Judge Yolanda Orozco, Case 19STCV37312 2022-09-07 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Yolanda Orozco, Case: 19STCV37312, Date: 2022-09-07 Tentative Ruling

Counsel may submit on the tentative ruling by emailing Dept. 31 before 8:30 the morning of the hearing. The email address is smcdept31@lacourt.org. Please do not call the court to submit on the tentative. Please do not submit to the tentative ruling on behalf of the opposing party. Please do not e-mail the Court if you plan to appear and argue.

In deciding whether to submit on the tentative ruling or attend the hearing and present oral argument, please keep the following in mind:

The tentative rulings authored by this court reflect that the court has read and considered all pleadings and evidence timely submitted to the court in connection with the motion, opposition, and reply (if any). Because the pleadings were filed, they are part of the public record.

Oral argument is not an opportunity to simply regurgitate that which a party set forth in its pleadings. Nor, is oral argument an opportunity to "make a record" when there is no court reporter present and the statements and arguments of counsel are already part of the record because they were set forth in the pleadings. Finally, simply because a party or attorney disagrees with the court's analysis and ruling or is not satisfied with it does not necessarily warrant oral argument when no new arguments will be articulated.

If you submit on the tentative, you must immediately notify all other parties email that you will not appear at the hearing. If you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the motions. If all parties to the motion submit, this tentative ruling will become the final ruling after the hearing date and it will be memorialized in a minute order. This tentative ruling is not an invitation, nor an opportunity, to file further documents relative to the hearing in question. No such document will be considered by the Court.

**Tentative rulings on Motions for Summary Judgment will only be available for review in the courtroom on the day of the hearing.

Case Number: 19STCV37312 Hearing Date: September 7, 2022 Dept: 31

MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES IS GRANTED, IN PART

Background

On October 18, 2020, Plaintiff Daniel Kang filed the instant action against Volvo Cars of North America, LLC aka Volvo Cars US, LLC, Volvo of Santa Monica (collectively “Volvo”); and Does 1 through 10.

On January 15, 2020, Plaintiff filed the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). The FAC asserts causes of action for:

1) Violation of Subdivision (d) of Civil Code Section 1793.2 (against Volvo NA);

2) Violation of Subdivision (b) of Civil Code Section 1793.2 (against Volvo NA);

3) Violation of Subdivision (a)(3) of Civil Code Section 1793.2 (against Volvo NA);

4) Breach of Express Written Warranty (Civ. Code § 1791.2, subd. (a); § 1794) (against Volvo NA);

5) Breach of the Implied Warranty of Merchantability (Civ. Code § 1791.1; § 1794; § 1795.5) (against Volvo NA);

6) Fraud by Omission (against Volvo NA); and

7) Negligent Repair (against Volvo SM).

Plaintiff accepted Volvo’s 998 Settlement Offer on April 22, 2022. On May 23, 2022, a Notice of Settlement was filed.

On July 20, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Attorney’s Fees, Costs, and Expenses.

On August 24, 2022, Volvo filed an Opposition. Volvo filed a Reply on August 30, 2022.

Legal Standard

Under the Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d) the prevailing party in an action that arises out of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act is entitled to fees that were reasonably incurred:¿ “If the buyer prevails under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the Court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney's fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” (Civ. Code, § 1794(d).)¿¿¿¿

The lodestar method is the primary method for determining a reasonable attorney fee award under section 1794, subdivision (d).¿ (See Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 818-19.)¿ “A trial court assessing attorney fees begins with a touchstone or lodestar figure, based on the careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney involved in the presentation of the case.” (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1321 [internal quotations omitted].)¿ “The reasonableness of attorney fees is within the discretion of the trial court, to be determined from a consideration of such factors as the nature of the litigation, the complexity of the issues, the experience and expertise of counsel and the amount of time involved.¿ [citation] The court may also consider whether the amount requested is based upon unnecessary or duplicative work.”¿ (Wilkerson v. Sullivan (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 443, 448.)¿ “The basis for the trial court's calculation must be the actual hours counsel has devoted to the case, less those that result from inefficient or duplicative use of time.”¿ (Horsford v. Board Of Trustees Of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 395.)¿ “The law is clear, however, that an award of attorney fees may be based on counsel's declarations, without production of detailed time records.”¿(Raining Data Corp. v. Barrenechea (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1375.)¿¿¿

In setting the hourly rate for an attorney fees award, courts are entitled to consider the rate of “fees customarily charged by that attorney and others in the community for similar work.” (Bihun v. AT&T Information Systems, Inc. (1993) 13 Cal. App. 4th 976, 997 [affirming rate of $450 per hour], overruled on other grounds by Lakin v. Watkins Associated Indus. (1993) 6 Cal. 4th 644, 664; see also Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 1009 [“[R]ate determinations in other cases, particularly those setting a rate for the plaintiffs' attorney, are satisfactory evidence of the prevailing market rate.”].)

