Judge: William A. Crowfoot, Case: 24AHCV00057, Date: 2025-05-09 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24AHCV00057    Hearing Date: May 9, 2025    Dept: 3

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - NORTHEAST DISTRICT

I.            INTRODUCTION

This lemon law action was filed on January 10, 2024, by plaintiff Carmina Magana (“Plaintiff”) against defendant Kia America, Inc. (“Defendant”). Plaintiff alleges that on or before March 6, 2021, she leased a new 2021 Kia Sorento (“Subject Vehicle”) and that Defendant breached the implied and express warranties of merchantability under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (“SBA”) because the vehicle was defective.

On January 27, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion for attorney fees, followed by an amended notice of motion on February 3, 2025. Plaintiff requests attorneys fees and costs as the prevailing party on her SBA claims. Plaintiff does not seek a lodestar multiplier, but requests $20,025 in fees and $869.13 in costs.

II.          LEGAL STANDARD

Under the SBA, “[i]f the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney's fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” (Civ. Code § 1794(d).) “The statute requires the trial court to make an initial determination of the actual time expended; and then to ascertain whether under all the circumstances of the case the amount of actual time expended and the monetary charge being made for the time expended are reasonable.” (Goglin v. BMW of North America, LLC (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 462.) Some of these circumstances include, but are not limited to, the complexity of the case and procedural demands, the skill exhibited and the results achieved. (Ibid.) “A prevailing buyer has the burden of ‘showing that the fees incurred were ‘allowable,’ were ‘reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation,’ and were ‘reasonable in amount.’” (Ibid [quoting Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 103].) “The lodestar method is applicable to calculating attorney fees under section 1794, subdivision (d).” (Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 997.)

The basis for the trial court's calculation must be the actual hours counsel has devoted to the case, less those that result from inefficient or duplicative use of time.” (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 395.) “In challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence. General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice.” (Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.)

III.        DISCUSSION

Plaintiff’s request for $20,894.13 in fees and costs is based, in part, on her attorney’s billing rate of $375 per hour (from January 2023 through December 31, 2023), $450 per hour (from January 1, 2024, through December 31, 2024), and $475 per hour (beginning on January 1, 2025). Her attorney, Justin Ibrahim, has been practicing for 7 years and has handled, since July 2019, approximately 450 cases involving the SBA and secured over $8.5 million in damages and fees for his clients. (Motion, Ibrahim Decl., ¶ 5.) Mr. Ibrahim also states that in 2021, 2023, and 2024, various trial courts have found his rates reasonable. (Id., ¶¶ 7-10.)

In a late-filed opposition brief, Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to prove with admissible evidence that her attorney’s rates are what a client would pay on an hourly basis for a lemon law action. (Opp., p. 5.) Nevertheless, Defendant offers no rates in comparison, instead choosing to suggest a blended rate of $350 without any context. (Opp., pp. 5-6.) Given Mr. Ibrahim’s extensive experience and evident success in lemon law matters, the Court finds that his hourly rates are reasonable.

Next the Court evaluates whether the amount of time Mr. Ibrahim spent on Plaintiff’s case was reasonable. Mr. Ibrahim attaches a copy of his time log showing that from October 15, 2023, to January 27, 2025, he has spent a total of 45.3 hours on this matter. (Motion, Ibrahim Decl., Ex. B.) “‘In challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence. General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice.’”  (Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 488; Etcheson v. FCA US LLC (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 831, 848.)

Here, Defendant argues that the amount of time claimed is unreasonable because Plaintiff’s counsel utilized templates for written discovery. Specifically, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s counsel should not have spent 4.7 hours on “template written discovery”, 1.7 hours to “prepare a routine dealership subpoena”, or 5.2 hours to “review Defendant’s standard discovery responses and draft a template meet and confer letter.” (Opp., p. 7.) Defendant argues that the Court should either strike these fees or reduce them by at least half. Yet, upon review of Plaintiff’s counsel’s time log, Plaintiff’s counsel spent 4.7 hours collectively to draft four sets of written discovery, which is not unreasonable. Similarly, although Defendant complains about the “routine” subpoena, there is no evidence before the Court for it to consider whether or not the amount of time spent on preparing that subpoena was unreasonable because Defendant did not attach a copy of it. Last, Plaintiff’s counsel expended a reasonable 5.2 hours to review Defendant’s responses and draft a meet and confer letter because the letter was 25 pages. Even assuming that Defendant used “template responses”, Plaintiff’s counsel has a professional obligation to review them within the context of this specific matter. Therefore, the Court declines Defendant’s invitation to strike or reduce any hours claimed by Plaintiff’s attorney.

IV.        CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, Plaintiff’s motion for attorney fees and costs is GRANTED in its entirety.

Dated this 9th day of May 2025

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.