Judge: William A. Crowfoot, Case: 23GDCV01391, Date: 2023-11-13 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23GDCV01391    Hearing Date: November 13, 2023    Dept: 3

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - NORTHEAST DISTRICT

 

LIDA ZOHRABIANS, by and through her Successor-in-Interest, NAHID MINASKANIAN, et al.,

                   Plaintiff(s),

          vs.

 

CENTRAL CONVALESCENT HOSPITAL OF GLENDALE INC. dba CHANDLER CONVALESCENT, et al.,

 

                   Defendant(s).

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     CASE NO.:  23GDCV01391

 

[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION

 

Dept. 3

8:30 a.m.

November 13, 2023

 

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I.            INTRODUCTION

On July 5, 2023, this action was filed by Anahid Minaskanian (“Plaintiff”), individually, and as successor-in-interest to Lida Zohrabians (“Zohrabians”), against Central Convalescent Hospital of Glendale Inc. dba Chandler Convalescent Hospital (“CCH”) (erroneously sued as “Central Convalescent Hospital of Glendale Inc. dba Chandler Convalescent Hospital – Glendale” and “Chestnut Ridge Post Acute LLC dba Chandler Convalescent Hospital – Glendale”), and Renew Health Consulting Services, LLC (“Renew Health”). Vartan Vartanians and Mary Boudaghians were named as nominal defendants. Plaintiff asserts causes of action for elder abuse and neglect, violation of Health & Safety Code section 1430(b), negligence, and wrongful death.

On August 11, 2023, CCH and Renew Health (collectively, “Defendants”) filed this petition to compel arbitration and stay action.

Plaintiff filed an opposition brief and objection on October 30, 2023.

Defendants filed a reply brief on November 3, 2023.

II.          LEGAL STANDARD

In deciding a motion to compel arbitration, trial courts must decide first whether an enforceable arbitration agreement exists between the parties, and then determine the second gateway issue whether the claims are covered within the scope of the agreement. (Omar v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 955, 961.) The party seeking arbitration has the “burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by a preponderance of the evidence, while a party opposing the petition bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence any fact necessary to its defense.” (Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Group, Inc. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836, 842.) The trial court “sits as the trier of fact, weighing all the affidavits, declarations, and other documentary evidence, and any oral testimony the court may receive at its discretion, to reach a final determination.” (Id.) General principles of contract law govern whether parties have entered a binding agreement to arbitrate. (Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236; see also Winter v. Window Fashions Professions, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 943, 947.)¿

III.        DISCUSSION

A.   Evidentiary Objections

Plaintiff objects to Exhibits A and B to the Declaration of Denise A. Isfeld on the grounds that they lack foundation, call for legal conclusions, and are improper opinions. Exhibit A is a copy of the arbitration agreement and Exhibit B is a copy of the Physician’s Orders for Life Sustaining Treatment (“POLST”) from Zohrabian’s records. The objection to Exhibit A is overruled. “For purposes of a petition to compel arbitration, it is not necessary to follow the normal procedures of document authentication.” (Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 218. “A plain reading of the statute indicates that as a preliminary matter the court is only required to make a finding of the agreement's existence, not an evidentiary determination of its validity.” (Id. at p. 219.) “Once the petitioners had alleged that the agreement exists, the burden shifted to respondents to prove the falsity of the purported agreement.” (Ibid.)

The POLST, however, is not an arbitration agreement. Therefore, the objection on the grounds that the document lacks foundation is sustained.  

B.   Whether a Valid Arbitration Agreement Exists

“The party seeking to compel arbitration bears the burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement.” (Flores v. Evergreen at San Diego, LLC (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 581, 586 .) Here, Defendants argue that Zohrabian’s daughter, Mary Boudaghians (“Boudaghians”) signed an arbitration agreement on Zohrabian’s behalf. The agreement, attached as Exhibit to defense counsel’s declaration, states that it is to be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) and encompasses “any dispute” between Zohrabian and CCH or ReNew Health, including “any action for injury or death arising from negligence, intentional tort and/or statutory causes of action (including all California Welfare and Institutions Code sections and Health and Safety Code section 1430).” The agreement is also “binding on all parties, including [Zohrabian]’s representatives, executors, family members, and heirs who bring any claim individually or in a representative capacity.” Based on this language, the claims asserted by Plaintiff, either on her own behalf as Zohrabian’s heir or on behalf of Zohrabian in a representative capacity, fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement.  

Defendants argue that Zohrabian is bound to the arbitration agreement that Boudaghians signed because Boudaghians also signed Zohrabian’s POLST and represented that she was Zohrabian’s “legally recognized decisionmaker.” Defendants argue that “[i]t would be counter intuitive to contend that [Boudaghians] had the power to decide if [Zohrabian] lived or died but not the power to execute an Arbitration Agreement on [Zohrabian]’s behalf.” (Motion, p. 7.) However, this contention was expressly rejected by the Second Appellate District in Logan v. Country Oaks Partners, LLC (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 365. In Logan, the court of appeals distinguished between the authority granted to an individual through an advance directive and the authority to execute optional arbitration agreements, such as the one at issue in this case. (Logan, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 375; Motion, Ifeld Decl., Ex. A, p. 1.) Furthermore, it is well-settled that conduct by an agent alone is not sufficient to establish agency; rather, both words and conduct by principal and agent are necessary to create an agency relationship. (See Flores, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at pp. 587-588 [“an agency cannot be created by the conduct of the agent alone; rather conduct by the principal is essential to create the agency”].) Defendants provide no evidence of any conduct by Zohrabians to demonstrate that Boudaghians was her actual or ostensible agent. The POLST is inadmissible for the reasons stated above, but even if it were admissible, it alone is not proof that Boudaghians was actually Zohrabian’s “legally recognized decisionmaker.”

Based on the foregoing, Defendants fail to allege the existence of an enforceable arbitration agreement.

IV.         CONCLUSION

Defendants’ petition to compel arbitration is DENIED.

Dated this 13th day of November, 2023

 

 

 

 

       William A. Crowfoot

Judge of the Superior Court

 

 

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.