Request for Judicial Notice

Plaintiff requests Judicial Notice of the following:

1. A February 27, 2014 Minute Order granting plaintiff’s motion for fees and costs in the matter Khani v. Ford Motor Company (L.A. Super. Ct. Case No. BC466626), attached as Exhibit 1 to the Declaration of Payam Shahian.

2. A May 9, 2017 Stipulation and signed Order regarding judgment of jury verdict with a 2 times civil penalty and attorney fees, costs, and expenses in the matter of Vanwaus v. FCA US, LLC (Los Angeles Super. Ct., Case No. BC591282), attached as Exhibit 2 to the Declaration of Payam Shahian.

3. A September 27, 2017 Minute Order concerning the Court’s Fee Order in the matter of Fuller v. FCA US, LLC (Los Angeles Super. Ct., Case No. BC556964), attached as Exhibit 3 to the Declaration of Payam Shahian.

4. A February 27, 2017 Notice of Ruling and Tentative Ruling in the matter of Kazaryan v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (Los Angeles Super. Ct., Case No. BC574416) attached as Exhibit 4 to the Declaration of Payam Shahian.

5. A Notice of Ruling in the matter of Geredes v. Chrysler Group LLC (Los Angeles Super. Ct., Case No. BC52364) attached as Exhibit 5 to the Declaration of Payam Shahian.

6. A Notice of Ruling in the matter of Ahmed Al-Jiboury v. FCA (Los Angeles Superior Court Case No BC648057) attached as Exhibit 6 to the Declaration of Payam Shahian.

7. A Second Amended Judgment on Jury Verdict after Entry of Additur in the matter of Kadkhoda v. MBUSA (Los Angeles Superior Court Case No BC563069) attached as Exhibit 7 to the Declaration of Payam Shahian.

8. A Notice of Ruling on Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees, costs and expenses in the matter of Raul Galindo v. General Motors (LASC Case No BC693061) attached as Exhibit 8 to the Declaration of Payam Shahian.

9. An Order on attorney’s fees and prejudgment interest in the lemon law matter of Abraham Forouzan v. BMW (United States District Court for the Central District of California Case No. 2:17-cv-03875-DMG-GJS), attached as Exhibit 9 to the Declaration of Payam Shahian.

10. An Order on attorney’s fees, costs and expenses in the lemon law matter of Joshua Holeman v. FCA (United States District Court for the Central District of California Case No. 2:17-cv-08273-SVWSK), attached as Exhibit 10 to the Declaration of Payam Shahian.

11. An Order on attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses in the lemon law matter of Catherine Shepard v. BMW (Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. BC622506), attached as Exhibit 11 to the Declaration of Payam Shahian.

12. Order on attorneys’ fees and prejudgment interest in the lemon law matter of Jerry Zomorodian v. BMW (United States District Court for the Central District of California Case No. 2:17-cv5061-DMG(PLAx)), attached as Exhibit 12 to the Declaration of Payam Shahian.

13. Order on attorneys’ fees and prejudgment interest in the lemon law matter of Zargarian v. BMW (United States District Court for the Central District of California Case No. 2:18-cv-04857-RSWLPLA), attached as Exhibit 13 to the Declaration of Payam Shahian.

14. September 16, 2016 order granting plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees, Costs and Expenses in the lemon law matter of Soderstrom v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (San Francisco Super. Ct., Civil Case No.CGC15544475) attached as Exhibit 14 to the Declaration of Payam Shahian.

15. The Declaration of Bryan Kemnitzer filed in support of plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees, Costs, and Expenses in the Song Beverly natter of Soderstrom v Mercedes-Benz, USA, LLC (San Francisco Super. Ct., Civil Case No. CGC15544475) attached as Exhibit 15 to the Declaration of Payam Shahian.

