Judge William A. Crowfoot, Case Number: BC695119, Date: 2024-12-11 Tentative Ruling

On November 15, 2024, defendants Estelle Campbell and Studios at Walnut, LLC (“Campbell Defendants”) filed this motion for a determination of good faith of the settlement between plaintiff Yuka Tamura (“Plaintiff”) and De Miranda Management (“De Miranda”) reached during the trial whereupon Plaintiff would enter into a full release of all claims against De Miranda in exchange for payment by De Miranda of an undisclosed amount.

1. the settlement between Plaintiff and De Miranda is found to be in good faith within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure §§ 877 and 877.6, and satisfies the requirements of Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 15 488;

2. the amount of the settlement between Plaintiff and De Miranda be disclosed in the interest of justice;

3. all present and future claims against the Campbell Defendants, “including any claims which have been, or could have been brought, in this action or any of the related actions, are hereby dismissed with prejudice”;

4. all present and future claims, complaints, and cross-complaints by De Miranda against the Campbell Defendants are dismissed with prejudice and forever barred, and that their liability for all such claims are forever extinguished.

First, the Court was informed, by way of Plaintiff’s ex parte application filed on December 4, 2024, and heard on December 5, 2024, that a condition precedent to the settlement between the Plaintiff and De Miranda had not yet been fulfilled. More significantly, as of December 5, 2024, the Court was informed that Plaintiff had not signed, and in fact was refusing to sign, the release documents agreed upon with De Miranda, and De Miranda, therefore, had not released the settlement payment to Plaintiff. The Court is unaware of any change in that impasse, and the docket contains no dismissal of De Miranda by Plaintiff. If Plaintiff and De Miranda have not agreed upon a settlement, then this motion would be moot.

Nonetheless, for the sake of a full discussion of the issues presented by this motion, assuming the Plaintiff-De Miranda settlement agreement provides for a payment to Plaintiff by De Miranda of more than the $21,000 awarded to Plaintiff by the jury, the Campbell Defendants ask the Court to find the settlement to be in good faith. That said, the Campbell Defendants also seek an order forcing the disclosure of the full settlement amount, and not merely whether it was more than $21,000. That is requested is made “in the interest of justice” without any further explanation of necessity.

Even if there were a valid settlement agreement between De Miranda and Plaintiff, that agreement would not affect the Campbell Defendants’ potential liability to any other party, except possibly a joint tortfeasor. The language of Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6 makes clear that a finding of good faith “shall bar any other joint tortfeasor . . . from any further claims against the settling tortfeasor. . . for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6.) As applied to this case, a determination of good faith would shield De Miranda from any future claims for indemnity or contribution from the Campbell Defendants (or other joint tortfeasors) based on comparative negligence or comparative fault because the settlement was reached before judgment or verdict. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 877, 877.6.) It does not operate, however, to protect the Campbell Defendants from Plaintiff’s claims and it is not clear to the Court on what authority the Campbell Defendants rely for the fourth request in their motion.

If the Campbell Defendants are arguing that the settlement amount reached between Plaintiff and De Miranda either partially or completely offsets the jury verdict of $21,000, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 877 so that the judgment should be modified accordingly, that is a different (and possibly premature) issue given that no settlement appears to have been reached. Also, the process for determining an offset in order to ensure that Plaintiff does not enjoy a double recovery is to compel Plaintiff to execute an acknowledgement or partial acknowledgement of satisfaction of judgment per Code of Civil Procedure section 724.110. (Jhaveri v. Teitelbaum (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 740, 753-755.) In determining whether a settlement offsets a judgment, Code of Civil Procedure section 877 only requires that a nonsettling defendant prove that the settling codefendants were “claimed to be liable for the same tort,” not that they were in fact liable. (Code Civ. Proc., § 877; Poire v. C.L. Peck/Jones Brothers Construction Corp. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1832, 1837-1841; Knox v. County of Los Angeles (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 825, 831.) However, because the existence of a settlement agreement is in question, there does not appear to be a settlement amount that can offset the jury’s verdict.

Based on the foregoing, the motion for determination of good faith settlement is DENIED.

William A. Crowfoot

Judge of the Superior Court

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.