Judge: Yolanda Orozco, Case: 19STCV13270, Date: 2023-04-25 Tentative Ruling
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**Tentative rulings on Motions for Summary Judgment will only be available for review in the courtroom on the day of the hearing.
Case Number: 19STCV13270 Hearing Date: April 25, 2023 Dept: 31
PROCEEDINGS: MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT/SUMMARY ADJUDICATION
MOVING PARTY: Defendant
Kia Motor America Inc. (“Kia”)
RESP. PARTY: Plaintiffs
Adolfo and Olga Flores
MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT/ADJUDICATION
TENTATIVE RULING
Defendant’s Motion for
Summary, or Summary Adjudication in the alternative, is DENIED.
Background
On April 17, 2019, Plaintiffs Adolfo Flores and Olga Flores
filed a Complaint against Defendant Kia Motor America, Inc. (“Kia”) and Does 1
to 10. The Complaint alleges causes of action for:
1)
Violation of the Song-Beverly Act, Breach of Express
Warranty;
2)
Violation of the Song-Beverly Act, Breach of Implied
Warranty;
3)
Violation of the Song-Beverly Act § 1793.2;
4)
Fraudulent Inducement – Concealment; and
5)
Fraudulent Inducement – Intentional Misrepresentation.
On November 11, 2021, Defendant moved for summary
adjudication of Plaintiff’s second, third, fourth, and fifth causes of action.
The Court granted summary adjudication as to the fourth and fifth causes of
action and denied adjudication as to the second and third causes of action.
(Min. Or. 02/07/22.)
On September 09, 2022, the Court DENIED Defendant’s Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings as to the first, second, and third causes of
action.
On October 07, 2022, Defendant Kia moved for Summary
Judgment, or Summary Adjudication, as to the first, second, and third causes of
action.
Plaintiffs filed opposing papers on March 22, 2023.
Defendant Kia filed a reply on April 18, 2023.
Legal Standard
The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary
adjudication “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’
pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in
fact necessary to resolve their dispute.”¿ (Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co.
(2001) 25 Cal. 4th 826, 843.) “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c,
subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the
evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’
and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no
triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7
Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)¿¿¿¿¿
¿
“On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is
always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material
fact.” (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th
1510, 1519.) The moving party is entitled to summary judgment if they can show
that there is no triable issue of material fact or if they have a complete
defense thereto. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal. 4th at 843.)¿ Summary
adjudication may be granted as to one or more causes of action within an
action, or one or more claims for damages. (Cal. Code of Civ. Proc.
§437c(f).)¿¿¿¿¿¿
¿
A defendant moving for summary judgment bears two burdens:
(1) the burden of production – presenting admissible evidence, through material
facts, sufficient to satisfy a directed verdict standard; and (2) the burden of
persuasion – the material facts presented must persuade the court that the
plaintiff cannot establish one or more elements of a cause of action, or a
complete defense vitiates the cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(2);¿Aguilar,¿supra,
25 Cal.4th at p. 850-851.) A defendant may satisfy this burden by showing that
the claim “cannot be established” because of the lack of evidence on some
essential element of the claim.¿¿(Union Bank v. Superior Court (1995) 31
Cal.App.4th 574, 590.)¿¿Once the defendant meets this burden, the burden shifts
to the plaintiff to show that a “triable issue of one or more material facts
exists as to that cause of action or defense thereto.”¿(Id.)¿“On ruling
on a motion for summary judgment, the court is to ‘liberally construe the
evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts
concerning the evidence in favor of that party.’” (Cheal v. El Camino
Hospital¿(2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 736, 760.)¿¿¿
¿
On a summary judgment motion, the court must therefore
consider what inferences favoring the opposing party a factfinder could
reasonably draw from the evidence. While viewing the evidence in this manner,
the court must bear in mind that its primary function is to identify issues
rather than to determine issues. [Citation.]” (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.¿(1999)
75 Cal.App.4th¿832, 839.)¿¿
¿
Defeating summary judgment requires only a single disputed
material fact. (See CCP § 437c(c) [a motion for summary judgment “shall be
granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.”] [emphasis added].) Thus, any disputed material fact means the
court must deny the motion – the court has no discretion to grant summary
judgment. (Zavala v. Arce (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 915, 925, fn. 8; Saldana
v. Globe-Weis Systems Co. (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1505, 1511-1512.)¿¿¿
EVIDENTIARY
OBJECTIONS
Plaintiff
submitted evidentiary objections to the Declaration of Kevin Hanson filed in
support of this Motion.