16. February 14, 2019, order in Khomsone v BMW of North America, LLC (Alameda Super. Ct., Civil Case No. RG17856686) attached as Exhibit 16 to the Declaration of Payam Shahian.

17. July 28, 2020, order granting plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees, Costs, and Expenses in the matter of Flores v. FCA US, LLC (Sacramento Super. Ct., Case No. 34-2016-00192221-CU-BCGDS) attached as Exhibit 17 to the Declaration of Payam Shahian.

18. August 25, 2020, order in the matter of Jurosky v BMW of North America, LLC, (United States District Court for the Southern District of California Case No. 19cv706 JM (BGS)) attached as Exhibit 18 to the Declaration of Payam Shahian.

19. December 18, 2020 Order granting plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees, Costs & Expenses in the lemon law matter of Gonzalez v. MBUSA, (Los Angeles Co. Super. Ct. Civil Case No. SC128379) ) attached as Exhibit 19 to the Declaration of Payam Shahian.

20. April 29, 2021 Minute Order granting plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees, Costs & Expenses in the lemon law matter of Jose Medina v. KMA (Los Angeles Co. Super. Ct., Civil Case No. 19STCV02985) attached as Exhibit 20 to the Declaration of Payam Shahian.

21. May 10, 2021 Tentative Ruling granting plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees, Costs & Expenses in the lemon law matter of Michelle Williams v. KMA (Los Angeles Co. Super. Ct., Civil Case No. BC722351) attached as Exhibit 21 to the Declaration of Payam Shahian.

22. July 23, 2021, Minute Order granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorney’s Fees, Costs & Expenses in the lemon law matter of Scott Michael Feldman Gregory v. FCA US LLC, (County of Marin Case No. CIV1901820) attached as Exhibit 22 to the Declaration of Payam Shahian.

23. August 10, 2021, Tentative Ruling granting plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees, Costs & Expenses in the lemon law matter of Covarrubias v. Ford Motor Company, (N.D. Cal. Case No. 19-cv-01832-FMC) attached as Exhibit 23 to the Declaration of Payam Shahian.

24. June 25, 2018 order granting plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees, Costs & Expenses in the lemon law matter of Hall vs. FCA US LLC, (San Diego Superior Court Case No. 37-2016-00006383) attached as Exhibit 24 to the Declaration of Payam Shahian.

25. Declaration of Payam Shahian filed in support of plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees, Costs, and Expenses in the Song Beverly matter of Hall vs. FCA US LLC, (San Diego Superior Court Case No. 37-2016-00006383) attached as Exhibit 25 to the Declaration of Payam Shahian.

26. March 14, 2022 Order granting attorney’s fees in Oscar Millan vs Kia Motors America, Inc., (Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. BC710535) attached as Exhibit 26 to the Declaration of Payam Shahian.

27. March 14, 2022 Order granting attorney’s fees in Jason J. Arnold, et al.. vs FCA US, LLC. Et al. (Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. 19STCV26274), attached as Exhibit 27 to the Declaration of Payam Shahian.

28. March 29, 2022 Order granting attorney’s fees and approving rates in Mo Rahman v. FCA US LLC, et al. – F. Supp. 3d --, 2022 WL 1013433 (C.D. Cal. March 29, 2022), attached as Exhibit 28 to the Declaration of Payam Shahian.

29. Order on attorneys’ fees in Holcomb v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, Case No. 18CV475JM(BGS) 2020 WL 759285 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2020) attached as Exhibit 29 to the Declaration of Payam Shahian.

Pursuant to Evidence Code Section 452 subdivision (d)(2), the Court may take judicial notice of records of any court of record of the United States. However, the court may only judicially notice the existence of the record, not that its contents are the truth. (Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1565.)

Plaintiff’s request for Judicial Notice is GRANTED.

Evidentiary Objections

Defendant Volvo’s Objection to the Declaration of Payam Shahian is OVERRULED. Shahian is permitted to speak of his knowledge regarding the prevailing market rate for attorneys of comparable experience. (See Zargarian v. BMW of N. Am., LLC (C.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2020) 442 F. Supp. 3d 1216, 1227 [denying BMW’s relevance objections on the same grounds.])

