Judge: Yolanda Orozco, Case: 19STCV30835, Date: 2022-10-31 Tentative Ruling

Counsel may submit on the tentative ruling by emailing Dept. 31 before 8:30 the morning of the hearing. The email address is smcdept31@lacourt.org. Please do not call the court to submit on the tentative. Please do not submit to the tentative ruling on behalf of the opposing party. Please do not e-mail the Court if you plan to appear and argue.

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**Tentative rulings on Motions for Summary Judgment will only be available for review in the courtroom on the day of the hearing.



Case Number: 19STCV30835    Hearing Date: October 31, 2022    Dept: 31

HEARING DATE:                 October 31, 2022

CASE NUMBER:                  19STCV30835

CASE NAME:                        Emily Beers. v. Robert Giambalvo, et al.

MOVING PARTIES:             Defendants, Redfin Corporation and Robert Giambalvo

OPPOSING PARTIES:          Defendants, Prima Property, LLC-Application filed on April 19, 2022

TRIAL DATE:                        None

PROOF OF SERVICE:          OK 

                                                                                                                                                           

MOTION:                               Motion to Contest Good Faith Settlement Determination 

OPPOSITION:                       October 18, 2022

REPLY:                                  October 24, 2022

                                                                                                                                                           

TENTATIVE:                         The Redfin Defendants’ motion is granted. The Application for Determination of Good Faith Settlement is denied. The Redfin Defendants are to give notice. 

 

                                                                                                                                                           

Background

This action arises in connection with a residence located at 2320 Berkeley Avenue in Los Angeles County, California (the “Residence”).  Emily Beers (“Plaintiff”) alleges that Defendant and Seller, Prima Property, LLC (“Seller”) acquired the Residence with the intent of remodeling and reselling it (“Flipping” or “Flipping Homes”).  Plaintiff alleges that Seller, in flipping the Residence, remodeled the Residence in a generally unworkmanlike manner. Thereafter, Plaintiff purchased the Residence and certain systems in the Residence began breaking down, which led Plaintiff to discover other undisclosed material defects to many areas, such as the Residence’ electrical system, plumbing system, framing, and load bearing components.

 

After Seller remodeled the Residence, it allegedly listed the residence as “exceptional” on the Multiple Listing Service despite its alleged knowledge that the Residence contained many defects. Further, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Redfin Corporation (“Redfin”) and Robert Giambalvo (“Giambalvo”) are also liable to her for damages because they repeatedly made allegedly false representations that the Residence was of superior quality and free from defects in assisting her with purchase of the Residence.  

 

Plaintiff’s operative Complaint alleges causes of action as follows: (1) fraudulent inducement against Seller, (2) intentional misrepresentation, (3) constructive fraud, (4) fraud-concealment against all Defendants, (5) breach of fiduciary duty against Redfin, (6) negligent misrepresentation, (7) negligence, (8) negligence per se against Seller, (9) breach of contract against Seller, (10) violation of Penal Code § 496(a) against Seller, (11) violation of Business and Professions Code § 7000 against Seller, (12) violation of implied warranties against Seller, (13) violation of Business and Professions Code § 17200 against Seller. 

 

On July 20, 2020, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint. (“FAC”)  

 

On July 27, 2020, Seller’s Motion to Compel Arbitration was granted. The court further ordered as follows: 

 

“Plaintiff is ordered to arbitrate her claims against Seller pursuant to the RPA and to file a petition to arbitrate within 60 days. The court sets an order to show cause re commencement of arbitration for September 30, 2020 at 8:30 a.m. If plaintiff files proof of commencement before that date, no appearance is necessary. Plaintiff’s remaining causes of action against the Defendants who are not parties to the arbitration are stayed pending the completion of arbitration.” 

 

(July 27, 2020 Minute Order.) 

 

On August 21, 2020, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Partial Settlement with Seller and a Request for Dismissal as to Seller.  

 

On September 30, 2020, the court held an Order to Show Cause Regarding Commencement of Arbitration. At this hearing, the court lifted the stay previously set on July 27, 2020.

 

On December 23, 2020, Plaintiff gave notice that the FAC was being withdrawn.   

 

On February 3, 2021, the court granted Redfin Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration and stayed the action pending binding arbitration as to the entire action.

 

On August 5, 2020, Plaintiff reached a settlement with the Seller conditioned upon a determination of good faith settlement. On April 19, 2022, Seller filed their application for Determination of Good Faith Settlement. On May 9, 2022, Redfin Defendants filed their motion contesting the motion for good faith settlement.

Seller opposes the motion contesting good faith settlement.

