case: 23AHCV02620, Date: 2024-01-19 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23AHCV02620 Hearing Date: January 19, 2024 Dept: 3
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - NORTHEAST
DISTRICT
I.
INTRODUCTION
On November 8, 2023, plaintiff South
Goodyear Investment Corporation (“Plaintiff”) filed this unlawful detainer
action against defendant Karen Brandt dba Lulu Brandt (“Defendant”) in
connection with the premises located at 1 West California Boulevard, Suite #412
in Pasadena, California. On December 1, 2023, Defendant filed an answer.
On December 19, 2023, Plaintiff filed
an ex parte application for an order advancing the hearing date on a motion to
compel arbitration that Defendant served (but did not file) or, in the
alternative, deny the motion. The motion was not on file with the Court, but a
hearing was reserved for May 20, 2024.
On December 20, 2023, the Court granted
Plaintiff’s ex parte application and advanced the hearing from May 20, 2024 to
January 5, 2024, with any opposition brief to be filed before January 3, 2024.
The Court ordered the motion filed forthwith.
Defendant did not file the motion to
compel arbitration until January 4, 2024. On the same day, Plaintiff filed an
opposition brief to the motion to compel arbitration. Because the motion was
filed late, on January 5, 2024, the hearing was continued to January 19, 2024.
II.
LEGAL
STANDARD
In
deciding a motion to compel arbitration, trial courts must decide first whether
an enforceable arbitration agreement exists between the parties, and then
determine the second gateway issue whether the claims are covered within the
scope of the agreement. (Omar v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2004) 118
Cal.App.4th 955, 961.) The party seeking arbitration has the “burden of proving
the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by a preponderance of the
evidence, while a party opposing the petition bears the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence any fact necessary to its defense.” (Ruiz v.
Moss Bros. Auto Group, Inc. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836, 842.) The trial
court “sits as the trier of fact, weighing all the affidavits, declarations,
and other documentary evidence, and any oral testimony the court may receive at
its discretion, to reach a final determination.” (Id.) General
principles of contract law govern whether parties have entered a binding
agreement to arbitrate. (Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market
Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236; see also Winter v.
Window Fashions Professions, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 943, 947.)¿
III.
DISCUSSION
The operative lease includes an
arbitration agreement as an addendum, but notably explicitly excludes several
disputes from the scope of arbitration, including, “[c]laims relating to (a)
[Plaintiff]’s exercise of any unlawful detainer rights pursuant to applicable
law or (b) rights or remedies used by [Plaintiff] to gain possession of the
Premises or terminate [Defendant]’s right of possession to the Premises, all of
which disputes shall be resolved by suit filed in the applicable court of
jurisdiction, the decision of which court shall be subject to appeal pursuant
to applicable law.” (Lease, p. 17
Defendant argues that this unlawful
detainer action is subject to arbitration because the complaint seeks damages.
Defendant argues that possession cannot be at issue because she is not in
possession of the property, but it is Brandt & Winston Inc. that is in
possession, and, therefore, the claim for damages must be arbitrated.
In opposition, Plaintiff argues that
this action is specifically excluded from the scope of the arbitration agreement
because Plaintiff is exercising its unlawful detainer rights by seeking
possession and a monetary judgment for failure to pay rent.
By arguing that possession is not at
issue, Defendant is challenging the merits of the unlawful detainer action. However,
not only does Defendant fail to submit any evidence to support this assertion,
but the merits of the unlawful detainer are irrelevant to this motion, which only
examines whether this complaint presents a dispute which is arbitrable. The
dispute, regardless of whether it has merit, is an unlawful detainer action. (See
Briggs v. Electronic Memories & Magnetics Corp. (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d
900, 906 [an unlawful detainer will not lie against a defendant who is not in
possession of the premises at commencement of the lawsuit].) Moreover, Plaintiff’s
request for damages does not bring this unlawful detainer action within the
scope of the arbitration agreement because the unlawful detainer statute allows
for the assessment of damages, including the amount of rent due “if the alleged
unlawful detainer be after default in the payment of rent.” (Code Civ. Proc., §
1174, subd. (b).) Also, any attorneys’ fees incurred with this unlawful
detainer action would relate to Plaintiff’s exercise of its unlawful detainer
rights and therefore, is not subject to arbitration.
Accordingly, the Court finds that this
unlawful detainer action falls outside the scope of the arbitration agreement.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s
motion to compel arbitration is DENIED.
Dated this
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William A. Crowfoot Judge of the Superior Court |
Parties who intend to submit on this
tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating
intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided
on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit
on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may
nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a
submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others
might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from
the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no
appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the
tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.