Objections Nos. 1, 2, and 3 are SUSTAINED.
Discussion
Defendant Kia moves for
summary judgment, or summary adjudication, on the basis that Kia did not make
any express warranties with respect to the sale of Plaintiff’s vehicle as a
used vehicle.
The parties dispute whether
“other
motor vehicle sold with a manufacturer's new car warranty” includes used
vehicles sold with some balance of the original warranty rather than a full
warranty. (See Civ.
Code § 1793.22 subd. (e)(2).)
Plaintiffs Adolfo Flores and
Olga Flores bought a used 2014 Kia Sorento (the “subject vehicle”) from Car
Pros Kia on May 30, 2016. (UMF 1.) Defendant Kia maintains that Car Pros Kia is
an independent third-party dealer, not owned by Kia. (Hanson Decl. ¶ 6).
Plaintiffs maintain that Car Pros Kia is affiliated with Kia and that Kia’s
2014 Motor Vehicle Manual (the “2014 Manual”) states that a consumer must
present their vehicle to an authorized Kia dealership to get warranty service.
(Sumra Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. A. at 3-5.)
The section titled “The
Warranty Period” of the 2014 Manual states:
“Any remaining
portion of any warranty, except the 120 month/100,000 mile Power Train
(Original Owner) warranty, is fully transferable to subsequent owners.”
(Sumra Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. A p.
5.) The Limited Liability of the warranty states “[s]uch repair or replacement”
of factory installed parties “shall be carried out by an Authorized Kia Dealer
at its place of business.” (Sumra Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. A at 8.)
The Court finds that Kia
failed to show that it did not make any express warranties with respect to the sale
of the subject vehicle as a used vehicle. Kia failed to show that its vehicle
warranty is not transferable to subsequent owners.
Defendants assert that under
Rodriguez v. FCA US, LLC (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 209, used vehicles with a
balance remaining on a new vehicle warranty are not considered a “new motor
vehicle” under the Song-Beverly Act, such that no warranties attached to
Plaintiff’s purchase of a used vehicle. Defendants correctly note that Rodriguez
is pending review before the California Supreme Court and that Rodriguez
may be cited for its persuasive value but is not binding on this Court pursuant
to Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 45.
In Jensen v. BMW of North America, Inc. (1995) 35
Cal.App.4th 112, the Third District rejected the idea that used vehicles sold
with a balance of the warranty are not subject to the protections of the
Song-Beverly Act:
“We conclude the words of section
1793.22 are reasonably free from ambiguity and cars sold with a balance
remaining on the manufacturer's new motor vehicle warranty are included within
its definition of “new motor vehicle.”
(Id. at 123.)
Jensen
examined the legislative history of the Song Beverly Act, concluding that “section 1793.22 includes cars sold
with a balance remaining on the new motor vehicle warranty” and that such a
finding “is consistent with the Act's purpose as a remedial measure” and “also
consistent with the Department of Consumer Affairs' regulations which interpret
the Act to protect ‘any individual to whom the vehicle is transferred during
the duration of a written warranty.’ (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 16, § 3396.1, subd.
(g).)” (Jensen, supra, 35 Cal.App.4th at 126 [internal citations
omitted].)
The Court finds Jensen to be not only
persuasive but binding on this court. (See Cuccia v. Superior Court (2007)
153 Cal.App.4th 347, 353–354.)
Despite not being a
manufacturer, Kia also admits it is “a distributor and warrantor of certain new
Kia automobiles.” (Hanson Decl. ¶ 3.) Under section 1795, obligations under the
Song-Beverly Act attach “[i]f express warranties are made by persons other than
the manufacturer of the goods, the obligation of the person making such warranties
shall be the same as that imposed on the manufacturer under this chapter.” (Civ.
Code, § 1795.)
Therefore, the Court finds
that material issues of fact exist regarding wither Kia issued or made express
warranties with respect to the subject vehicle. Consequently, Defendant Kia has
failed to meet its initial burden of showing that it is entitled to summary
judgment as a matter of law.
The motion is DENIED.
Conclusion
Defendant’s Motion for
Summary, or Summary Adjudication in the alternative, is DENIED.
Defendant to give notice.