Judge William A. Crowfoot, Case Number: 23AHCV02781, Date: 2024-08-14 Tentative Ruling

Judge: William A. Crowfoot, Case: 23AHCV02781, Date: 2024-08-14 Tentative Ruling

On November 30, 2023, plaintiff Danny Martinez (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against defendants Ming C. Peng (“Peng”) and City of San Marino (“Defendant”). Plaintiff asserts a cause of action for negligence and alleges that on or about November 16, 2022, he was involved in an automobile collision when Peng failed to stop at an intermittent flashing red light. (Compl., ¶ 10.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to maintain the traffic light and is liable under Government Code sections 815.2(a), 815.6, 820, and 830.8. (Compl., ¶¶ 13-16.)

A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the pleadings and will be sustained only where the pleading is defective on its face. (City of Atascadero v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 445, 459.) A demurrer may be brought if insufficient facts are stated to support the cause of action asserted. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).) “We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. We accept the factual allegations of the complaint as true and also consider matters which may be judicially noticed. [Citation.]” (Mitchell v. California Department of Public Health (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1000, 1007; Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 604 [“the facts alleged in the pleading are deemed to be true, however improbable they may be”].) Allegations are to be liberally construed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 452.) In construing the allegations, the court is to give effect to specific factual allegations that may modify or limit inconsistent general or conclusory allegations. (Financial Corporation of America v. Wilburn (1987) 189 Cal.App.3rd 764, 769.)

Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to state sufficient facts establishing a claim for negligence because none of the statutes cited in the Complaint provide a basis for liability. First, Defendant argues that Government Code sections 815.2(a) and 820, which provide that a public entity is vicariously liable for an act or omission of its employee (who is liable to the same extent as that of a private person except as otherwise provided by statute), are inapplicable because public employees cannot be held personally liable for an alleged dangerous condition of public property. (Gov. Code, § 840.) Government Code section 815.6 is also not an appropriate basis for liability because Plaintiff identifies no mandatory duty that Defendant allegedly failed to discharge. Last, Plaintiff’s citation to Government Code section 830.8 fails to establish a basis for liability. Government Code section 830.8 provides immunity to a public entity for the failure to provide traffic or warning signals, signs, makings, or devices “unless such were required to warn of a known dangerous condition, which would not be reasonably apparent to, and would not have been anticipated by a person exercising due care.” Plaintiff does not allege facts identifying a dangerous condition because Government Code section 830.4 states that a condition is not dangerous due to the public entity’s failure to provide traffic control signals, stop signs, or other signs or roadway markings. Additionally, in Chowdhury v. City of Los Angeles (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1187, the court held that a traffic signal rendered inoperable by a power outage does not constitute a dangerous condition because motorists are required to treat an inoperative signal as a four-way stop pursuant to Vehicle Code section 21800, and four-way stops are not dangerous when used with due care by the general public.

The Court notes that Plaintiff argues in opposition that the intersection was also confusing because there were six different ways to enter it. However, this allegation is not included in the complaint, nor does Plaintiff allege that he was confused. Accordingly, Defendant’s demurrer is sustained.

William A. Crowfoot

Judge of the Superior Court

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.