Judge: William A. Crowfoot, Case: 24NNCV01990, Date: 2024-09-10 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24NNCV01990 Hearing Date: September 10, 2024 Dept: 3
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - NORTHEAST
DISTRICT
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Plaintiff(s), vs. Defendant(s). |
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[TENTATIVE]
ORDER RE: Dept.
3 8:30
a.m. |
I.
INTRODUCTION
On May 31, 2024, plaintiff Svetlana
Henderson (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against defendants John B. Fortner
(“Fortner”) and Jon D. Henderson (“Henderson”) for elder financial abuse, fraud
and deceit by concealment, quiet title, cancellation of instrument, and adverse
possession. Fortner is Plaintiff’s brother and Henderson is Plaintiff’s
ex-husband. (Compl., ¶¶ 2 ,4.)
Plaintiff alleges she owns the
residential duplex located at 1417 and 1419 Bresee Avenue, Pasadena, CA 91104
(“Subject Property”) after she and her mother, Elizabeth Fortner (“Elizabeth”),
purchased it on March 6, 2007, as joint tenants with rights of survivorship. (Compl.,
¶ 8.) Plaintiff alleges that on March 6, 2015, while Elizabeth was still alive,
Fortner fraudulently transferred Elizabeth’s interest in the Subject Property
to himself without Plaintiff or Elizabeth’s knowledge or approval. (Compl., ¶
10.) A copy of a quitclaim deed is attached to the Complaint as Exhibit A. Elizabeth
passed away on June 9, 2022. (Comp., ¶ 9.)
On July 31, 2024, Fortner filed this
motion to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages and paragraphs 25, 26,
and 32. Paragraphs 25 and 26 are part of the Complaint’s first cause of action
for financial elder abuse and Paragraph 32 is part of the Complaint’s second
cause of action for fraud and deceit by concealment.
II.
LEGAL
STANDARD
Any party, within the time allowed to
respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole
or any part thereof. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435 subd., (b)(1).) The court may,
upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems
proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any
pleading. (Code Civ. Proc, § 436, subd. (a); Stafford v. Shultz (1954)
42 Cal.2d 767, 782 [“Matter in a pleading which is not essential to the claim
is surplusage; probative facts are surplusage and may be stricken out or
disregarded”].) An immaterial or irrelevant allegation is one that is not
essential to the statement of a claim or defense; is neither pertinent to nor
supported by an otherwise sufficient claim or defense; or a demand for judgment
requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint. (Code Civ Proc, § 431.10, subd. (b).) The grounds for moving to strike must appear
on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437.)
III.
DISCUSSION
Punitive damages may be imposed where
it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been
guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) A
motion to strike punitive damages is properly granted where a plaintiff does
not state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, including allegations that
defendant is guilty of oppression, fraud or malice. (Turman v. Turning Point of Cent. California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.) The
allegations supporting a request for punitive damages must be alleged with
specificity; conclusory allegations without sufficient facts are not enough. (Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033,
1041-1042.)
Fortner moves to strike Plaintiff’s
request for punitive damages on the grounds that no specific facts have alleged
to justify such a request. Plaintiff opposes Fortner’s motion and argues that
her allegations are sufficient to allege fraud and deceit because she alleges
that Fortner transferred title to the Subject Property from his mother to
himself without the knowledge, consent, or approval of Plaintiff or Elizabeth.
(Compl., ¶¶ 9-10.) However, Plaintiff lacks standing to bring an elder abuse
claim that belongs to her mother and Plaintiff does not allege that she is
bringing an action as Elizabeth’s successor-in-interest.
As for Plaintiff’s second cause of
action for “fraud and deceit by concealment”, Plaintiff alleges that Fortner
acted fraudulently by concealing the fact that he had recorded the quitclaim
deed. There are four circumstances in which nondisclosure or concealment may
constitute actionable fraud: “(1) when the defendant is in a fiduciary
relationship with the plaintiff; (2) when the defendant had exclusive knowledge
of material facts not known to the plaintiff; (3) when the defendant actively
conceals a material fact from the plaintiff; and (4) when the defendant makes
partial representations but also suppresses some material facts. [Citation.]”’ (LiMandri
v. Judkins (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 326, 336.) Here, Plaintiff does not allege
that she is in a fiduciary relationship with Fortner. And while she alleges
that Fortner had exclusive knowledge of the quitclaim deed, this is belied by
the fact that Elizabeth’s notarized signature is on the quitclaim deed; absent
any allegation that the signature is forged, the requirement of exclusive
knowledge does not appear to have been met. Last, Plaintiff does not allege any
acts constituting “active concealment”, nor does she identify any “partial
representations” which Fortner made while suppressing some other material
facts.
In light of the foregoing, the motion
to strike is GRANTED in its entirety. As for whether Plaintiff should be given leave
to amend the complaint, the Court notes that Fortner’s demurrer is scheduled
for hearing on November 27, 2024. Therefore, in the interest of judicial
economy, the Court will defer its decision until after it has ruled on
Fortner’s demurrer.
Moving party to give notice.
Dated
this
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William A.
Crowfoot Judge of the Superior Court |
Parties who intend to submit on this
tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating
intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided
on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit
on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may
nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a
submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others
might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from
the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no
appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the
tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.