Discussion

Pursuant to the terms of the signed 998 Settlement between the parties, the Subject Vehicle would be repurchased for $35,000.00, and “Volvo will pay Plaintiff’s attorney's fees, expenses and costs in the amount to be determined by the Court to have been reasonably incurred pursuant to Civil Code Section 1794(d) via a single noticed motion.” (Henderson Decl. ¶ 25, Ex. A.)

Plaintiff requests a fee award totaling $119,905.38 for two and half years of litigation. The amount consists of $71,135.50 for Strategic Legal Practices, APC (“SLP”) and $12,564.00 for California Consumer Attorneys, P.C. (CCA) and a 1.35 multiplier on attorney fees or $29,295.18, and $7,027.33 in costs and expenses for SLP. In addition, Plaintiff’s counsel requests an additional $3,500.00 for reviewing Defendant’s Opposition, drafting a response, and attending the hearing on the Motion. Attached as Exhibit A is a copy of the billing invoice. (Rosenstein Decl. Ex. A.) In total, Plaintiff requests $123,523.01, which includes $3,500 in fees for reviewing Volvo’s Opposition, preparing a Reply brief, and attending the hearing on the Motion. (Shahian Decl. ¶ 62.)

Volvo Opposes the Motion on the basis that the Fees and Costs sought by SLP arise either unreasonable, duplicative, or unnecessary. SLP maintains that the fees were reasonably incurred.

1. No Memorandum of Costs

Under Civil Codes section 1794(d), if the buyer prevails, they are entitled to recover “as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses . . . reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.”

Though not explicitly stated in section 1974(d), to recover costs, Plaintiff was required to file a memorandum of costs prior to seeking recovery of costs. California Rules of Court rule 3.1700 states:

“A prevailing party who claims costs must serve and file a memorandum of costs within 15 days after the date of service of the notice of entry of judgment or dismissal by the clerk under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.5 or the date of service of written notice of entry of judgment or dismissal, or within 180 days after entry of judgment, whichever is first. The memorandum of costs must be verified by a statement of the party, attorney, or agent that to the best of his or her knowledge the items of cost are correct and were necessarily incurred in the case.”

(CRC rule 3.1700(a).)

The Court knows of no case that would allow Plaintiff to recover costs without filing a memorandum of costs, since without the memorandum the non-prevailing party would not be able to move to strike or tax costs under California Rules of Court rule 3.1700(b). Moreover, a memorandum of costs would allow the court to determine if the costs were “necessarily incurred in the case.” (CRC rule 3.1700(a).)

Accordingly, the Court will only consider the motion as to Plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees and not costs. Plaintiff must file a Memorandum of Costs.

2. Recovery for Fraud Cause of Action

Volvo asserts that SLP failed to show how much time was spent on the Song-Beverly Act claims in comparison to the fraud claim, the latter which is not entitled to attorney’s fees. Volvo relies on Bell v. Vista Unified School Dist. (2000) for the proposition that “[w]hen a cause of action for which attorney fees are provided by statute is joined with other causes of action for which attorney fees are not permitted, the prevailing party may recover only on the statutory cause of action.” (Bell v. Vista Unified School Dist. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 672, 689.)

SLP points out that under Santana v. FCA US, LLC (2020), “apportionment is not required when the claims for relief are so intertwined that it would be impracticable, if not impossible, to separate the attorney’s time into compensable and noncompensable units.” (Santana v. FCA US, LLC (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 334, 349 citing Bell, supra, 82 CalApp.4th at 263.) SLP argues that under Bell, attorney’s “fees need not be apportioned when incurred for representation on an issue common to both causes of action in which fees are proper and those in which they are not.” (Bell, supra, 82 Ca.App.4th at 263.)

Under Civil Code Section 1794(d) and under the terms of the 998 Offer, Plaintiff can recover attorney’s fees for the time spent prosecuting the action, including the fraud claim because they encompass one common set of facts. (Santana, supra, 56 Cal.App 5th at 349.) Accordingly, the Court agrees that SLP was not required to apportion and allocate fees between the Song-Beverly Act claims and the fraud claims when both causes of action arose from the same operative fact; the purchase of the Subject Vehicle.

3. Costs Incurred after the First 998 Offer on February 18, 2022

Volvo argues that Plaintiff should not recover fees and costs incurred after Volvo made its first initial 998 Offer on February 18, 2022, because Plaintiff went on to accept the Offer on April 22, 2022. Volvo argues that during the 2.5 months that lapsed from when the Offer was originally made, Plaintiff incurred 22 billable hours, $10,450.00 in fees, and $2,909.35 in costs.

