Judge William A. Crowfoot, Case Number: 24NNCV03205, Date: 2025-04-29 Tentative Ruling

Judge: William A. Crowfoot, Case: 24NNCV03205, Date: 2025-04-29 Tentative Ruling

On July 30, 2024, plaintiff Ana Rivera (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against the City of Pasadena (“City”) and Bryan Vasquez (“Officer Vasquez”), a police officer. In her operative First Amended Complaint, filed on August 6, 2024, Plaintiff alleges that on or about the evening of July 1, 2023, the police were dispatched in response to a report of a single vehicle traffic collision involving property damage. (FAC, ¶ 16.) Plaintiff was the passenger of a vehicle driven by her husband, who was determined to have been driving under the influence of alcohol. (FAC, ¶¶ 16-17.) As Officer Dylan Boersma (“Officer Boersma”) put his hand around the right wrist of Plaintiff’s husband to initiate the process of arrest, Plaintiff placed her body between them. (FAC, ¶ 17.) Then, another officer, Jonathan Bombardier (“Officer Bombardier”) grabbed Plaintiff’s left arm and, along with Officer Vasquez, took Plaintiff down to the ground with so that she laid on her back with both of her arms above her head and pinned to the sidewalk by both officers’ body weight. (FAC, ¶ 17.) Plaintiff was then turned onto her stomach and Officer Bombardier restrained her arms behind her back. (FAC, ¶ 18.) Plaintiff alleges that while she was restrained, Officer Vasquez slammed her head against the concrete sidewalk and punched her twice in the face with a closed fist. (FAC, ¶ 18.) Plaintiff was then transported to Huntington Memorial Hospital where she received medical treatment for a head hematoma and orbital floor fracture of her right eye as a result of Officer Vasquez’s assault and battery. (FAC, ¶ 19.) Plaintiff alleges that Officer Vasquez acted with excessive and objectively unreasonable force and that City is vicariously liable as well as directly liable for negligently hiring, training, and supervising Officer Vasquez.

On April 2, 2025, Plaintiff filed this motion for discovery of Officer Vasquez’s personnel records pursuant to California Evidence Code sections 1043, 1045, Penal Code sections 832.5 and 832.7, and Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (“Pitchess”). Defendants Officer Vasquez and City (collectively, “Defendants”) filed an opposition brief on April 16, 2025. Plaintiff filed a reply brief on April 22, 2025.

In any case, civil or criminal, in which discovery or disclosure of a peace officer's personnel records are sought, the party seeking disclosure must file a written motion, known in the criminal context as a Pitchess motion, that, among other things, describes the information sought and states good cause for the discovery, “setting forth the materiality thereof to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation and stating upon reasonable belief that the governmental agency identified has the records or information from the records.” (Evid. Code, § 1043, subd. (b)(3); see generally, Evid. Code, §§ 1043, 1045; Pen. Code, §§ 832.5, 832.7, 832.8; People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1226.) The affidavit setting forth good cause “may be on information and belief and need not be based on personal knowledge [citation], but the information sought must be requested with sufficient specificity to preclude the possibility of a defendant's simply casting about for any helpful information [citation].” (Mooc, at p. 1226.) If the moving party fulfills these requirements, then the court examines the records in camera. (Ibid.) This process balances the conflicting interests of the moving party's right to a fair trial and the officer's interest in privacy. (Id. at p. 1227.)

Determining “materiality” involves several inquiries: (1) whether the requesting party has shown a logical connection between the charges and the proposed defense, (2) whether the request for Pitchess discovery is factually specific and tailored to support its claim of officer misconduct, (3) whether the requested Pitchess discovery supports the proposed defense or is likely to lead to information that would support the proposed defense, and (4) whether the requested information would be admissible at trial. (Warrick v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1011, 1027.)

“In any case, otherwise authorized by law, in which the party seeking disclosure is alleging excessive force by a peace officer or custodial officer, as defined in Section 831.5 of the Penal Code, in connection with the arrest of that party, or for conduct alleged to have occurred within a jail facility, the motion shall include a copy of the police report setting forth the circumstances under which the party was stopped and arrested, or a copy of the crime report setting forth the circumstances under which the conduct is alleged to have occurred within a jail facility.” (Evid. Code, § 1046.)

Plaintiff requests 11 categories of documents and Defendants oppose the requests on the grounds that they are not supported by good cause and are overbroad. Plaintiff attaches a copy of the police report setting forth the circumstances of her arrest as Exhibit C to her motion.

The Court agrees that Plaintiff’s Request Nos. 1 through 3 are overbroad because they are not limited to any specific facts regarding the alleged misconduct in this action. For instance, Request No. 1 demands “[a]ll DOCUMENTS RELATING TO OFFICER VASQUEZ’s employment” including his entire personnel file, any “performance evaluations, disciplinary records, commendations, awards, or records of termination.” This request encompasses irrelevant information such as salary information, medical information, and unrelated correspondence. Request No. 2 demands “[a]ll background investigations of OFFICER VASQUEZ” performed before or at the time of his hiring, and Request No. 3 requests “[a]ny information contained in the personnel and/or internal investigation files which indicates or identifies previous employment or experience by OFFICER VASQUEZ in law enforcement-related work”; but neither of these categories are limited to information or knowledge City may have had regarding a particular characteristic that made Officer Vasquez unfit when he was hired.

