Judge William A. Crowfoot, Case Number: 24NNCV04300, Date: 2025-04-22 Tentative Ruling

Judge: William A. Crowfoot, Case: 24NNCV04300, Date: 2025-04-22 Tentative Ruling

On September 16, 2024, plaintiffs Viktoriya S. Kyarunts, Irina Y. Kyarunts, and Sofiya Kyarunts (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed this action against defendants Peter Andrew Coeler and Barbara Cannen Coeler, individually and as trustees of the PB Living Trust, Dated June 16, 2017, Willi H. Coeler and Stefanie U. Coeler, individually and as trustees of the W&S Coeler Living Trust Dated January 13, 2014, and P.A.C. Properties (collectively, “Defendants”). Plaintiffs assert causes of action for negligence, premises liability, breach of the implied warranty of habitability, private nuisance, breach of the implied covenant of quiet use and enjoyment, constructive eviction, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”). The action arises from Plaintiffs’ tenancy at an apartment complex located at 4930 Whitsett Avenue, Apartment 7, Valley Village, California 91607 (“Premises”) from April 16, 2022, to May 2023. Plaintiffs allege there were issues with water leakage, water intrusion, dampness, and toxic mold exposure at the Premises that caused them severe personal injury.

On January 17, 2025, Defendants filed a demurrer to Plaintiffs’ IIED claim and a motion to strike their allegations pertaining to and request for punitive damages.

A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the pleadings and will be sustained only where the pleading is defective on its face. (City of Atascadero v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 445, 459.) “We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. We accept the factual allegations of the complaint as true and also consider matters which may be judicially noticed. [Citation.]” (Mitchell v. California Department of Public Health (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1000, 1007; Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 604 [“the facts alleged in the pleading are deemed to be true, however improbable they may be”].) Allegations are to be liberally construed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 452.) In construing the allegations, the court is to give effect to specific factual allegations that may modify or limit inconsistent general or conclusory allegations. (Financial Corporation of America v. Wilburn (1987) 189 Cal.App.3rd 764, 769.)

A demurrer may be brought if insufficient facts are stated to support the cause of action asserted. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).) “A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) A demurrer for uncertainty will be sustained only where the complaint is so bad that the defendant cannot reasonably respond. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f).)

Where the complaint contains substantial factual allegations sufficiently apprising defendant of the issues it is being asked to meet, a demurrer for uncertainty will be overruled or plaintiff will be given leave to amend. (Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2.)

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1).) The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782 [“Matter in a pleading which is not essential to the claim is surplusage; probative facts are surplusage and may be stricken out or disregarded”].) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with California law, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (b).) An immaterial or irrelevant allegation is one that is not essential to the statement of a claim or defense; is neither pertinent to nor supported by an otherwise sufficient claim or defense; or a demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.10, subd. (b).) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437.)

The elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress are: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct with the intent to cause, or with reckless disregard for the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) extreme or severe emotional distress; and (3) proximate causation. (So v. Shin (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 652, 671.) “In order to avoid a demurrer, the plaintiff must allege with ‘great[ ] specificity’ the acts which he or she believes are so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” (Vasquez v. Franklin Management Real Estate Fund, Inc. (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 819, 832 [citing Schlauch v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 926, 936.)

Defendants demur to Plaintiffs’ IIED claim on the grounds that Plaintiffs fail to allege any outrageous conduct or intention to harm. Defendants also demur on the grounds that the IIED claim is uncertain. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ allegations “demonstrate numerous efforts . . . to resolve the problems in question, over a period of months.” (Demurrer, pp. 6-7.) Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs concede that they “eventually remediated the rental unit.” (Compl., ¶ 32.)

Plaintiffs repeatedly allege that “no adequate remediation ever occurred” or that “no adequate remediation was ever undertaken.” (Compl., ¶¶ 23, 26-28, 30.) In one instance, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ inadequate remediation efforts included “put[ting] holes in the ceiling and le[aving] buckets to catch the leaking water” (Compl., ¶¶ 16-21.) But Plaintiffs do not explain what made any of the prior attempts at remediation inadequate. This distinguishes their case from the facts in Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903, 921, and the other cases cited in Plaintiffs’ opposition brief because those cases involved the landlord’s refusal and failure to address the complained-of conditions, not merely a failure to provide “adequate” remediation.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs fail to sufficiently allege an intent to cause emotional distress or a reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress on behalf of Defendants. Defendants’ demurrer to the Sixth Cause of Action for IIED is SUSTAINED.

Defendants move to strike Plaintiffs’ punitive damages allegations on the grounds that they are not set forth with specificity. A motion to strike punitive damages is properly granted where a plaintiff does not state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, including allegations that defendant is guilty of oppression, fraud or malice. (Turman v. Turning Point of Cent. California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.) The allegations supporting a request for punitive damages must be alleged with specificity; conclusory allegations without sufficient facts are not enough. (Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1041-1042.)

Plaintiffs request punitive damages in connection with their claims for private nuisance and constructive eviction. However, Plaintiffs fail to describe Defendants’ failure to remediate any water intrusion, leakage, or mold in a manner that demonstrates malice, fraud, or oppression. ).) “Malice” is conduct intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1).) Just as Plaintiffs fail to plead an intent to cause (or reckless disregard of the probability of causing) severe emotional distress, Plaintiffs also fail allege, with sufficient specificity, that Defendants acted with “conscious disregard” or engaged in “despicable conduct. (Angie M. v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1228 [“Conscious disregard for the safety of another may be sufficient where the defendant is aware of the probably dangerous consequences of his or her conduct and he or she willfully fails to avoid such consequences”]; Tomaselli v. Transamerica Ins. Co. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1287 [despicable conduct defined as “conduct which is so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people”].)

William A. Crowfoot

Judge of the Superior Court

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.