Judge Yolanda Orozco, Case 19STCV04161 2022-09-09 Tentative Ruling

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**Tentative rulings on Motions for Summary Judgment will only be available for review in the courtroom on the day of the hearing.

On February 4, 2019 Plaintiffs Deandre Vaughns (“DV”), Danielle Watkins (“DW”), Deandre Vaughns, Jr. (“DVJ”), a minor by and through his guardian ad litem DV, and Dre-Dann Vaughns (“DDV”), a minor by and through his guardian ad litem DV (collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed a Complaint asserting causes of action for (1) breach of implied warranty of habitability, (2) breach of statutory warranty of habitability, (3) breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, (4) negligence, (5) violation of Civil Code section 1942.4, and (6) private nuisance against Defendant Las Aguilas Properties, LLC (“Aguilas”).

On April 30, 2020, Defendants Management and Leasing Services (“MLS”), Juan Vargas (“JV”), Elvira Vargas (“EV”), and Irma Verduzco (“IV”) were substituted in for Does 1-4, respectively.

On January 26, 2022, Power Property Management, Inc. was substituted in for Doe 5.

Plaintiffs now move for summary adjudication as to their fifth cause of action for violation of Civil Code section 1942.4.

As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the moving party must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts proving the essential elements of a cause of action, negating the essential elements of a cause of action, or establishing a defense. (CCP § 437c(p)(2); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

Once the moving party has met that burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)

Defendant’s Objections Nos. 22 (incorrectly number 40) and 24 (incorrectly numbered 42) are SUSTAINED.

Plaintiffs’ Objections consisting of three objections to the Declaration of Kinga Lovasz are OVERRULED.[1]

Plaintiffs move for summary adjudication as to their fifth cause of action (hereinafter the “cause of action”) for violation of Civil Code section 1942.4 because they can establish all of the elements and there is no defense.

Civil Code section 1942.4 provides that “[a] landlord of a dwelling may not demand rent, collect rent, issue a notice of a rent increase, or issue a three-day notice to pay rent or quit . . . if all of the following conditions exist prior to the landlord’s demand or notice: (1) [t]he dwelling substantially lacks any of the affirmative standard characteristics listed in Section 1941.1 or violates Section 17920.10 of the Health and Safety Code, or is deemed and declared substandard as set forth in Section 17920.3 of the Health and Safety Code because conditions listed in that section exist to an extent that endangers the life, limb, health, property, safety, or welfare of the public or the occupants of the dwelling[;] (2) [a] public officer or employee who is responsible for the enforcement of any housing law, after inspecting the premises, has notified the landlord or the landlord’s agent in writing of his or her obligations to abate the nuisance or repair the substandard conditions[;] (3) [t]he conditions have existed and have not been abated 35 days beyond the date of service of the notice specified in paragraph (2) and the delay is without good cause . . . [; and] (4) [t]he conditions were not caused by an act or omission of the tenant or lessee in violation of Section 1929 or 1941.2.” (Civ. Code, § 1942.4.)

“Any building or portion thereof including any dwelling unit . . . in which there exists any of the following listed conditions to an extent that endangers the life, limb, health, property, safety, or welfare of the public or the occupants thereof shall be deemed and hereby is declared to be a substandard building:. . .

(d) All wiring, except that which conformed with all applicable laws in effect at the time of installation if it is currently in good and safe condition and working properly.

Plaintiffs present evidence that they were charged, and Defendant collected, rents from Plaintiffs from November 2015 to February 2016. (Def. UMF Nos. 1-2.) In addition, Plaintiffs present evidence that Defendant was repeatedly cited by the City of Los Angeles’ Los Angeles Housing and Investment Department (“LAHCID”) for failing to maintain electrical wiring and the required inspection approvals for all new wiring, and that the inspections “revealed conditions that affect the health and safety of the [Plaintiffs].” (Def. UMF Nos. 3, 5, 15.) The violation was assigned a “high” level of severity, which meant that the “[e]xposed wiring is a potentially life-threatening condition that may cause an electrical fire, electrocution or electric shock and if it remains uncorrected, the risk of harm, injury of death to residents of the building increases.” (UMF No 7.)

On October 23, 2015 LAHCID served Defendant with a Notice and Order to Comply. (Def. UMF No. 8.) On December 2, 2015, the subject dwelling was inspected, which revealed that the wiring conditions had not been corrected. (Def. UMF No. 10.) Defendant was served with a second Notice and Order to Comply and given until January 8, 2016 to “eliminate all of the described conditions.” (Def. UMF No. 12.) The subject dwelling was then inspected again on January 11, 2016, which revealed that there was partial compliance with the Notice and Order to Comply, but that the exposed wiring had not been corrected. (Def. UMF No. 10.) On February 4, 2016, the LAHCID inspector closed the case relating to the subject dwelling.

Plaintiffs present evidence that the uninhabitable conditions were not abated within 35 days and that the delay was without good cause, as it took Defendant 104 days to abate the faulty/exposed wiring of which it was put on notice. (Def. UMF Nos. 16-20.) Moreover, the conditions were not caused by Plaintiffs as LAHCID cited Defendant, not Plaintiffs, for the violations.[2] (Def. UMF No. 37.)

The Court finds Plaintiffs have established all of the elements for a violation of Civil Code section 1942.4. This shifts the burden to Defendant to establish a triable issue of material facts as to any of the elements for violation of Civil Code section 1942.4, or any defense thereto.

Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s cause of action is barred by the applicable one-year statute of limitations.

“An action upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture, if the action is given to an individual, or to an individual and the state, except if the statute imposing it prescribes a different limitation” must be brought within one year from the date of the injury. (Code Civ. Proc. § 340(a).) “Under well-established California law, statutes that provide for mandatory damages either in addition to actual injury or regardless of actual injury or fault are considered to be in the nature of a penalty or forfeiture subject to the one-year limitations period.” (County of El Dorado v. Superior Court (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 620, 625.)

The Court finds that violations of Civil Code section 1942.4 are subject to a one-year statute of limitations because it imposes mandatory damages in addition to the actual damages sustained by the tenant or lessee. (Civ. Code § 1942.4(b)(1) [“A landlord who violates this section is liable to the tenant or lessee for the actual damages sustained by the tenant or lessee and special damages of not less than one hundred dollars ($100) and not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000).] (Emphasis added.)

As a preliminary matter, Plaintiffs argue in their reply, and the Court agrees, that this cause of action has not accrued for Plaintiffs DVJ and DDV because they were minors (and are still minors) at the time the circumstances and events giving rise to this lawsuit took place. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 352(a) [“If a person entitled to bring an action, mentioned in Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 335) is, at the time the cause of action accrued either under the age of majority or lacking the legal capacity to make decisions, the time of the disability is not part of the time limited for the commencement of the action.”])

To the extent the Plaintiffs’ cause of action is not barred by the statute of limitations, Defendant contends that Plaintiffs failed to establish that they were tenants at the subject unit. In their Reply, Plaintiffs point the Court to evidence that DV was a tenant at the subject unit, nothing more. (See Christensen Decl., ¶ 10 Exh. A, Exh. H 22:18-21.) Plaintiffs fails to point the Court to any evidence showing that DW, DVJ, and DDV were tenants at the subject unit. Accordingly, Defendant have established a triable issue of fact as to whether they are liable to DV, DVJ, and DDV under Civil Code section 1942.4 inasmuch as there is no evidence that all Plaintiffs were tenants at the relevant times. [3]

In addition, with the exception of DVJ and DDV, the evidence provided shows that Plaintiffs’ cause of action is barred by the one-year state of limitations. The evidence shows that the last date that Defendant’s demanded rent or collected rent from Plaintiffs, while the subject dwelling was substandard was February 2016. Plaintiffs had one year from February 2016 to file their cause of action. Plaintiffs did not file this cause of action until February 4, 2019, two years after they should have. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations.

In their Reply, Plaintiffs argue that this cause of action is not subject to the one-year statute of limitations because the “special damages” in Civil Code section 1942.4 are not a penalty or forfeiture. Plaintiffs are mistaken. As set forth by the County of El Dorado court, a cause of action is subject to a one-year statute of limitations, when the statute provides for “ mandatory damages either in addition to actual injury or regardless of actual injury or fault.” Civil Code section 1942.4 is clear that a landlord shall be liable to the tenant/lessee for “actual damages,” and, in addition to the actual damages, the landlord is liable for mandatory damages of “not less than one hundred dollars ($100) and not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000)” for violating Civil Code section 1942.4, which subjects this cause of action to a one-year statute of limitations.

Plaintiffs for the first time in their Reply contend that this cause of action is not barred by statute of limitations because of the discovery rule; however, Plaintiffs failed to present any evidence in their moving papers to support this contention, and presenting that evidence is their Reply is improper and will not be considered. (See¿Jay¿v. Mahaffey¿(2013) 218 Cal.App.4th¿1522, 1538 [Generally new evidence in not permitted in reply papers].)

Plaintiffs also argue that only the “special damages” and not the “actual damages” are subject to the one-year state of limitations. However, Plaintiffs fail to provide the Court with any binding authority that the Court is to apply different statute of limitations to Civil Code section 1942.4, and as set forth by the County of El Dorado court, “statutes that provide for mandatory damages either in addition to actual injury . . . are . . . subject to the one-year limitations period.” (County of El Dorado, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at 625 (emphasis added.))

Plaintiffs further argue that Civil Code section 1942.4 is not dependent on whether Plaintiff’s paid rent (as they argue that Defendant demanded rent in February 2016), and while Plaintiffs are correct, the last date that Defendant demanded rent from Plaintiffs was in February 2016, and Plaintiffs had one-year from that date to file this cause of action.

Thus, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Adjudication as to Plaintiffs’ fifth cause of action is DENIED.

For the reasons stated, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Adjudication as to Plaintiffs’ fifth cause of action is DENIED.

The parties are strongly encouraged to attend all scheduled hearings virtually or by audio. Effective July 20, 2020, all matters will be scheduled virtually and/or with audio through the Court’s LACourtConnect technology. The parties are strongly encouraged to use LACourtConnect for all their matters. All masking protocols will be observed at the Courthouse and in the courtrooms.

[1] The Court notes that Plaintiffs included a fourth space for an objection, but did not include the material being objected to in this space.

[2] The Court notes that Defendant’s contention that Plaintiffs failed to present evidence that they did not cause the condition of the subject unit is without merit, in light of the evidence of LAHCID citing Defendant and not Plaintiffs.

[3] The Court notes that to the extent that it references Plaintiffs hereinafter it refers to Plaintiffs DV and DW.