Judge: William D. Claster, Case: 21-01185991, Date: 2022-08-12 Tentative Ruling
Intervenors YIMBY Law, People for Housing Orange County (A Chapter of YIMBY Action), and Californians for Homeownership Inc.'s Notice of Motion and Motion for Attorney Fees Under Code of Civil Procedure Section 1021.5 ROA 243
Intervenors YIMBY Law, People for Housing Orange County (a Chapter of YIMBY Action), and Californians for Homeownership, Inc. move for an award of attorneys’ fees under CCP § 1021.5. The motion is DENIED.
CCP § 1021.5 provides, in relevant part:
Upon motion, a court may award attorneys’ fees to a successful party against one or more opposing parties in any action which has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest if: (a) a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has been conferred on the general public or a large class of persons, (b) the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement, or of enforcement by one public entity against another public entity, are such as to make the award appropriate, and (c) such fees should not in the interest of justice be paid out of the recovery, if any.
Intervenors were given leave to intervene in this matter as real parties in interest. While fees are usually awarded to a prevailing plaintiff under section 1021.5, nothing in the statute bars a prevailing real party in interest or defendant from seeking fees. “The relevant inquiry in cases where the defendant or the real party in interest prevails in defending against litigation and seeks attorney fees from the party who initiated the litigation is whether the litigation sought to curtail or compromise important public rights.” (Save Our Heritage Organisation v. City of San Diego (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 154, 162 [SOHO].)
While SOHO holds that a real party in interest may recover fees, it also explains why a fee award would be improper here. In SOHO, the real party (Committee) was the proponent of a redevelopment project that was approved by San Diego. The petitioner (SOHO) challenged the project approval, arguing San Diego had violated CEQA, historical preservation laws, and land use laws. After the trial court granted the petition on some (but not all) grounds advanced by SOHO, the Committee appealed. The Court of Appeal reversed, finding San Diego had not abused its discretion in approving the project. (Id., at p. 158.)
The Committee then sought fees. The trial court denied the Committee’s motion, and the Court of Appeal affirmed. It explained that even when the requirements of section 1021.5 are otherwise satisfied, fees may be denied when “the party from whom fees are sought ‘is not the type of party on whom private attorney general fees were intended to be imposed.’ [Citation.]” (Id., at p. 161.) Turning to the case before it, the Court of Appeal explained:
By filing the petition for writ of mandamus, SOHO did not seek to curtail or compromise important public rights or exonerate SOHO’s violation of such rights. [Citation.] Rather, the litigation sought to correct what SOHO perceived to be violations of state and local environmental, historic preservation, and land use laws by [San Diego]. While ultimately unsuccessful, the litigation was precisely the type of enforcement action section 1021.5 was enacted to promote. [Citation.] We, therefore, cannot conclude the litigation was detrimental to the public interest such that imposing a fee award on SOHO would be appropriate. Consequently, we conclude the trial court did not err in denying the Committee’s motion for an award of section 1021.5 attorney fees. (Id., at p. 162.)
The same result holds here. Olen filed a writ petition to correct the City’s alleged violations of CEQA and the City’s General Plan and ICDP. Although Olen was unsuccessful, this is “precisely the type of enforcement action section 1021.5 was enacted to promote.” (Ibid.) Olen therefore “is not the type of party on whom private attorney general fees were intended to be imposed.” (Id., at p. 161.)
Intervenors argue Olen’s lawsuit was contrary to the public interest because there is a statewide housing crisis, and Olen “sought to block an affordable housing project that the City was required by state law to approve.” (Memo. at p. 12 [emphasis added].) Intervenors overstate their case. They are correct that by operation of the Housing Accountability Act and the Density Bonus Law, the City was required to find the project wasn’t in excess of the housing units allotted to the project site by the City’s General Plan and ICDP. But as Olen previously pointed out, and as the Court recognized, the DBL and HAA don’t excuse the City’s duty to comply with CEQA. (See Gov. Code § 65589.5(e).) If Olen had met its burden on its CEQA claims, the Court would have issued a writ directing the City to set aside the project approvals and proceed in accordance with applicable law. As in SOHO, this is the sort of enforcement action encouraged by section 1021.5. Accordingly, Intervenors’ motion is denied.