Judge: William A. Crowfoot, Case: BC719305, Date: 2022-09-12 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: BC719305    Hearing Date: September 12, 2022    Dept: 27

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

 

HYERIM YUN,

                   Plaintiff(s),

          vs.

 

LYFT INC., et al.,

 

                   Defendant(s).

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      CASE NO.: BC719305

 

[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

 

Dept. 27

1:30 p.m.

September 12, 2022

 

I.            INTRODUCTION

On August 24, 2018, Plaintiff Hyerim Yun (“Plaintiff”) filed this action. On January 16, 2020, Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) naming Lyft, Inc. (“Lyft”), Raquel Giddings (“Giddings”), Louie Medina (“Medina”), Marvin Flores (“Flores”), Kevin Makoyan (“Makoyan”), and Uber Technologies, Inc., Rasier, LLC, and Rasier-CA, LLC (collectively, “Uber”). The action arises from two separate car accidents that took place on February 27, 2017 (the “2017 Accident”) and September 30, 2018 (the “2018 Accident”). 

Plaintiff alleges that on February 27, 2017, she was a Lyft passenger in a vehicle driven by Giddings. (FAC, ¶ 15.) Plaintiff’s destination was her home but Giddings allegedly terminated the ride in the “suicide lane” which forced Plaintiff to exit the car in the middle of the road. (FAC, ¶¶ 16-17.) As she crossed the street to reach her home, she was hit by a vehicle operated by Sean Chiew (“Chiew”) (who was not named as a defendant by Plaintiff because they had previously settled the matter for $15,000). (FAC, ¶ 17.)  On November 9, 2020, Plaintiff named Paula Cabrera (“Cabrera”) as the driver defendant involved in the 2017 Accident. Cabrera filed a cross-complaint against Flores, Makoyan, and Chiew. Plaintiff then dismissed Giddings from the action. 

On August 17, 2022, Plaintiff filed this motion for leave to file a second amended complaint (“SAC”).  The proposed SAC corrects the name of the driver in the 2017 Accident and, more importantly, adds allegations that Lyft is a common carrier as defined by Civil Code section 2168 and therefore owed her a heightened duty of care under Civil Code section 2100. 

II.          LEGAL STANDARD

The court may, in its discretion and after notice to the adverse party, allow, upon any terms as may be just, an amendment to any pleading, including adding or striking out the name of any party, or correcting a mistake in the name of a party, or a mistake in any other respect.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (a)(1).)  “Public policy dictates that leave to amend be liberally granted.”  (Centex Homes v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 23, 32.)  “Although courts are bound to apply a policy of great liberality in permitting amendments to the complaint at any stage of the proceedings, up to and including trial . . . this policy should be applied only ‘where no prejudice is shown to the adverse party.’  [Citation].  A different result is indicated ‘where inexcusable delay and probable prejudice to the opposing party’ is shown.  [Citation.]”  (Magpali v. Farmers Group, Inc. (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1024, 487.)

The motion shall be accompanied by a declaration attesting to the effect of the amendment, why the amendment is necessary and proper, when the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered, and why the request for amendment was not made earlier.  (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 1.324(b).) 

III.        DISCUSSION

Although the operative FAC contains no allegations that it was a common carrier, Lyft preemptively addressed any charge of liability based on this theory in a summary judgment motion filed on April 25, 2022 (which Cabrera joined).  Plaintiff claims that, in an abundance of caution, the SAC is necessary so that Plaintiff may address this issue in Lyft’s motion. 

Lyft filed an opposition brief and Cabrera filed a notice of joinder.  First, Lyft argues that this motion was improperly made because Plaintiff only provided 17 court days’ notice of this motion and hearing instead of 18 court days.  However, Lyft does not request a continuance of the hearing and does not contend that it needs additional time to respond.  Also, in her reply brief, Plaintiff’s counsel authenticates a proof of service demonstrating that Lyft was personally served with the motion on August 17, 2022, and provided with an electronic copy as a courtesy copy.  (Reply, Smith Decl., Ex. A.)  Therefore, the Court shall proceed to consider the merits of the motion. 

Second, with respect to the substance of Plaintiff’s motion, Lyft argues that Plaintiff’s delay in adding common carrier allegations is unreasonable and unwarranted because Plaintiff was already aware of Lyft’s involvement in the accident and no new facts have been discovered.  Lyft also argues that the amendment would be prejudicial because the filing of the SAC would moot the pending summary judgment motion. 

The Court agrees that Plaintiff fails to identify any recent facts or evidence which would explain the addition of this new legal theory.  However, Lyft fails to show that the delay would be prejudicial.  Lyft has already briefed the issue of common carrier liability in anticipation of Plaintiff’s later reliance on this theory of a heightened duty imposed on common carriers.  Revising the brief to cite to specific allegations of the SAC would not constitute an undue burden.  Moreover, allowing the SAC would not open up a new field of inquiry which would require extensive discovery and, even if there were, there would be sufficient time to complete it because trial is scheduled for April 14, 2023. 

IV.         CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED.  Plaintiff is ordered to file her SAC within 5 days of the date of this order.

Moving party to give notice.

 

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SSCDEPT27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter.  Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue.  If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.