Judge: William A. Crowfoot, Case: 24NNCV00475, Date: 2024-12-06 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24NNCV00475 Hearing Date: December 6, 2024 Dept: 3
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - NORTHEAST
DISTRICT
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Plaintiff(s), vs. Defendant(s). |
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[TENTATIVE]
ORDER RE: Dept.
3 8:30
a.m. |
I. INTRODUCTION
On
March 25, 2024, plaintiff Rami Der-Artinian (“Plaintiff”) filed this action
against defendant Ganahl Lumber Company (“Defendant”) asserting cause of action
for negligence and premises liability.
On
July 24, 2024, Defendant filed this demurrer.
Plaintiff
filed an opposition brief on November 21, 2024.
Defendant
filed a reply brief on November 27, 2024.
II. LEGAL
STANDARDS
A demurrer may be brought if
insufficient facts are stated to support the cause of action asserted. (Code
Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).) “We treat the demurrer as admitting all
material facts properly pleaded but not contentions, deductions or conclusions
of fact or law. We accept the factual allegations of the complaint as true and
also consider matters which may be judicially noticed. [Citation.]” (Mitchell v. California Department of Public
Health (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1000, 1007; Del
E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 604
[“the facts alleged in the pleading are deemed to be true, however improbable
they may be”].) Allegations are to be liberally construed. (Code Civ. Proc., §
452.) In construing the allegations, the court is to give effect to specific
factual allegations that may modify or limit inconsistent general or conclusory
allegations. (Financial Corporation of
America v. Wilburn (1987) 189 Cal.App.3rd 764, 769.)
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff
alleges that on July 21, 2023, he was walking on the public sidewalk in front
of Defendant’s store on East Colorado Blvd. (the “Premises”) when he tripped
and fell over uneven or cracked pavement. (Compl., GN-1, Prem.L-1.) Plaintiff
alleges Defendant negligently owned, maintained, managed, operated, and
controlled the Premises. (Ibid.)
The elements
of a negligence and premises liability cause of action are the same: duty, breach,
causation, and damages. (See, e.g., Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp (2013) 220
Cal. App. 4th 994, 998; Ladd v. County of San Mateo (1996) 12
Cal.4th 913, 917.) “A defendant cannot be held liable for the defective or
dangerous condition of property which it did not own, possess, or
control.” (Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hospital (1985) 38 Cal.3d 112,
134.) There are exceptions to this
general rule where a person has voluntarily assumed a duty to act, either by
contract or by his or her actions (Interinsurance
Exchange of the Automobile Club of Southern California (2002) 161
Cal.App.3d 571, 575), or where a person creates the danger that causes the harm
or increases a foreseeable risk of harm (Vasilenko
v. Grace Family Church (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1077, 1081). Therefore, in the
absence of a statute, a landowner of property abutting a public street is generally
not liable to persons injured as a result of a dangerous condition of public
property, if the landowner did not create that condition. (Schaefer v.
Lenahan (1944) 63 Cal.App.2d 324, 326-32.) “The reason for this rule is
that a landowner generally has no right to control another’s property,
including streets owned and maintained by the government.” (Vasilenko,
supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1084.)
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s
Complaint fails because Plaintiff alleges that he tripped on a public sidewalk.
Defendant contends that since the sidewalk was public, it owed no duty to Plaintiff
because it did not own or control the sidewalk. (Demurrer, p. 5.) Defendant acknowledges
that as a landowner abutting a public sidewalk, it has a duty to repair or
reimburse the appropriate entity for the costs of repairs to the sidewalk, but argues
that this duty does not extend to injuries sustained by third parties.
In
opposition, Plaintiff does not identify any statute imposing a duty on
Defendant to maintain the sidewalk. Instead, Plaintiff emphasizes that the sidewalk
“serves as the sole access point to [Defendant’s] business.” (Opp., p. 5.) Defendant
denies that only one point of entry to its store exists, but even if the
sidewalk was the only means of entrance to Defendant’s store, it does not mean
that Defendant created the unevenness of the pavement or that it has
“dramatically asserted dominion and control” over the sidewalk, as required to
establish liability. (Lopez v. City of Los Angeles (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th
244, 256.) Plaintiff also suggests that Defendant “made defective alterations”
to the public property for its exclusive benefit and argues that this is an
issue of fact to be explored in discovery, but does not identify what the
defective alteration (or resulting exclusive benefits) might be. (Opp., pp.
5-6.) Ultimately, Plaintiff must plead facts showing that Defendant owed him a duty.
Plaintiff has not done so. Accordingly, the demurrer is sustained.
IV. CONCLUSION
Defendant’s demurrer is SUSTAINED with
20 days’ leave to amend.
Moving party to give notice.
Dated
this
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William A. Crowfoot Judge of the Superior Court |
Parties who intend to submit on this
tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating
intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided
on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit
on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may
nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a
submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others
might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from
the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no
appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the
tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.