Judge: William A. Crowfoot, Case: 24NNCV00260, Date: 2025-06-13 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24NNCV00260 Hearing Date: June 13, 2025 Dept: 3
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - NORTHEAST
DISTRICT
Plaintiff(s), vs. Defendant(s). |
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[TENTATIVE]
ORDER RE: Dept.
3 8:30
a.m. |
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Plaintiff Kip Green (“Plaintiff”) seeks
a default judgment against defendant Christopher Cabrera (“Defendant”). In his
Complaint, Plaintiff claims Defendant failed to keep him and the owner of the
RV (identified as Pam Feinstein) informed of the extensive delays in the repair
of said vehicle, and that the repairs ended up taking two years. Plaintiff also
alleges Defendant attempted to extort thousands of dollars from him by
falsifying lien sale documents. Plaintiff claims that Defendant attempted to
steal the RV, but it is unclear whether the RV was stolen and has since been
recovered. Plaintiff’s Complaint is also confusing because he attaches five
forms with different causes of action, all of which are based on the same set
of facts, yet identifies different start dates for the same conduct. For example,
as part of Plaintiff’s First Cause of Action, Plaintiff claims the negligence
occurred beginning in July 2021, while Plaintiff alleges that the conversion
and trespass to chattels forming the basis for his Second Cause of Action took
place beginning on January 1, 2022. Plaintiff’s Third and Fourth Causes of
Action alleges that the elder abuse and negligent/intentional infliction of
emotional distress began on August 30, 2023.
The ambiguous nature of Plaintiff’s
allegations renders the Complaint unintelligible. A defendant in default admits
only those facts which are well-pleaded. (Kim v. Westmoore Partners, Inc.
(2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 267, 272.) Therefore, a default judgment is
inappropriate because the Complaint fails to state a cause of action. Accordingly,
the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s application for default judgment and strikes the
Complaint for failing to conform to Code of Civil Procedure § 425.10, which
requires a complaint to contain “a statement of the facts constituting the
cause of action, in ordinary and concise language.”
The Court additionally notes that even
if Plaintiff’s Complaint were sufficiently pleaded, Plaintiff’s application for
default judgment is technically deficient in several ways. First, Plaintiff did
not file a proposed judgment on Form JUD-100 or some other appropriate form of
proposed judgment. Second, Plaintiff’s causes of action are rooted in tort; the
complaint must not state the amount of damages sought and before a default may
be entered, the plaintiff must serve defendant with a statement of “the nature
and amount of damages being sought.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.11; see Hamm v.
Elkin (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1343, 1345-1346 [service after default entry
but before prove-up not sufficient].) A copy of the statement of damages served
on Defendant is not on file with the Court. The statement of damages provided is
addressed to Jhamina Emminger (“Emminger”). Therefore, the Court is unable to
determine whether Plaintiff’s requested default judgment exceeds the amount
demanded in the statement of damages served on Cabrera. (Code Civ. Proc., §
585, subd. (b).) Third, Emminger remains a defendant in this case and there is
no application for a separate judgment supported by a showing of grounds for
each judgment. (California Rules of Court Rule 3.1800, subd. (a)(7).)
Plaintiff’s application is also
substantively deficient. As a threshold matter, Plaintiff does not specify the
amount of the judgment to be entered. Item 2 on Plaintiff’s Form CIV-100 requests
a total judgment of $400,000 but identifies $480,000 in special damages and
$1,500,000 in general damages. Plaintiff’s annotation stating “a lesser amount”
in the margin of the form does not assist the Court. Also, Plaintiff submits no
admissible evidence supporting his claimed damages. There is no evidence that
the RV’s value is $50,000, or that the loss of its use is valued at $3,000 per
month other than Plaintiff’s conclusory say-so. Plaintiff additionally vaguely
describes the emotional distress he currently experiences as “a constant
aggravation and terror in [his] life”, which is insufficient to justify the $1
million in general damages that he demands (if that is in fact, the amount he
is demanding). Moreover, Plaintiff fails to substantiate his request for
$10,000 for medical damages. Plaintiff claims that his medication, Caplyta,
costs $100 per day but states that he only takes it “as needed”. Additionally,
since Plaintiff admits that he is on Medicare, his recovery for his medical
damages is limited to the amounts paid by Medicare. (Sanchez v. Strickland (2011)
200 Cal.App.4th 758, 760.) Last, it is unclear why Plaintiff believes
that the damages should be trebled as Plaintiff cites no statutory basis for
doing so.
In light of the foregoing, the Court DENIES
the application for default judgment. Since Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to
state a cause of action, the Court STRIKES the Complaint in its entirety and
grants Plaintiff leave to amend. An amended pleading that adequately states a
cause of action will necessarily require material changes; therefore, it will
need to be personally served on all defendants (including Defendant) who must
be given the opportunity to respond. (Petty v. Manpower, Inc. (1979) 94
Cal.App.3d 794, 798 [substantial amendment of complaint after default is not
permitted without second service of process].) Accordingly, the Court sets an
OSC re: Filing of Amended Complaint and Proof of Service of Summons for
___________ at 8:30 a.m. in Department 3 of the Alhambra Courthouse.
Dated
this
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William A.
Crowfoot Judge of the Superior Court |
Parties who intend to submit on this
tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating
intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided
on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit
on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may
nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a
submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others
might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from
the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no
appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the
tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.