Judge: William A. Crowfoot, Case: 24NNCV02807, Date: 2025-01-17 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24NNCV02807    Hearing Date: January 17, 2025    Dept: 3

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - NORTHEAST DISTRICT

I.            INTRODUCTION

On July 10, 2024, plaintiff Alejandro Guzman (“Plaintiff”) filed this employment law action against Nabi Merchant (“Merchant”) for wrongful termination and various violations of the Labor Code. On October 17, 2024, Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). Plaintiff alleges Merchant did business as Subway aka Subway 2132 (FAC, ¶ 3) at Subway Store number 2132 in Studio City, California. Plaintiff also alleges that his manager/supervisor was Merchant’s wife, Noori Merchant. (FAC, ¶ 14.)  

On November 20, 2024, Merchant filed this motion to strike Plaintiff’s punitive damages allegations.

On January 2, 2025, Plaintiff filed an opposition brief.

No reply brief has been filed.

II.          LEGAL STANDARD

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435 subd., (b)(1).) The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc, § 436, subd. (a); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782 [“Matter in a pleading which is not essential to the claim is surplusage; probative facts are surplusage and may be stricken out or disregarded”].) An immaterial or irrelevant allegation is one that is not essential to the statement of a claim or defense; is neither pertinent to nor supported by an otherwise sufficient claim or defense; or a demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint. (Code Civ Proc, § 431.10, subd. (b).) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437.)

III.        DISCUSSION

Punitive damages may be imposed where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) A motion to strike punitive damages is properly granted where a plaintiff does not state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, including allegations that defendant is guilty of oppression, fraud or malice. (Turman v. Turning Point of Cent. California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.) “Mere negligence, even gross negligence, is not sufficient to justify such an award” for punitive damages. (Kendall Yacht Corp. v. United California Bank (1975) 50 Cal. App. 3d 949, 958.) The allegations supporting a request for punitive damages must be alleged with specificity; conclusory allegations without sufficient facts are not enough. (Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1041-1042.)

“Malice” is conduct intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1).) “As amended to include [despicable], the [Civil Code section 3294] plainly indicates that absent an intent to injure the plaintiff, ‘malice’ requires more than a ‘willful and conscious’ disregard of the plaintiffs’ interests. The additional component of ‘despicable conduct’ must be found.” (College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725.) Despicable conduct is “conduct which is so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people. Such conduct has been described as ‘having the character of outrage frequently associated with crime.’” (Tomaselli v. Transamerica Ins. Co. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1287.) Further, “[t]here must be evidence that defendant acted with knowledge of the probable dangerous consequences to plaintiff’s interests and deliberately failed to avoid these consequences.” (Flyer’s Body Shop Profit Sharing Plan v. Ticor Title Ins. Co. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1149, 1155; see also Angie M. v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1228 [“Conscious disregard for the safety of another may be sufficient where the defendant is aware of the probably dangerous consequences of his or her conduct and he or she willfully fails to avoid such consequences”].)

Merchant argues that Plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to state a claim for punitive damages because an employer, at its discretion, may allow customers to leave tips, allow “tip pooling”, and direct its employees schedules. (Motion, pp. 6-7.) Merchant argues that the mere fact that Plaintiff was terminated does not give right to punitive damages. (Motion, p. 7.)

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that there are sufficient allegations of malice, oppression, and fraud against Merchant because he alleges that his manager/supervisor retaliated against him for participating in a worker’s compensation investigation and for complaining about withheld tips. (FAC, ¶¶ 13-14, 20, 24, 26-27.) This retaliation included: (1) altering Plaintiff’s work schedule by first reducing his hours and then placing him on a night shift while knowing that Plaintiff relied on public transportation and would face commuting challenges since his bus did not operate after the store’s closing hours and (2) wrongfully terminating him after 9 years of “exemplary service.” (FAC, ¶¶ 17, 19, 28, 30-31.) Plaintiff also alleges such retaliation was ratified by Merchant. (FAC, ¶ 44, 59; Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (b).) These allegations are sufficient to plead a punitive damages claim against his employer, Merchant, because if they are proven to be true, Plaintiff will have demonstrated that his manager/supervisor engaged in intentionally malicious conduct and that Merchant ratified such conduct. In light of the foregoing, the motion to strike is DENIED.

IV.        CONCLUSION

Defendant’s motion to strike is DENIED.

Moving party to give notice.

Dated this 17th day of January 2025

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter.  Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue.  If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.