Judge William A. Crowfoot, Case Number: 24NNCV03078, Date: 2024-12-17 Tentative Ruling

Judge: William A. Crowfoot, Case: 24NNCV03078, Date: 2024-12-17 Tentative Ruling

On July 23, 2024, plaintiff Leyda Escamilla (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against defendant San Marino Unified School District (“District”), Linda de la Torre (“de la Torre”), Jason Rose (“Rose”), and Benjamin Wolf (“Wolf”) (collectively, “Defendants”) for violations of the Reporting by School Employees of Improper Governmental Activities Act (the “Act”) under California Education Code sections 44113 and 44114, conspiracy, punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees.

Plaintiff alleges she is a “classified employee serving in the position of Health Services Assistant assigned to SMHS [San Marino High School] and thus is a public school employee under the Act.” Plaintiff alleges:

On August 29, 2023, she reported orally to her supervisors, Wolf and nonparty Lena Richter (“Richter”), that the SMHS Head Football Coach Nate Turner presented a clear and present threat to the health and safety of employees and the public (SMHS students) because Mr. Turner has a violent past, a history of gang violence and drug dealing, multiple felony arrests, and had recently been accused of several incidents of violence against women resulting in restraining order applications from his female victims and retraining orders issued against Mr. Turner.” When Wolf and Richter asked Plaintiff how she knew this information, she stated that she could go home and retrieve a packet of documents substantiating her report. Wolf and Richter requested that Plaintiff do so.

Plaintiff alleges that “[l]ater that same day, [she] provided to Wolf and Richter a packet of documents substantiating the information [she] had orally reported.” (Compl., ¶ 16.) Plaintiff also provided a copy of this packet to District School Board Vice President Joseph Chang (with Wolf’s specific approval) on August 29, 2023, and on August 30, 2023, to Plaintiff’s union president. (Compl., ¶ 18.) On September 1, 2023, Plaintiff “documented the information constituting her concerns in a letter addressed to Defendant Rose.” (Compl., ¶ 19.)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants conspired to protect District’s role in hiring Mr. Turner and “concocted a false narrative of Plaintiff’s reporting and conduct, erected false standards for reporting protected disclosures, and engaged in a pattern of workplace harassment, bullying, and intimidation featuring multiple acts of reprisal, retaliation, threats, and coercion against Plaintiff.” (Compl., ¶. 22.)

On September 30, 2024, Defendants filed this motion to strike the Complaint. (Notice, p. 2.) Defendants also seek attorneys’ fees in the amount of $19,708.

On December 10, 2024, Defendant filed reply papers, including evidentiary objections.

The California Supreme Court, in Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, summarized the showings and findings required for an anti-SLAPP motion as follows:

At the first step, the moving defendant bears the burden of identifying all allegations of protected activity, and the claims for relief supported by them. When relief is sought based on allegations of both protected and unprotected activity, the unprotected activity is disregarded at this stage. If the court determines that relief is sought based on allegations arising from activity protected by the statute, the second step is reached. There, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that each challenged claim based on protected activity is legally sufficient and factually substantiated. The court, without resolving evidentiary conflicts, must determine whether the plaintiff's showing, if accepted by the trier of fact, would be sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment. If not, the claim is stricken. Allegations of protected activity supporting the stricken claim are eliminated from the complaint, unless they also support a distinct claim on which the plaintiff has shown a probability of prevailing.

In ruling on the anti-SLAPP motion, the court shall consider the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16(b)(2).) However, the court does not “weigh credibility [nor] compare the weight of the evidence. Rather, [the court] accepts as true the evidence favorable to the plaintiff and evaluates the defendant’s evidence only to determine if it has defeated that submitted by the plaintiff as a matter of law.” (Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 326.)