The Redfin Defendants’ motion now comes on for hearing.

 

 

Redfin Defendants’ Objections

Objections to Declaration of Kevin Spainhour

Objection 1: Sustained.   

Objections 2-3.  Overruled.

 

Discussion 

 

I.                   Legal Standard 

 

Any party to an action involving joint tortfeasors may seek a hearing on the issue of the good faith of a settlement entered into by the plaintiff and one or more of the alleged tortfeasors.  

(CCP § 877.6(a)(1).)  “A determination by the court that the settlement was made in good faith shall bar any other joint tortfeasor or co-obligor from any further claims against the settling tortfeasor or co-obligor for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault.”  (CCP § 877.6(c).) 

 

“The statutory requirement of good faith extends not only to the amount of the overall settlement but as well to any allocation which operates to exclude any portion of the settlement from the setoff.”  (L.C. Rudd & Son, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 742, 748.)  “Where there are multiple defendants, each having potential liability for different areas of damage, an allocation of the settlement amount must be made.”  (Id. at p. 750.)  Failure to do so may preclude a ‘good faith’ determination because there is no way to determine the appropriate setoff pursuant to section 877 against the nonsettling defendant.  (Ibid.)  It is the burden of the settling parties to explain to the court and to all other parties the evidentiary basis for any allocations and valuations made sufficient to demonstrate that a reasonable allocation was made. (Ibid.) 

 

In Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488 (Tech-Bilt), the California Supreme Court set forth the factors to be considered in determining whether a settlement is in good faith:  

 

[T]he intent and policies underlying section 877.6 require that a number of factors be taken into account including a rough approximation of plaintiffs’ total recovery and the settlor’s proportionate liability, the amount paid in settlement, the allocation of settlement proceeds among plaintiffs, and a recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than he would if he were found liable after a trial.  Other relevant considerations include the financial conditions and insurance policy limits of settling defendants, as well as the existence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of nonsettling defendants.  [Citation.]  Finally, practical considerations obviously require that the evaluation be made on the basis of information available at the time of settlement. 

 

(Id. at p. 499.) 

A trial court need not consider and weigh the Tech-Bilt factors when a motion for good faith determination is uncontested.  (Grand Terracesupra, 192 Cal.App.3d at p. 1261.)  “That is to say, when no one objects, the barebones motion which sets forth the ground of good faith, accompanied by a declaration which sets forth a brief background of the case is sufficient.”  (Ibid.)   

 

II.                Analysis

 

The Seller seeks a determination that their settlement with Plaintiff for $75,000 was made in good faith and an order that the settlement “represents a fair and equitable approximation of Defendant’s liability in this action.” (Notice of Motion, 1-2.)

 

Seller argues that their motion should be granted because their settlement with Plaintiff satisfies several Tech-Bilt factors. Specifically, Seller argues that their settlement satisfied this first three factors for the following reasons: (1) the settlement is “her own valuation of the costs of repairs” (2) the Seller’s settlement payment is substantially more than their share of liability, (3) the settlement did not result from collusion, fraud or tortious conduct, (4) Defendant’s only liability remains for cosmetic changes Defendant made to the property, and (5) as discovery has yet to be completed, and an investigation into the facts has yet to take place, the settlement arose from the information available at the time, the inspection reports and Plaintiff’s valuation. (Application, 11-15.)

 

The Seller submits a declaration from Kevin Spainhour (“Spainhour”) in support of their motion. According to Spainhour, Seller and Plaintiff reached a settlement that includes the following terms:

 

3. SETTLEMENT

3.1 Intent This Agreement is a full release and settlement of any and all claims and demands of any type asserted or which could have been asserted by the Settling Parties against each other to date, arising out of or related to PLAINTIFF's purchase of the Property and arising out of or related to the Action. In consideration of the mutual promises, covenants, and commitments contained in this Agreement, the Settling Parties agree as set forth in this Section 3 and all of the subsections thereof.

3.2 Terms of Payment and Settlement DEFENDANT agrees to pay the total lump sum of Seventy Five Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents ($75,000.00) in good funds to PLAINTIFF pursuant to the terms of this subsection 3.2 (the "Settlement Payment") on or before August 10, 2020.

The Settlement Payment shall be made by a Cashier's Check in United States Dollars and in good funds payable to The KERMAN[ LAW FIRM, located at 12400 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 400, Los Angeles, CA 90025, telephone number: (310) 475~3400. The Settlement Payment to PLAINTIFF shall be delivered in full to The Kermani Law Firm, Plaintiff's counsel as stated herein, on or before MONDAY, AUGUST 10, 2020. Failure to deliver the Settlement Payment cashier's check on or before said date, to the Kermani Law Firm is a material breach or this Agreement and renders this Agreement completely null and void.

