Judge: William A. Crowfoot, Case: 24PDUD00077, Date: 2025-04-07 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24PDUD00077    Hearing Date: April 7, 2025    Dept: 3

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - NORTHEAST DISTRICT

I.            INTRODUCTION

On January 9, 2024, plaintiff Gray Wolf Industries, LP (“Gray Wolf”) filed this unlawful detainer action against Naomi Rhoads and Chassoon Rhoads (collectively, “Defendants”) relating to real property located at 325 Pasadena Avenue, South Pasadena, California 91030 (“Property”). On February 5, 2025, the operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) was filed alleging that the Property had been sold by Gray Wolf to Chunyu Li (“Li”). The FAC asserts unlawful detainer claims based on nonpayment of rent and nuisance.

On April 2, 2025, Defendants filed this motion for summary judgment on the grounds that Gray Wolf lacks standing to maintain this unlawful detainer action and that both Gray Wolf and Li failed to comply with the notice disclosure requirements under Civil Code section 1962. 

II.          LEGAL STANDARD

A motion for summary judgment in an unlawful detainer action “shall be granted or denied on the same basis as a motion under [Code of Civil Procedure s]ection 437c” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1170.7; CRC 3.1351.) A defendant has met their burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if they have shown that one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to that cause of action. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 849.) Once the defendant has met that moving burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. (Ibid.) The plaintiff may not rely upon the mere allegations or denials’ of his pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists but, instead, must set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Ibid.)

III.        DISCUSSION

A.   Standing

Defendants argue that Gray Wolf lacks standing to bring this action because the FAC alleges that as of December 24, 2024, Gray Wolf no longer owned the Property and the Property is currently owned by Li.

“The general rule is that a sale by a lessor of real estate, during an unexpired leasehold term, under which a tenant is holding, where a condition is attached, does not of itself abrogate the lease, terminate the leasehold estate, or authorize the landlord to treat the lease as at an end without offering to fulfill the condition. Its effect is to substitute the vendee of the reversion to all of the rights of the original lessor. The vendee then becomes the landlord by operation of law and the tenant becomes a tenant of the vendee of the reversion.” (Upton v. Toth (1940) 36 Cal.App.2d 679, 684.)

Here, Gray Wolf is no longer identified as a plaintiff in the FAC. Instead, the only plaintiff identified in the FAC is Li. Gray Wolf’s non-involvement in this case is confirmed by its discovery responses, in which it refers to itself as a non-party. Therefore, the motion for summary judgment on the grounds that Gray Wolf lacks standing is DENIED as moot.

B.   Notice

Defendants next argue that even if Li were the plaintiff, summary judgment should still be granted because Civil Code § 1962 requires an owner to make several disclosures and prohibits an eviction for nonpayment of rent that accrued during the period of noncompliance by a successor owner such as Li. (Civ. Code, § 1962, subd. (c).) However, the FAC asserts three theories for unlawful detainer, only one of which is the nonpayment of rent. Since two more causes of action remain which are based on nuisance, summary judgment is DENIED.

IV.         CONCLUSION

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED.  

Dated this 7th day of April 2025

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.