Judge: William D. Claster, Case: 18-01040053, Date: 2022-07-28 Tentative Ruling

Isabel Garibay’s Motion for Leave to Intervene

Before the Court is Isabel Garibay’s motion for leave to intervene.  For the reasons set forth below, the motion is DENIED. However, the Court will grant the motion if Defendant Crown has any objection to the inclusion of a statement such as the following in the order approving the proposed PAGA settlement: The portion of the PAGA settlement based on Labor Code § 2802 violations does not apply to any underlying claims for cell phone reimbursement.  

Garibay is the plaintiff in Garibay v. Able Services, Alameda County SC No. RG1577358.  The defendants in Garibay include Crown Building Maintenance Co. and several related companies.  As relevant here, Garibay’s claims include a PAGA claim based on violations of Labor Code § 2802.  She contends Crown failed to reimburse employees for required personal cell phone use, and she seeks civil penalties under PAGA.

Crown is also a defendant here.  In this action, Crown has reached an agreement with plaintiffs Rosa Chavez and Estanislao Crisantos to settle their PAGA claims.  The settlement agreement in this matter provides that the “Aggrieved Employees,” defined as all non-exempt Crown employees in California from March 2019 to the present, will release “all claims . . . under PAGA . . . arising out of the violations alleged in the pleadings . . . including . . . failure to reimburse necessary business expenses . . . [and] Labor Code section[] . . . 2802.”  (Jackson Decl. (ROA 438), Ex. A, at ¶¶ 16, 18-19.)

Garibay believes Crown is attempting to settle a portion of her PAGA claim out from under her: PAGA claims based on cell phone reimbursement from March 2019 to the present.  (The PAGA period in Garibay is unclear from the papers, but the case was filed in 2015.)  She expresses particular concern because the release arguably could be read to cover cell phone claims even though cell phone claims have never been part of this case as pled.

Garibay proposed that she and Crown stipulate the settlement here would have no effect on her claims.  Crown refused the stipulation.  (Jackson Decl., ¶ 6.)  Garibay then filed the present motion.

Were the above facts the entire story, the Court would grant permissive intervention for much the same reasons set forth in the ruling on Daniel Chatterton and Erick Juanta’s recent motions for leave to intervene.  In opposition, however, Crown states:

• “[T]here are no cell phone reimbursement claims at stake in the settlement proposed by [Plaintiffs] and Crown.”  (Crown Opp., p. 1.)

• “[I]t is obvious by the terms of the proposed settlement that it does not seek to release cell phone reimbursement claims.”  (Ibid.)

• “[T]he Chavez/Crisantos settlement will not resolve personal cell phone claims, the sole claim at issue in Garibay’s litigation.”  (Ibid.)

Based on Crown’s unequivocal position that this settlement will have no effect on the cell phone claims in Garibay, the Court finds Garibay lacks the interest in this action necessary for intervention, and on that basis denies the motion.  However, to assist the parties and the Alameda County Superior Court in future proceedings, the Court notes that (1) Crown has taken this position in a judicial proceeding; (2) Crown was successful in asserting this position (i.e., the Court adopted the position or accepted it as true); and (3) there is no evidence before the Court that Crown has taken this position as a result of ignorance, fraud, or mistake.  (See Jackson v. County of Los Angeles (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 171, 183.) In addition, Crown must represent to this Court that it will not object to the proposed language of the eventual approval order as set forth above.