Judge: Yolanda Orozco, Case: 19STCV25754, Date: 2022-07-28 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 19STCV25754 Hearing Date: July 28, 2022 Dept: 31
DEMURRER IS SUSTAINED, IN PART; MOTION TO STRIKE IS DENIED
Background
This case concerns the ownership interest in the property
located at 732 117th St., Los Angeles, CA 90044 (“the Property”). Plaintiff
Sharon A. Sperling (“Sharon”) claims that Defendant Paul Sperling Sr. (“Paul
Sr.”) entered into a Stipulation for Settlement with her and her then
co-plaintiff Jewel Hunter (“Hunter”) in separate litigation between the parties
which required Paul Sr. to “execute any and all documents necessary to convey
title [to the Property] to Plaintiffs” Sharon and Hunter. Notably, this Stipulation for Settlement was
entered into on December 27, 2013 (“the Stipulation) in separate litigation
between Sharon and Paul Sr, which was dismissed on March 3, 2014. (Exh. 1 to
FAC; docket for Case No. BC503667.) Plaintiff alleges that title to the
property was never conveyed to her; rather, on August 23, 2018, Paul Sr.
quitclaimed the Property to current defendant Paul Sperling Jr. (Paul Jr.).
Plaintiff Sharon now brings causes of action for:
(1)
Specific Performance;
(2)
Breach of Contract;
(3)
Declaratory Relief Regarding Document No. 20111599755;
(4)
Declaratory Relief Regarding Document No. 20180869076;
(5)
Cancellation of Instrument;
(6)
Quiet Title; and
(7)
Financial Elder Abuse
Defendant Paul Jr. (“Defendant”) demurs to the first through
sixth causes of action in the FAC and moves to strike allegations in the FAC
related to punitive damages; attorneys’ fees; as well as factual allegations
that Defendant argues are time barred and irrelevant to the action at bar.
Plaintiff is representing herself pro per having
filed a substitution of attorney in November of 2021. Defendant’s demurrer and
motion to strike was filed June 3, 2021 with a hearing date of October 4, 2023.
(Demurrer pp. 1.)
This hearing on the Demurrer was continued to this date in a
Minute Order dated May 10, 2022.
Plaintiff was given notice of the hearing by mail at her personal
address as it appears in the substitution of attorney form she executed
November 5, 2021.
Plaintiff has not filed an opposition to the demurrer, nor
has Defendant filed any notice of non-opposition.
Legal Standard on
Demurrer
A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of
action. Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747. When
considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Wilson
v. Transit Authority of City of Sacramento (1962) 199 Cal.App.2d 716,
720-21.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of
the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004)
116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleading alone, and not on the
evidence or facts alleged.” (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Servs. (2007)
153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.) As such, the court assumes the truth of the
complaint’s properly pleaded or implied factual allegations. (Id.)
However, it does not accept as true deductions, contentions, or conclusions of
law or fact. (Stonehouse Homes LLC v.
City of Sierra Madre (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 531, 538.) A demurrer may be
sustained “only if the complaint fails to state a cause of action under
any possible legal theory.” (Sheehan v.
San Francisco 49ers, Ltd. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 992, 998.)
Legal Standard
for Motion to Strike
Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and
file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof. (Code of Civ.
Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1322(b).) The court
may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion and upon terms it deems
proper: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in
any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or
filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of
the court. (Code of Civ. Proc., § 436, subds. (a)-(b); Stafford v. Shultz
(1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782 [“Matter in a pleading which is not essential to the
claim is surplusage; probative facts are surplusage and may be stricken out or
disregarded”].)
Discussion
Statute of Limitations
The factual basis for Plaintiff’s
claims concern a property dispute that was settled in December 27, 2013, pursuant
to the referenced Stipulation in separate litigation with Paul Sr. The statute
of limitations for the first through sixth causes of action is set at four
years by California Code of Civil Procedure Section 337 subdivision 1. The only
allegation in the FAC beyond the date of December 2013, is the allegation that
Paul Sr. quitclaimed the Property to Paul Jr. on August 23, 2018, and therefore
clouded title on the Property that should have allegedly been transferred to
Defendant in accordance with the 2013 Stipulation.
Missing from the factual
allegations is any explanation or basis for Plaintiff's failure to seek
enforcement of the Stipulation at any time since it was agreed to, or during
the four years since. Plaintiff filed
her Complaint in this matter on July 24, 2019, almost 6 years after the
Stipulation.
The Court agrees with Defendant
that the first through sixth causes of action are time barred under California
Code of Civil Procedure Section 337 subdivision 1.
Plaintiff’s seventh cause of action
for financial elder abuse is based on the allegedly invalid transfer of the
Property to Paul Jr. on August 23, 2018. The statute of limitations for a cause
of action for financial elder abuse is four years under California Welfare and Institutions
Code Section 15657.7. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s seventh cause of action is not
time-barred, and the Demurrer is overruled.
Res Judicata
Defendant further argues that the
seventh cause of action is barred by res judicata based on Plaintiff’s
prior lawsuit that was brought and dismissed with prejudice on March 3, 2014. (Demurrer
pp. 8.) However, res judicata cannot apply on this basis as the alleged
injury took place after the dismissal of the 2014 lawsuit, in 2018.
Motion to Strike
Defendant
moves to strike Plaintiff’s factual allegations relating to punitive damages
and for recovery of attorney's fees, along with other factual allegations that
Defendant argues are irrelevant.
Initially,
the Court finds that, as to the factual allegations relating to the first
through sixth causes of action, the motion to strike is moot as a result of the
demurrer.
As to the
allegations relating to punitive damages and attorney's fees, Plaintiff’s
seventh cause of action for financial abuse remains. Reasonable attorney’s fees
and costs are recoverable under California Welfare & Institutions Code §
15657.5, as are punitive damages.
Defendant
argues that Plaintiff has not pled allegations of “oppression, fraud, or
malice” with the requisite specificity to maintain a plea for punitive damages,
especially with regard to Defendant Paul Jr. However, as described above,
Plaintiff specifically alleges that Defendant Paul Jr. knowingly recorded the
false quitclaim deed on October 28, 2018, with the intent to harm and defraud
Plaintiff. This is sufficient to sustain the allegations of punitive damages.
The Court DENIES
Defendant’s Motion to strike in its entirety.
Conclusion
The Court finds that Plaintiff’s first
through sixth causes of action are time-barred under the applicable statutes of
limitations and on that basis the Demurrer is SUSTAINED, without leave to
amend. The Demurrer is OVERRULED as to the seventh cause of action for elder
abuse and it is not time-barred, nor bar by res judicata. The Motion to
Strike is DENIED.
Defendant to give notice.