 

3.3 Dismissal

 

Upon DEFENDANT's fulfillment of: (a) the payment by AUGUST I 0, 2020 as provided in this Agreement; (b) unconditional clearing in good funds of the Settlement Payment that are available for withdrawal by PLAINTIFF's counsel; and (c) DEFENDANT's obligation to execute this Agreement, then and only then shall PLAINTIFF execute and file with the court, including service on DEFENDANT's attorney Kevin Spainhour, Esq., a Notice of Settlement within ten ( I 0) court days and a Request for Dismissal with prejudice of DEFENDANT within ten ( I 0) court days after the Settlement Payment has been made pursuant to this Agreement in good funds and has unconditionally cleared into the financial institution of Plaintiff's counsel and is available for immediate withdrawal and DEFENDANT's obligations have been met pursuant to this Agreement.

 

Thereafter, Plaintiff shall provide DEFENDANT's attorney with a signed copy of the Request for Dismissal within ten (I 0) court days after a conformed copy of the entered Request for Dismissal is received by Plaintiff's attorneys.

 

...

 

 4. MUTUAL GENERAL RELEASES

 

In consideration of the terms and conditions made by the Settling Parties to each other under this Agreement, DEFENDANT for itself, and on behalf of its past, present and future members, shareholders, investors, affiliates, attorneys, heirs, executors, administrators, successors and assigns, ("privies") release, unconditionally and immediately upon execution of this Agreement acquits and forever discharges PLAINTIFF and PLAINTIFF's heirs, executors, administrators, successors, assigns, and attorneys, from any and all claims, liabilities, demands, obligations, costs, any costs or expenses whatsoever, attorneys' fees and actions which DEFENDANT and its privies have held or could have held against PLAINTIFF and her privies, or now hold with respect to the matters asserted or that could have been asserted in the Action, including, but not limited to, claims for attorneys fees and costs related to or arising out of any and all motions, petitions or proceedings; claims of malicious prosecution, sanctions, claims for attorneys fees and costs for any reason whatsoever or any other claims whatsoever related to or arising out of the Action and/or the Property.

 

In consideration of the terms and conditions made by the Settling Parties to each other under this Agreement, subject to the unconditional receipt by AUGUST 10, 2020, by PLAINTIFF's attorney, in trust, of unconditional cleared funds available for immediate withdrawal, representing the Settlement Payment, PLAINTIFF for herself and on behalf of her heirs, executors, administrators, attorneys, successors and assigns, releases, ("privies") acquits and forever discharges DEFENDANT and DEFENDANT's past, present and future members, shareholders, investors, affiliates. heirs. executors, administrators, successors, assigns, ("privies") from any and all claims, liabilities, demands, obligations, costs, any costs or expenses whatsoever, attorneys' fees and actions which PLAINTIFF and her privies have held or could have held against DEFENDANT and its privies, or now hold with respect to the matters asserted: or that could have been asserted in the Action, including, but not limited to, claims for attorneys fees and costs related to or arising out of any and all motions, petitions or proceedings, claims of malicious prosecution, sanctions, claims for attorneys fees and costs for any reason whatsoever or any other claims whatsoever related to or arising out of the Action and/or the Property.

 

By entering into this Settlement Agreement, PLAINTIFF does not waive or assign any of her rights to pursue an action or remedy against any person or entity who is not a signatory to this Agreement, including but not limited to defendant Robert Giambalvo, defendant Redfin Corporation and DEFENDANT's general contractors or subcontractors involved in work at the Property all of whom are specifically excluded from this Agreement.

 

5. WAIVER OF CIVIL CODE§ 1542

Subject to and without waiving PLAINTIFF's rights under Section 3, it is the intention of the Settling Parties in executing this Agreement that it shall be effective as a bar to each and every claim, demand and cause of action against the other Settling Party, and in furtherance of this intention the Settling Parties and their privies, and each of them, waive and relinquish all rights and benefits they may have under California Civil Code section 1542, which provides in pertinent part:

A GENERAL RELEASE DOES NOT EXTEND TO CLAIMS THAT THE CREDITOR OR RELEASING PARTY DOES NOT KNOW OR SUSPECT TO EXIST IN HIS OR HER FAVOR AT THE TIME OF EXECUTING THE RELEASE AND THAT, IF KNOWN BY HIM OR HER, WOULD HAVE MATERIALLY AFFECTED HIS OR HER SETTLEMENT WITH THE DEBTOR OR RELEASED PARTY.