Plaintiff asserts that engaging in further discovery, such as preparing and attending the PMQ deposition and exchanging emails with opposing counsel, where necessary to evaluate the 998 Offer fully and fairly. This also included communicating the offer with Plaintiff and informing Plaintiff of what was learned from the discovery.

After reviewing the time entries, the Court finds the hours billed were reasonably incurred. Accordingly, no deductions will be made.

4. Recovery of Court Reporter Fees and Other Expenses

Plaintiff states that Volvo has no authority to support this proposition because under Civil Code section 1794(d), the inclusion of the word “expenses” include expenses beyond those enumerated under Code of Civil Procedure section 1035.5. (See Jensen v. BMW of North America (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 112, 137-138 [examining the legislative history of Song-Beverly to determine that the “costs and expenses” language was to be interpreted broadly to include such things as filing fees, expert witness fees, marshal’s fees, etc., to “‘open the litigation process to everyone.’”]; see also Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 24, 42-43 [finding buyer could recover reasonable costs incurred in connection with her action under Song-Beverly, including trial transcripts that were not court ordered.].) Therefore, the Court agrees with SLP that court reporter fees are recoverable under section 1794(d).

As to any other expenses opposed by Volvo, Volvo fails to point to the specifically objected expenses. (See Lunada¿Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 240 Cal.App.4th 459, 488 [“In challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence.”].) Accordingly, Volvo has failed to show that the costs and expenses SLP seeks to recover are not recoverable under section 1794(d).

Thus, no deductions in costs and expenses will be made.

5. Improper Billing

Volvo alleges that Plaintiff’s billing is unreasonable, duplicative, and unnecessary, due to Plaintiff’s use of block billing entries and overstaffing based on Volvo’s assertion that thirteen (13) attorneys worked on the case, each with various billing rates ranging from $350.00 to $650.00 per hour. Reviewing the SLP’s billing records shows that only 11 attorneys worked on the matter. (Shanian Decl. ¶ 60, Ex. 30.)

a. Billing by Greg Sogoyan

In particular, Volvo objects to the billing of Greg Sogoyan. (See i.e., Shahian Ex. 30.)

· On 8/26/20, Sogoyan billed 4.9 hours to “Prepare for, and attend IDC; draft hearing outcome memo”. – The Court finds that the amount billed is excessive and therefore unreasonable. First, the drafting a hearing outcome memorandum is unnecessary as it is not in aid of prosecuting the case. A deduction will be made for this task each time it is billed. Second, the IDC was no more than 30 minutes, and the court requires only a 2-page statement. It should only have taken 1.5 hours to prepare for and attend the IDC. Accordingly, $1,309.00 will be subtracted from SLP’s lodestar amount.

· On 11/04/20, Sogoyan billed 3.9 hours to “Prepare for & attend motion to leave to file second amended complaint; draft hearing outcome memo.” – Since the Court’s tentative ruling was to grant the motion, there should have been little preparation required to attend the hearing, especially since opposing counsel did not appear. The total time spent on this task should have been 1.5 hours. Accordingly, $924.00 will be subtracted from SLP’s lodestar amount.

· On 12/04/20, Sogoyan billed 4.5 hours to “review volvo documents production and P’s repair history.”

· On 1/4/21, Sogoyan billed at total of 8.3 hours to “Analyze defendant’s opposition to plaintiff’s motion to compel deposition of DeGrazio, prepare outline of arguments for reply brief” (3.7 hours) and “Draft Plaintiff’s reply brief in support of Plaintiff’s motion to compel deposition of DeGrazio” (4.6 hours), billed at a rate of $395.00 per hour. – The amount billed is excessive and therefore unreasonable. It should have taken counsel no more than 1 hour to review the opposition and 2.5 hours to draft a reply. Accordingly, $1,896.00 will be subtracted from SLP’s the lodestar amount

· On 1/11/21, Sogoyan billed a total of 3.7 hours to “: Prepare for and attend hearing regarding Plaintiff’s motion to compel deposition of Steve DeGrazio; draft hearing outcome memo,” billed at a rate of $395.00 per hour. – The Court notes that the parties appeared by telephone and it should only have taken 2.0 hours to prepare for and attend the hearing. Accordingly, $671.50 will be subtracted from SLP’s lodestar amount

6. Boilerplate Work

Volvo alleges SLP billed 41.1 hours for a total of $17,467.50 for pure boilerplate work such as:

· Plaintiff’s counsel billed 14.5 hours ($6,525.00) for preparing, reviewing and revising the Complaint, First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) and Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). These are form documents that SLP uses in every Volvo case that vary only in the caption, names of plaintiffs, vehicle information (year, model, and VIN) and where applicable, alleged concerns.

