Judge William D. Claster, Case 21-01213808 2022-10-14 Tentative Ruling

Judge: William D. Claster, Case: 21-01213808, Date: 2022-10-14 Tentative Ruling

1. Defendants City of Newport Beach and Samir Ghosn's Notice of Motion and Motion for Stay Pending Appeal and Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies ROA 149

2. Status Conference

Defendant City of Newport Beach and Samir Ghosn move to stay this case pending the resolution of the appeal in Reeves v. City of Newport Beach, No. G060740 (Reeves I). For the reasons set forth below, the motion is GRANTED. A status conference will be held on March 15, 2023 at 8:30 a.m. A joint status conference statement should be filed on or before March 8, 2023.

Defendants’ request for judicial notice is GRANTED. The Court also proposes on its own motion to take judicial notice of the trial court file in Reeves I.

I. Background

This case, Reeves I, and Reeves v. Rezaei, No. 21-01186967 (Reeves II) all arise from the City’s revocation of a certificate of occupancy for Reeves’ home in Newport Beach.

In Reeves I, Reeves seeks a writ of mandate directing the City’s Building and Fire Board of Appeals to (1) set aside its decision denying his appeal of the revocation, and (2) reinstate the certificate of occupancy. (See Reeves I, ROA 2, at p. 13.) Judge Howard denied Reeves’ writ petition in a written order on August 27, 2021. (Reeves I, ROA 71.) Reeves appealed that decision. Per Defendants’ request for judicial notice, briefing in the appeal is complete (or at least Reeves has filed his opening and reply briefs).

In Reeves II, Reeves seeks damages from design professionals involved in the construction of his home. On August 24, 2022, Judge Hurwitz stayed Reeves II pending resolution of the appeal in Reeves I. The stay was entered without objection from counsel. (Defs.’ RJN, Ex. 3.)

In this case, Reeves brings a number of claims arising from the City’s permitting and appeals process, as well as a fraud claim against Samir Ghosn, the City’s building inspector. As relief, he seeks both damages and “[a] permanent injunction requiring Defendants to issue a Certificate of Occupancy for the Subject Property.” (4AC, p. 33.) Unlike Reeves II, Reeves objects to staying this case pending the appeal in Reeves I.

II. Discussion

Courts have the inherent power to stay proceedings in the interests of justice. (See, e.g., People v. Bell (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 323, 329 (recognizing “general rule that a court ordinarily has inherent power, in its discretion, to stay proceedings when such a stay will accommodate the ends of justice”).) In addition, the Rules of Court provide that complex cases such as this “require[] exceptional judicial management to . . . promote effective decision making by the court, parties, and counsel.” (CRC 3.400(a).)

Reeves argues the appeal in Reeves I will have little, if any, effect on proceedings here. The Court disagrees for several reasons. First, this contention contradicts Reeves’ own notice of related cases here, which states that Reeves I is related to this case because it “involves the same parties and is based on the same or similar claims.” (ROA 4.)

Second, a comparison of the two actions shows considerable overlap. For example, in this case, Reeves seeks an injunction requiring the City to reinstate his certificate of occupancy. In Reeves I, he seeks a writ of mandate directing the City to set aside its previous denial of his appeal and reinstate his certificate of occupancy. If the Court of Appeal were to reverse and order the trial court to issue Reeves’ requested writ of mandate, it appears that would moot Reeves’ request for injunctive relief.

As another example, Reeves contends here that Newport Beach Municipal Code §§ 15.80.030 and 20.70.020 permit his preferred solution to the issues that caused the certificate of occupancy to be revoked. He advanced similar arguments before Judge Howard, who concluded the City’s contrary conclusion was supported by the record. Reeves’ appellate briefing (Defs.’ RJN, Exs. 1-2) repeatedly takes issue with the City’s and Judge Howard’s interpretation of those provisions of the Municipal Code. The Court believes judicial economy would best be served by letting the Court of Appeal first interpret those provisions.

Furthermore, because it appears the appeal in Reeves I is fully briefed, the Court expects it will be argued relatively soon, with a decision no later than 90 days thereafter. Accordingly, this action will be stayed pending the outcome of the appeal in Reeves I.