Judge: William A. Crowfoot, Case: 24AHCV00042, Date: 2024-08-02 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24AHCV00042 Hearing Date: August 2, 2024 Dept: 3
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - NORTHEAST
DISTRICT
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Plaintiff(s), vs. Defendant(s). |
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[TENTATIVE]
ORDER RE: Dept.
3 August
2, 2024 |
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I.
INTRODUCTION
On
On
Plaintiffs filed an opposition brief on
June 17, 2024.
Defendants filed a reply brief on
II.
LEGAL
STANDARD
In deciding a motion to compel
arbitration, trial courts must decide first whether an enforceable arbitration
agreement exists between the parties, and then determine the second gateway
issue whether the claims are covered within the scope of the agreement. (Omar
v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 955, 961.) The party seeking
arbitration has the “burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration
agreement by a preponderance of the evidence, while a party opposing the
petition bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence any
fact necessary to its defense.” (Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Group, Inc.
(2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836, 842.) The trial court “sits as the trier of fact,
weighing all the affidavits, declarations, and other documentary evidence, and
any oral testimony the court may receive at its discretion, to reach a final
determination.” (Id.) General principles of contract law govern whether
parties have entered a binding agreement to arbitrate. (Pinnacle Museum
Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223,
236; see also Winter v. Window Fashions Professions, Inc. (2008) 166
Cal.App.4th 943, 947.)¿
III.
DISCUSSION
“The
party seeking to compel arbitration bears the burden of proving the existence
of a valid arbitration agreement.” (Flores v. Evergreen at San Diego, LLC
(2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 581, 586.) Defendant attaches a copy of an Arbitration
Agreement signed by Simons as Exhibit A to its motion. The Arbitration
Agreement requires Mulkey to arbitrate any dispute “as to medical malpractice
(that is, whether medical services rendered under this contract were necessary
or unauthorized or were improperly, negligently or incompetently rendered).” However,
the arbitration agreement also explicitly excludes a plaintiff’s ability to sue
for violations of the California Resident’s Bill of Rights contained in Title
22, section 72527. Therefore, only Mulkey’s first and second causes of action
for elder abuse and negligence are subject to arbitration. The third cause of
action for violation of Health & Safety Code section 1430 is not subject to
arbitration.
In opposition, Plaintiffs rely on Avila v. Southern California Specialty Care,
Inc. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 835 and argue that even if Mulkey is a party to
the Arbitration Agreement, the Heirs’ wrongful death claims, insofar as they
are premised on elder abuse, are not subject to arbitration. Plaintiffs also argue
that the Court should exercise its discretion and refuse to enforce the
Arbitration Agreement pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2 (c) because
allowing the Heirs’ wrongful death claims to proceed in court against Defendant
while Mulkey’s claims are decided in arbitration would result in conflicting
rulings of law and fact.
Plaintiffs’ arguments are incorrect for
three reasons. First, in Ruiz v. Podolsky
(2010) 50 Cal.4th 838, 849, the California Supreme Court held that Code of
Civil Procedure section 1295 allows a patient to bind their nonsignatory heirs so
that the heirs are required to arbitrate wrongful death claims premised on
medical malpractice. Second, the Second Appellate District recently held in Holland v. Silverscreen Healthcare, Inc. (2024)
101 Cal.App.5th 1125, 1134, that an heir cannot bring their own wrongful death claim
for elder abuse because such a claim belongs solely to the decedent or the
decedent’s estate. Therefore, the Heirs’ wrongful death claims are necessarily
premised on professional negligence and subject to arbitration under Ruiz. Although Plaintiffs attempt to
minimize the Holland court’s opinion
by claiming that it held only that the plaintiffs failed to plead their elder
abuse claim with adequate specificity, this characterization ignores the Holland court’s conclusion that “if the
[heirs] cannot maintain a claim for abuse under the Elder Abuse Act in their
own name, it makes no sense for them to be able to pursue a claim for wrongful
death based upon that same alleged abuse.” (Holland, supra, at p. 1134.) Therefore,
without a viable claim for wrongful death based on elder abuse, the Heirs’
wrongful death claim is necessarily premised on professional negligence, and subject
to arbitration under Ruiz.
Based on the foregoing, Mulkey’s first
and second causes of action and the Heirs’ fourth cause of action for wrongful
death are subject to arbitration. Although Mulkey’s third cause of action for
violation of Health & Safety Code section 1430 cannot be arbitrated, the
Court lacks discretion to deny the petition to compel arbitration because this
non-arbitrable claim does not involve the nonsignatory Heirs. (Laswell v. AG Seal Beach, LLC (2010) 189
Cal.4th 1399, 1409.)
IV.
CONCLUSION
Defendant’s petition to compel
arbitration is
Dated
this
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William A.
Crowfoot Judge of the Superior Court |
Parties who intend to submit on this
tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating
intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided
on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit
on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may
nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a
submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others
might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from
the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no
appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the
tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.