· Plaintiff’s counsel billed 16.7 hours ($7,515.00) to prepare form, boilerplate discovery requests, responses and objections.

· Plaintiff’s counsel billed 9.9 hours ($4,207.50) to prepare various boilerplate meet and confer letters that were simply cut and pasted from numerous form letters of the same form and content served by Plaintiff’s counsel in other cases.

Accordingly, Volvo argues that in a statutory fee-shifting case “[t]he Court should not permit Plaintiff’s counsel to recover the time value creating substantive legal work product, as if it were the original, for each successive reproduction of a boilerplate template.” (Opp. at 13: 9-11.)

SLP asserts that although “while templates provide a solid and organized starting point for a legal document” and save time, SLP is still required to address the specific facts to each case and billed “for the actual amount of time spent on a task.” (Reply at 9:13-16.)

The Court finds that the time spent preparing, reviewing, and revising the three complaints was reasonable.

However, the Court finds that due to the lack of complexity and novelty involved in this case, 16.7 hours spent on discovery requests, responses and objections is unreasonable. Accordingly, the Court deducts 5.00 hours billed at the rate $365.00 (the lowest listed billing rate) from SLP’s motion. Similarly, the court deducts 2.97 hours from the meet and confer letters at the billing rate of $365.00. “It is well established that the determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees is committed to the discretion of the trial court, whose decision cannot be reversed in the absence of an abuse of discretion. The value of legal services performed in a case is a matter in which the trial court has its own expertise . . . The trial court make its determination after consideration of a number of factors, including the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required in its handling, the skill employed, the attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the case.” (Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 623-624 [citations omitted].)

Accordingly, $1,825.00 and $1,082.00 will be subtracted from SLP’s lodestar amount.

7. Attorney’s Fees and Hourly Rates

The hourly rates for Strategic Legal Practices, APC (“SLP”)’s attorneys are attached in the Time Keeper Summary as Exhibit 30 to the Shahian Declaration.

· Breita Linnel billed a total of 10.80 hours at a rate of $495.00 per hour. (See Shahian Decl. ¶¶ 37, 38.)

· Gregory Sogoay billed 11.80 hours at a rate of $395.00 per hour, and 29.70 hours at a rate of $385.00 per hour. (See Shahian Decl. ¶¶ 39, 40.)

· James Doddy billed 9.80 hours at a rate of $595.00 per hour. (See Shahian Decl. ¶¶ 45, 46.)

· Kareem Aref billed 18.70 hours at a rate of $410.00 per hour. (See Shahian Decl. ¶¶ 43, 44.)

· Karen Wallace billed 39.90 hours at a rate of $450.00 per hour. (See Shahian Decl. ¶¶ 41, 42.)

· Kyle Tracy billed 7.20 hours at a rate of $450.00 per hours and 3.50 hours at a rate of 445.00 per hour. (See Shahian Decl. ¶¶ 47, 48.)

· Mark Gibson billed 6.20 hours at a rate of $435.00 per hour. (See Shahian Decl. ¶¶ 49, 50.)

· Mathew Pardo billed 1.10 hours at a rate of $410.00 per hour and 12.80 hours at a rate of 365.00 per hour. (See Shahian Decl. ¶¶ 51, 52.)

· Nazanin Mani billed 8.70 hours at a rate of $375.00 per hours. (See Shahian Decl. ¶¶ 53, 54.)

· Tina Abdolhosseini billed 2.40 hours at rate of $415.00 per hour. (See Shahian Decl. ¶¶ 55, 56.)

· Tina Dolin billed 1.80 hous at a rate of $550.00 per hour, 1.0 hour at a rate of 425.00 per hour, and another 1.0 hour at a rate of $395.00 per hours. (See Shahian Decl. ¶¶ 57, 58.)

The hourly rates for California Consumer Attorneys, P.C.(CCA)’s is attached as Exhibit 31 to the Shahian Declaration and is also Exhibit A to the Rosenstein Declaration.)

