Judge William A. Crowfoot, Case Number: 23PDUD02994, Date: 2024-07-02 Tentative Ruling

Judge: William A. Crowfoot, Case: 23PDUD02994, Date: 2024-07-02 Tentative Ruling

This unlawful detainer action was filed on August 23, 2023. Defendant Jaydon Douglas Paull (“Defendant”) moves for an order imposing sanctions against Plaintiff Hrayr Brian Der Vartanian (“Plaintiff”) and Plaintiff’s counsel, Dennis P. Block (“Mr. Block”), pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure §§ 128.5 and 128.7. Defendant also requests the Court order the Complaint withdrawn or stricken and dismiss the action with prejudice with a judgment of dismissal in Defendant’s favor.

“A trial court may order a party, the party’s attorney, or both, to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred by another party as a result of actions or tactics, made in bad faith, that are frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 128.5, subd. (a).) The term “frivolous” is defined as “totally and completely without merit or for the sole purpose of harassing an opposing party.” (Id., subd. (b)(2).) If warranted, the court may award to the party prevailing on the motion the reasonable expenses and attorney’s fees incurred in presenting or opposing the motion. (Id., subd. (f)(1)(C).) “In determining what sanctions, if any, should be ordered, the court shall consider whether a party seeking sanctions has exercised due diligence.” (Id., subd. (f)(1).)

“Every pleading, petition, written notice of motion, or other similar paper shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney’s individual name, or, if the party is not represented by an attorney, shall be signed by the party. Each paper shall state the signer’s address and telephone number, if any. Except when otherwise provided by law, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. An unsigned paper shall be stricken unless omission of the signature is corrected promptly after being called to the attention of the attorney or party.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 128.7, subd. (a).)

“By presenting to the court, whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating, a pleading, petition, written notice of motion, or other similar paper, an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances, all of the following conditions are met:

(1) It is not being presented primarily for an improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.

(2) The claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law.

(3) The allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery.

(4) The denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or belief.

If the court determines that subdivision (b) has been violated, the court may “impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties that have violated subdivision (b) or are responsible for the violation. In determining what sanctions, if any, should be ordered, the court shall consider whether a party seeking sanctions has exercised due diligence.” (Id., subd. (c).)

Defendant seeks sanctions for Plaintiff’s repeated attempts to evict him from 631 Caleb Street, Glendale, 91202 (the “Property”). Defendant emphasizes that the present unlawful detainer action is the fifth one brought by Plaintiff, who dismissed all four prior actions voluntarily.

First, Defendant argues that this most recent unlawful detainer action is legally baseless because Plaintiff asserts that the Property is exempt from the Tenant Protection Act of 2019 (“TPA”) even though the Court previously held that the TPA applied and the notice of exemption had to have been provided by August 1, 2020. This argument is unpersuasive because the eviction is based on “no-fault just cause” due to an intent to substantially remodel the Property. Therefore, although the Complaint alleges that the Property is exempt from the TPA, the notice underlying the unlawful detainer cites to the TPA’s definition of just cause as a basis for eviction and the claim of exemption is irrelevant.

Second, as evidence of bad faith, Defendant points out that the Complaint was verified by Plaintiff in late July 2023 but never signed by counsel, who filed it in August. Defendant contends that Plaintiff brought this action in retaliation only after Defendant moved to recover costs from Plaintiff’s prior unlawful detainer action in Case No. 22PDUD01479. This evidence is unpersuasive. A review of the docket from this earlier case shows that Defendant filed a memorandum of costs on March 23, 2023, and that Plaintiff filed a motion to tax costs on April 10, 2023, which predates the filing of the complaint in this action by several months.

Rather, Defendant’s strongest arguments in favor for sanctions and a finding of bad faith are premised on the lack of any legal or factual basis for this action. Defendant points out that “simple, key facts such as the amount of rent agreed upon are wrong.” Defendant additionally argues that the Complaint is totally without merit and “lacks an evidentiary factual basis” because he denies ever receiving the 60-day Notice, and notice is a requisite element for an unlawful detainer. Defendant also argues that any intent to commence substantial remodeling is disingenuous because Defendant has made numerous complaints over the years regarding repairs which Plaintiff has ignored.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the TPA and TPR are irrelevant because under the City of Glendale’s eviction ordinances, intent to undertake a substantial remodel is a legitimate basis for a no-fault just cause eviction. However, this argument is unavailing because the Complaint did not indicate that the Property was subject to those ordinances nor does the Notice that was served reference them. The Court additionally notes that if Plaintiff was intending to argue that Glendale’s ordinance applied, the notice provided to Defendant was defective because it did not include “the permit to demolish the unit or the permit for capital improvements, along with any construction estimates and schedule for performing the work” as required by section 9.30.031 of the Glendale Municipal Code.

Critically, even if no-fault just cause evictions are permitted under either the TPA or Glendale’s eviction ordinances for substantial remodeling, Plaintiff submits no evidence supporting his purported intent to commence substantial repairs, nor does he provide any evidence that those repairs would require Defendant to leave the property for more than 30 or 45 days.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that sanctions are warranted and imposed upon Plaintiff pursuant to section 128.7 for this factually frivolous complaint. However, although sanctions are warranted against Plaintiff, it is unclear what the appropriate amount of sanctions would be. Defendant does not substantiate the reasonableness of the $33,250 in attorneys’ fees incurred, other than to say that defense counsel has expended 95 hours litigating the action. There is no breakdown of how much time was spent on any particular task or phase of litigation and the Court cannot determine whether those 95 hours were reasonable. Therefore, the Court continues the hearing on sanctions so that defense counsel may submit a supplemental declaration explaining why the amount of attorneys’ fees requested is reasonable.

Sanctions are not imposed against Plaintiff’s counsel, Mr. Block. Plaintiff cites to Primo Hospitality Group, Inc. v. Haney (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 165, in which the court refused to impose sanctions on an attorney who did not present the complaint to the court before the sanctions motion was served, but merely substituted in afterwards. (Id., p. 175.) Like in Primo Hospitality, Defendant contends that the complaint was filed for an improper purpose. However, Mr. Block did not file the complaint. Although the party seeking sanctions in Primo Hospitality claimed that opposing counsel “certified the merit of the case every time [the attorney] filed a paper or appeared for plaintiffs and spoke to the court,” the Primo Hospitality court disagreed. (Primo Hospitality, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 172.) The court also noted that the motion for sanctions did not specify conduct taken by opposing counsel but was premised entirely on the filing of the complaint. Here too, Defendant’s motion for sanctions only describes the initiation of this action as the conduct deserving of sanctions.

Last, the Court strikes the Complaint. Under section 128.7, “[a]n unsigned paper shall be stricken unless omission of the signature is corrected promptly after being called to the attention of the attorney or party.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 128.7, subd. (a).) This fact was called to the attention of Plaintiff and Mr. Block in October 2023 but has not yet been remedied.

The Complaint is deemed stricken and the hearing on this motion for sanctions is CONTINUED to ________. Defendant is submit a supplemental declaration substantiating the requested amount in sanctions.

Because the Complaint is stricken, the summary judgment motion is MOOT and taken off calendar.

William A. Crowfoot

Judge of the Superior Court

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.