Judge William A. Crowfoot, Case Number: 24NNCV00486, Date: 2025-01-31 Tentative Ruling

Judge: William A. Crowfoot, Case: 24NNCV00486, Date: 2025-01-31 Tentative Ruling

On March 26, 2024, plaintiff Alejandro Rios (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against defendant Puente Hills Ford, LLC (“Defendant”). Plaintiff alleges that he purchased a 2022 Ford Escape (“Subject Vehicle”) from Defendant and, as part of the purchase agreement, was entitled to four oil changes. (Compl., ¶¶ 2, 6.) After the first oil change was performed, the Subject Vehicle’s oil life sensor activated, suggesting that it was unsafe to drive. (Compl., ¶ 9.) Plaintiff alleges that the oil change service was not performed properly and that a visual inspection and laboratory analysis showed that the oil had not been replaced. (Compl., ¶¶ 13-16.) Plaintiff complains that Defendant has failed to take any correct action for the potentially compromised condition of the Subject Vehicle’s engine and contends that this conduct is retaliatory because Plaintiff realized that the sales contract initially included a significant overcharge. The sales contract was subsequently revised and Plaintiff was “compensated with additional items such as new car mats, seat covers, steering wheel covers, and oil change services at a low cost to preserve the buyer-seller relationship.” (Compl., ¶¶ 23-25.)

On December 31, 2024, Defendant filed this motion to enforce a settlement agreement and enter a judgment of dismissal pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6.

On January 15, 2025, Plaintiff filed an “objection”, which the Court treats as an opposition brief.

On January 27, 2025, Plaintiff filed, without leave of court, a sur-reply and an exhibit. Another set of exhibits was filed on January 28, 2025.

Section 664.6 provides: “If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 664.6.) In hearing a section 664.6 motion, the trial court may receive evidence, determine disputed facts, and enter terms of a settlement agreement as a judgment. (Bowers v. Raymond J. Lucia Companies, Inc. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 724, 732.) The court may interpret the terms and conditions to settlement (Fiore v. Alvord (1985) 182 Cal.App.3d 561, 566), but the court may not create material terms of a settlement, as opposed to deciding what terms the parties themselves have previously agreed upon (Weddington Productions, Inc. v. Flick (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 793, 810).

Defendant argues that dismissal is required because the parties entered into a release on April 20, 2024. (Ramos Decl., Ex. A.) The release provides that Defendant shall pay Plaintiff $3,500 for “complete resolution of the claims set forth in the Recitals Section and/or those claims that could have been raised by the [Plaintiff] in any related to the lawsuit.” (Id., p. 1.) The Recitals describe Rio’s purchase of the Subject Vehicle, the alleged failure to perform oil changes or negligent performance of the oil changes, and claims of predatory lending practices and sales contract terms. (Id., p. 1.)

Defendant’s General Manager, James Ramos, as well as its Service Director, David Okamoto, both set forth in detailed declarations that they observed Plaintiff sign the settlement agreement on April 26, 2024, and receive the $3,500 settlement check and place it in his inside jacket pocket. (Ramos Decl., ¶ 21 Okamoto Decl., ¶ 5.) Their own observations are not hearsay and Plaintiff’s conduct in signing the agreement (insofar as it is construed to be assertive conduct) is subject to the “party admission” exception to the hearsay rule. (People v. Iraheta (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 1228, 1248; Evid. Code, § 1220).) They also possess personal knowledge of their own observations and therefore establish an adequate foundation for their testimony. (Id.) Ramos also properly authenticates screenshots of surveillance camera footage depicting Plaintiff and himself on April 26, 2024. (Ramos Decl., ¶ 24, Exs. H-P.)

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the release is not valid because it is not notarized. However, Plaintiff provides no authority for the proposition that a settlement agreement must be notarized for it to be enforceable. Critically, however, Plaintiff does not deny signing the settlement agreement or receiving the $3,500 from Defendant. Plaintiff does not introduce any evidence contradicting the detailed declarations of James Ramos and David Okamoto describing his execution of the agreement and placing the settlement check in his pocket.

Plaintiff also argues that there was “no meeting of the minds” because the agreement names “Alejandro Rios”, not “Alejandro Rey Rios”, which is his correct legal name. (Objection, pp. 6, 10-11.) Yet, there does not appear to be any confusion about his identity given that Plaintiff brought this lawsuit naming himself twice as “Alejandro Rios” on the caption page. Even the signatures on Plaintiff’s Complaint and impermissible sur-reply state “Alejandro Rios” showing that he uses these two names interchangeably. And, as stated above, Plaintiff does not deny having signed the settlement agreement.

Last, Plaintiff argues that the payment of $3,500 was merely “partial” and states that there is no showing that he waived all of his claims or executed a comprehensive release of liability. This is contradicted by the plain language of the settlement agreement which states that the $3,500 is for “complete resolution” of all claims relating to his purchase of the Subject Vehicle, Defendant’s purported failure to perform the promised oil changes, and all claims relating to any predatory lending practices or sales contract terms. (Ramos Decl., Ex. A, p. 1.) There is also a waiver under Civil Code section 1542 stating that Plaintiff “waives any and all rights or benefits that he may now have, or may have in the future, under the terms of California Civil Code section 1542.” (Ex. A, pp. 1-2.)

The Court additionally notes that Plaintiff’s numerous exhibits were untimely filed and not relevant to determining the existence of a valid settlement agreement. The copies of the sales contract, laboratory testing results, and maintenance records only relate to the purported merits of Plaintiff’s claims. (See “Plaintiffs answer to defendants brief”, filed 1/27/2025; “Exhibit List”, filed 1/27/2025.) The second “Exhibit List”, filed on 1/28/2025, only includes emails between Defendant’s representative, James Ramos, and Plaintiff, in October and November 2024. The significance of these emails is not apparent as they only show that Plaintiff incorrectly claimed to have obtained a default judgment against Defendant.

In light of the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to enforce the Settlement Agreement and: (1) vacates Defendant’s default entered on October 15, 2024, and (2) enters a judgment of dismissal with prejudice. The Court declines Defendant’s “request” for a hearing date on a motion for attorneys’ fees for enforcement of the settlement agreement; Defendant may reserve a hearing date online through the Court Reservation System.

William A. Crowfoot

Judge of the Superior Court

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.