“To prevail on an anti-SLAPP motion, the movant must first make ‘a threshold showing the challenged cause of action’ arises from an act in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech in connection with a public issue.” (Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, 192.) “A claim arises from protected activity when that activity underlies or forms the basis for the claim.” (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1062.) “‘The only means specified in section 425.16 by which a moving defendant can satisfy that [‘arising from’] requirement is to demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct by which plaintiff claims to have been injured falls within one of the four categories described in subdivision (e) . . . .’” (Id. [quoting Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 66].) “[I]n ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion, courts should consider the elements of the challenged claim and what actions by defendant supply those elements and consequently form the basis for liability.” (Id.)

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated Education Code section 44113 by

directly and indirectly us[ing] and attempt[ing] to use Defendants’ official authority or influence (effecting or threatening to effect reprisal as described herein, including but not limited to repeated false and bullying correspondence, threatened forced retirement, repeated false charges of misconduct, and referral to the ‘Justice Department;’ and taking and/or directing others to take, recommending, processing, and approving personnel action, including but not limited to forced retirement, forced administrative leave, and dismissal) for the purpose of intimidating, threatening, coercing, commanding or attempting to intimidate, threaten, coerce, or command Plaintiff for the purpose of interfering with the right of Plaintiff to disclose to an official agent (school administrator or member of the governing board of a school district) matters within the scope of the Act.”

(Compl., ¶ 32.) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants violated Education Code section 44114 by

intentionally engaged in acts of reprisal, retaliation, threats, coercion, and similar acts as described herein (including but not limited to repeated false and bullying correspondence, threatened forced retirement, repeated false charges of misconduct, referral to the ‘Justice Department,’ and taking and/or directing others to take, recommending, processing, and approving personnel action, including but not limited to forced retirement, forced administrative leave, and dismissal.

(Compl., ¶ 36.) Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim alleges substantially the same facts, claiming that de la Torre, Rose, and Wolf “acted in concert” to deprive Plaintiff of her rights under [Education Code] sections 44110-44114.” (Compl., ¶ 40.)

Defendants identify the specific allegations which they contend are protected activities. (Motion, pp. 14-15, citing Compl., ¶¶ 22, 24-28, 31-32, 34, 36, 38, and 42.) These identified allegations include writing various letters, informing Plaintiff of potential dismissal and proposing that she retire at the end of the school year following paid administrative leave, notifying Plaintiff of District’s intent to dismiss her, and sending Plaintiff home from work indefinitely. (Id.) Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims are “based upon the Defendants’ speech and conduct in furtherance of discipline proceedings under Education Code section 45113” and cite to two categories of protected activity identified in the anti-SLAPP statute: “(1) any written or oral statement or writing made before … any … official proceeding authorized by law” and “(2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by … any … official proceeding authorized by law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (e).)

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that her claims for violations of the Act and conspiracy are premised on disciplinary decisions and retaliatory actions – not speech – and are therefore not protected activities. (Opp., p. 12.) The Court agrees with Plaintiff and finds Verceles v. Los Angeles Unified School District (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 776, cited by Plaintiff, and Laker v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 745, cited by Defendants, instructive. In Verceles, the Second Appellate District agreed with the school district that an investigation into a public employee’s misconduct is an official proceeding but disagreed that any claim related to that proceeding arose from protected activity. In Laker, the Sixth Appellate District rejected a university’s argument that a retaliation claim was premised on protected activity and distinguished a “good-faith investigation into employee wrongdoing” from a “meritless” investigation “constitut[ing] retaliatory action.” (Laker, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at pp. 776-777; see also Bonni v. St. Joseph Health Sys. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1009 [denial of tenure not protected speech or petitioning].) Here, although Defendants are alleged to have made oral statements and sent written correspondence, this activity is evidence of the underlying retaliatory action allegedly taken in response to Plaintiff’s disclosures about Mr. Turner.

Since Defendants fail to satisfy their burden under the first prong to identify activity protected by the anti-SLAPP statute, the burden does not shift to Plaintiff to show that her claims have minimal merit. Therefore, the Court declines to rule on Defendants’ evidentiary objections to Plaintiff’s evidence submitted in opposition to their motion.

William A. Crowfoot

Judge of the Superior Court

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.