Request No. 4 demands “[a]ll Field Training Evaluations of OFFICER VASQUEZ” and is overbroad because the information is not tailored to the specific facts of this case. However, the motion is GRANTED in part with respect to Request No. 4 to only include field training evaluations relating to the handling and arrest of noncompliant individuals.

Next, Request Nos. 5 through 8 seek documents, records, complaints, statements, and witness information pertaining to Officer Vasquez’s “misconduct”, which Plaintiff defines as including,

any information or complaints alleged, suspected, and/or proven regarding: (i) aggressive behavior; (ii) violence and/or attempted violence; (iii) excessive force and/or attempted excessive force; (iv) punching, kicking, and/or striking another individual, including strikes with a fist, elbow, knee, head, and/or hand; (v) acts indicating inaccuracy or dishonesty; (vi) failure to follow department policy and/or law; (vii) improper arrest or detainment; (viii) fabrication, misrepresentation, suppression and/or embellishment of facts in reports, including but not limited to, police reports; (ix) fabrication, misrepresentation, suppression and/or embellishment of evidence; (x) false testimony; (xi) morally lax character and willingness to lie; (xii) fabrication and/or false claims of probable cause; and (xiii) fabrication and/or false claims about facts known at the time, including the conduct of the officer and the subject leading up to the use of force.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s definition of “misconduct” is too broad because: (1) it includes behavior beyond the use of force and (2) any prior use of force may have taken place in different settings. “[O]nly documentation of past officer misconduct which is similar to the misconduct alleged by [plaintiff] in the pending litigation is relevant and therefore subject to discovery.” (California Highway Patrol v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1021.)

While Plaintiff has shown good cause for discovery into past allegations, complaints, and investigations against Officer Vasquez concerning the use and attempted use of excessive force, there is no justification for defining “misconduct” to include “aggressive behavior”, “violence and/or attempted violence”, “punching, kicking, and/or striking another individual, including strikes with a fist, elbow, knee, head, and/or hand”, “improper arrest or detainment,” or “failure to follow department policy and/or law.” Therefore, Request Nos. 5 through 8 are GRANTED in part insofar as the definition of “misconduct” with respect to excessive force is limited to subsection (iii).

With respect to misconduct encompassing credibility issues, Plaintiff argues in her reply brief that complaints, reports, and investigations of Officer Vasquez’s credibility are relevant because Officer Vasquez, on information and belief, fabricated facts contained in the police report by stating that he punched her because Plaintiff had kicked him on the left side of his head with her right leg and he thought she would do it again. (Motion, Ex. C, p. 13.) Plaintiff’s counsel submits a supplemental declaration with Plaintiff’s reply brief stating that on information and belief, Officer Vasquez’s body camera did not capture any footage of Plaintiff kicking him. (Reply, Supp. King Decl.., ¶ 7.) Plaintiff’s counsel declares that the body camera footage shows Officer Vasquez punching Plaintiff in the face when she was flat on her stomach across the sidewalk with her legs fully extended in the opposition direction of where Officer Vasquez was positioned. (Reply, Supp. King Decl., ¶ 7.) Given this declaration, the motion is GRANTED in part with respect to Request Nos. 5 through 8 insofar as the term “misconduct”, as it relates to Officer Vasquez’s credibility, is limited to subsections (v), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), and (xiii).

Last, Request Nos. 9 through 11 request documents relating to any discipline or investigation conducted as a result of any misconduct (as defined above) and as well as all documents relating to any internal investigation into the incident underlying this lawsuit. Plaintiff establishes good cause for the discovery of these documents because they are relevant to Plaintiff’s claims that Defendant had prior knowledge of Officer Vasquez’s unfitness and/or ratified the alleged misconduct. Therefore, Request Nos. 9 through 11 are GRANTED in part based on the Court’s modification of the term “misconduct,” to only include subsections (iii), (v), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), and (xiii).

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED IN PART as to Request No. 4 to include Field Training Evaluations of Officer Vasquez relating to the apprehension and handling of noncompliant individuals. The Motion is also GRANTED IN PART as to Request Nos. 5 through 11. The term “misconduct” is modified to include only the following:

(viii) fabrication, misrepresentation, suppression and/or embellishment of facts in reports, including but not limited to, police reports; ...

(ix) fabrication, misrepresentation, suppression and/or embellishment of evidence; ...

(xiii) fabrication and/or false claims about facts known at the time, including the conduct of the officer and the subject leading up to the use of force.” (Motion, p. 4.)

The motion is DENIED without prejudice as to Request Nos. 1 through 3. The responsive documents shall be produced for in camera inspection on ____________. Any documents disclosed shall be designated as “confidential” pursuant to the Stipulation and Protective Order entered on January 15, 2025, and shall not be used for any purpose other than this lawsuit.

William A. Crowfoot

Judge of the Superior Court

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.