· Brian Murray (Associate Attorney) billed a total of 24.6 hours at an hourly rate of $450.00 per hour. (Rosenstein Decl. ¶ 3.)

· Michael Rosenstein (Partner) billed a total of 2.3 hours at an hourly rate of $650.00 per hour. (Rosenstein Decl. ¶ 4.)

Volvo argues that SLP’s fees are excessive. Volvo relies on Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of North America, LLC (2020), since it involved the same plaintiff law firm, for the proposition that $350.00 per hour billing rate was reasonable for a six day trial; which was affirmed by the Appeal Court. (See Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of North America, LLC (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 240, 245-246.) Volvo asserts that the case was overstaffed since 13 attorneys worked on the matter at various billing rates. Therefore, it requests that the Court apply a 75% reduction to reflect a reasonable hourly rate.

Plaintiff does not deny that multiple attorneys, 11 total, worked on the case, but asserts that 5 attorneys (Gregory Sogoyan, Kareem Aref, Karen Wallace, Matthew Pardo, and Breita Linnell, respectively) account for 124.80 hours or 75% of total hours worked (165.4 hours total). (Shahian Decl. ¶ 60.) Volvo fails to point to specific entries to support the proposition that SLP billed for duplicative and unnecessary work. A review of the billing record supports the finding that billings by other attorneys was minimal, nonduplicative, necessary, and reasonable.

Moreover, Plaintiff’s firm argues that since Mikhaeilpoor, other Courts have more recently awarded SLP rates similar or identical to those requested in this Motion. (See Shahian Decl. Ex. 1-29.) In Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 156 the Appeal Court found that the trial court abused its discretion in reducing counsel's hourly rates where “unrebutted declarations established the prevailing rates in the region for attorneys with comparable skills and expertise.”

Accordingly, no deductions will be made.

8. SLP’s $3,500.00 Request to Review and Oppose Volvo’s Opposition

SLP requests $3,500.00 in fees to review, draft a Reply, and attend a hearing on the motion. This is based on the billing rate of Breita Linnell, whose hourly rate is $495.00 per hour. (Linnell Decl. ¶ 4.) Linnell states she spent over 8 hours drafting a Reply brief and preparing the associated documents. (Id.)

The Court finds the amount requested to be excessive and therefore unreasonable when the reasonable amount of time spent should be 2.0 hours. Accordingly, the Court awards only $990.00 and deducts $2,510.00 from SLP’s lodestar amount.

9. Multiplier

Volvo asserts that because the results obtained were not exceptional, the Court should apply a downward adjustment. SLP maintains that when Volvo made its first 998 Offer, on March 4, 2020, it only offered $10,000.00 for the subject vehicle. Two years later, on February 18, 2022, Volvo made its second offer of $35,000; more than three times its initial offer.

The lodestar amount “may be adjusted by the court based on factors including (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, [and] (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.”¿(Bernardiv. County of Monterey (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1399 [citing Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.)¿ The purpose of any lodestar and the increase “is intended to approximate market-level compensation for such services” and is entirely discretionary.¿ (Id.)¿ “The purpose of a fee enhancement is not to reward attorneys for litigating certain kinds of cases, but to fix a reasonable fee in a particular action.”¿ (Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1171-72.)

The Court finds there is no basis to award a multiplier because the time and skill of SLP’s or CCA’s counsel and the contingent nature of the representation, are compensated with fees. There is nothing before the Court to suggest the relatively this case required extraordinary legal skill and/or required counsel to bear unnecessary risk. Nothing before this Court suggests that special skill was displayed or an extraordinary result was obtained by Plaintiff’s counsel.

SLP’s request to award a multiplier is DENIED.

10. Adjusted Lodestar

The Base (unadjusted) lodestar for SLP is $71,135.50 and $12,565.00 for CCA. With deductions totaling $10,217.00 for SLP, SLP’s adjusted lodestar is $60,918.50.

Conclusion

The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion IN PART, and awards SLP $60,918.50, and CCA $12,565.00 in attorneys’ fees.

Plaintiff to give notice.

The parties are strongly encouraged to attend all scheduled hearings virtually or by audio. Effective July 20, 2020, all matters will be scheduled virtually and/or with audio through the Court’s LACourtConnect technology. The parties are strongly encouraged to use LACourtConnect for all their matters. All masking protocols will be observed at the Courthouse and in the courtrooms.