 

The Settling Parties and their privies, and each of them, acknowledge that they may hereafter discover facts different from or in addition to those now known or believed to be true with respect to the Action and such claims, demands or causes of action, and agree that this Agreement shall be and remain effective in all respects notwithstanding any such different or additional facts.

 

(Spainhour Decl., Exh. A.)

 

Redfin Defendants, in their motion to contest this application, correctly point out that Seller failed to provide notice as required by CCP § 877.6. (Motion, 4-5.) Seller subsequently filed a Proof of Service establishing Defendant’s counsel were served by certified mail on September 21, 2022.  The court also notes that Seller served the Application upon defendants’ counsel by email on September 21, 2022. 

Redfin Defendants also contend the Application fails because it “does not present a rough approximation of a Plaintiff’s total recovery and thus there is no way to analyze what Prima's proportionate liability is, because it fails to take into account the potential indemnity to Redfin and Giambalvo; and because it offers no evidence or argument as to Prima's insurance or financial condition.” (Motion 6.) Redfin Defendants thus point out that Plaintiff’s estimation of the reasonable cost of repairs, as inferred from discovery responses, is in excess of $1,500,000.00, not $75,000. (Id.) Redfin Defendants further contend here that as the Complaint not only seeks $1.5 million in repair costs, “but also seeks non-economic damages, punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees,” the proposed settlement amount is not within a reasonable settlement range. (Motion, 7; citing Long Beach Mem. Med. Ctr. (2009) 172 Cal. App.4th 865, 874.) Redfin Defendants also correctly point out Seller has provided little information regarding its own financial conditions or insurance policy limits. (Motion, 7-8.) Lastly, Redfin Defendants also contend Seller produces little evidence to show why the non-settling Defendants should pay “significantly greater” than their share of liability. (Motion, 8.)

 

In opposition, Seller contends Plaintiff “has extensive knowledge relating to the cost of repairs and the conduct of the parties while transacting the sale that forms the basis for this action” and believes that $75,000 is a fair settlement for the Seller, even though the Complaint alleges $1,500,000.00 in cost of repairs. (Opp., 2-3.) Seller again reiterates the contention that it “approximates” Plaintiff’s “total recovery to be $75,000 and its proportionate liability to be less than 10%.” (Opp., 5-6.) However, Seller again fails to point to substantiating evidence for its valuation. Seller further contends Redfin Defendants have not offered any evidence that $75,000 “does not represent [Seller’s] proportionate liability in this action.” (Opp., 7.) As such, Seller contends Redfin Defendants have not met their burden to contest the determination. (Id.) Seller also points to Plaintiff’s incurred expenses, as described in the discovery responses, to assert “based on information available to the Court at this time, that $75,000 represents an approximation of Plaintiff’s total recovery in this action.” (Opp., 8.) Seller also fails to discuss its own financial conditions and policy limits, but rather contends “the relevance of this factor is not apparent” as “[Seller] has already paid the settlement.” (Opp., 8-9.) Lastly, Seller contends Plaintiff only asserted punitive and exemplary damages against the Redfin Defendants, and there “are no other damages being alleged against [Seller].” (Opp., 9-10.)

 

Redfin Defendants filed a reply to Seller’s opposition to the instant motion. The reply again argues that the application’s analysis about Seller’s liability, misrepresentations of allegations against it and the potential damages, Seller’s potential liability for punitive damages, and failure to provide more information regarding Seller’s financial conditions are insufficient to satisfy the Tech-Bilt factors. (Reply, 3-6.)

 

The court agrees with the contesting defendants that the Seller’s application fails to demonstrate why the settlement with Plaintiff was in good faith. According to the application, the settlement was in good faith because it was for an amount larger than Plaintiff’s claims against all defendants. However, Seller does not explain the basis for its approximation of its liability, and fails to discuss and/or include an analysis of all the claims made against it. Further, Seller fails to explain the entirety of the information made available to it during the settlement discussions, and further fails to divulge information regarding its own financial conditions. The substantial difference between Plaintiff’s alleged damages, and the small share of damages as represented by this settlement amount, give the court serious pause as explained by Long Beach Mem. Med. Ctr. (2009) 172 Cal. App.4th 865. As such, Seller’s application is insufficient in its analysis to show this court that the settlement has been made in good faith.  

 

For these reasons, the Seller’s application is denied and the Redfin Defendants’ motion to contest is granted.

 

Conclusion

 

The Redfin Defendants’ motion is granted. The Application for Determination of Good Faith Settlement is denied. The Redfin Defendants are to give notice.