Judge Yolanda Orozco, Case 20STCV10621 2022-07-26 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Yolanda Orozco, Case: 20STCV10621, Date: 2022-07-26 Tentative Ruling

Counsel may submit on the tentative ruling by emailing Dept. 31 before 8:30 the morning of the hearing. The email address is smcdept31@lacourt.org. Please do not call the court to submit on the tentative. Please do not submit to the tentative ruling on behalf of the opposing party. Please do not e-mail the Court if you plan to appear and argue.

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**Tentative rulings on Motions for Summary Judgment will only be available for review in the courtroom on the day of the hearing.

Case Number: 20STCV10621 Hearing Date: July 26, 2022 Dept: 31

MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES IS GRANTED, IN PART

Background

On March 17, 2020, Plaintiff Michael Robert Sarrail filed this instant action against FCA US, LLC; Steward Chrysler Dodge Jeep Ram (collectively “Defendants”) and Does 1 to 10 for violations of the Song-Beverly Act:

(1) Violation Of Subdivision (d) Of Civil Code Section 1793.2

(2) Violation Of Subdivision (b) Of Civil Code Section 1793.2

(3) Violation Of Subdivision (a)(3) Of Civil Code Section 1793.2

(4) Breach Of Express Written Warranty (Civ. Code, § 1791.2, Subd. (a); § 1794)

(5) Breach Of the Implied Warranty Of Merchantability (Civ. Code, § 1791.1; § 1794; § 1795.5)

(6) Fraudulent Inducement – Concealment

(7) Negligent Repair

On October 13, 2021, this Court granted Defendants’ request for summary adjudication as to the Plaintiff’s sixth cause of action for fraudulent inducement and claim for punitive damages.

On February 08, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Settlement. The case was ultimately settled for $141,000.00

On June 21, 2022, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Attorney’s Fees, Costs, and Expenses. Opposition to the motion was filed on July 13, 2022. Plaintiff filed a reply on July 19, 2022.

Legal Standard

Under the Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d) the prevailing party in an action that arises out of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act is entitled to fees that were reasonably incurred: “If the buyer prevails under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the Court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney's fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” (Civ. Code, § 1794(d).)

The lodestar method is the primary method for determining a reasonable attorney fee award under section 1794, subdivision (d). (See Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 818-19.) “A trial court assessing attorney fees begins with a touchstone or lodestar figure, based on the careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney involved in the presentation of the case.” (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1321 [internal quotations omitted].) “The reasonableness of attorney fees is within the discretion of the trial court, to be determined from a consideration of such factors as the nature of the litigation, the complexity of the issues, the experience and expertise of counsel and the amount of time involved. [citation] The court may also consider whether the amount requested is based upon unnecessary or duplicative work.” (Wilkerson v. Sullivan (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 443, 448.) “The basis for the trial court's calculation must be the actual hours counsel has devoted to the case, less those that result from inefficient or duplicative use of time.” (Horsford v. Board Of Trustees Of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 395.) “The law is clear, however, that an award of attorney fees may be based on counsel's declarations, without production of detailed time records.” (Raining Data Corp. v. Barrenechea (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1375.)

In setting the hourly rate for an attorney fees award, courts are entitled to consider the rate of “fees customarily charged by that attorney and others in the community for similar work.” (Bihun v. AT&T Information Systems, Inc. (1993) 13 Cal. App. 4th 976, 997 [affirming rate of $450 per hour], overruled on other grounds by Lakin v. Watkins Associated Indus. (1993) 6 Cal. 4th 644, 664; see also Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 1009 [“[R]ate determinations in other cases, particularly those setting a rate for the plaintiffs' attorney, are satisfactory evidence of the prevailing market rate.”].)

Request for Judicial Notice (if applicable)

The Court may take judicial notice of records of any court of record of the United States. (Evid. Code § 452(d)(2).) However, the Court may only judicially notice the existence of the record, not the truth of its contents. (Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1565.)¿

Plaintiff’s request Judicial Notice of the following exhibits attached to the Declaration of Payam Shahian.

Exhibit 1: A February 27, 2014 Minute Order granting plaintiff’s motion for fees and costs in the matter Khani v. Ford Motor Company (L.A. Super. Ct. Case No. BC466626)

Exhibit 2: A May 9, 2017 Stipulation and signed Order regarding judgment of jury verdict with a 2 times civil penalty and attorney fees, costs, and expenses in the matter of Vanwaus v. FCA US, LLC (Los Angeles Super. Ct., Case No. BC591282)

Exhibit 3: A September 27, 2017 Minute Order concerning the Court’s Fee Order in the matter of Fuller v. FCA US, LLC (Los Angeles Super. Ct., Case No. BC556964)

Exhibit 4: A February 27, 2017 Notice of Ruling and Tentative Ruling in the matter of Kazaryan v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (Los Angeles Super. Ct., Case No. BC574416)

Exhibit 5: A Notice of Ruling in the matter of Geredes v. Chrysler Group LLC (Los Angeles Super. Ct., Case No. BC52364)

Exhibit 6: A Notice of Ruling in the matter of Ahmed Al-Jiboury v. FCA (Los Angeles Superior Court Case No BC648057)

Exhibit 7: A Second Amended Judgment on Jury Verdict after Entry of Additur in the matter of Kadkhoda v. MBUSA (Los Angeles Superior Court Case No BC563069)

Exhibit 8 A Notice of Ruling on Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees, costs and expenses in the matter of Raul Galindo v. General Motors (LASC Case No BC693061)

Exhibit 9 An Order on attorney’s fees and prejudgment interest in the lemon law matter of Abraham Forouzan v. BMW (United States District Court for the Central District of California Case No. 2:17-cv-03875-DMG-GJS)

Exhibit 10: An Order on attorney’s fees, costs and expenses in the lemon law matter of Joshua Holeman v. FCA (United States District Court for the Central District of California Case No. 2:17- cv-08273-SVW-SK)

Exhibit 11: An Order on attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses in the lemon law matter of Catherine Shepard v. BMW (Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. BC622506)

Exhibit 12: Order on attorneys’ fees and prejudgment interest in the lemon law matter of Jerry Zomorodian v. BMW (United States District Court for the Central District of California Case No. 2:17-cv-5061-DMG(PLAx))

Exhibit 14: September 16, 2016 order granting plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees, Costs and Expenses in the lemon law matter of Soderstrom v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (San Francisco Super. Ct., Civil Case No.CGC15544475)

Exhibit 15: The Declaration of Bryan Kemnitzer filed in support of plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees, Costs, and Expenses in the Song Beverly [sic] natter of Soderstrom v Mercedes-Benz, USA, LLC (San Francisco Super. Ct., Civil Case No. CGC15544475)

Exhibit 16: February 14, 2019, order in Khomsone v BMW of North America, LLC (Alameda Super. Ct., Civil Case No. RG17856686)

Exhibit 17: July 28, 2020, order granting plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees, Costs, and Expenses in the matter of Flores v. FCA US, LLC (Sacramento Super. Ct., Case No. 34-2016- 00192221-CU-BC-GDS

Exhibit 18: August 25, 2020, order in the matter of Jurosky v BMW of North America, LLC, (United States District Court for the Southern District of California Case No. 19cv706 JM (BGS))

Exhibit 19: December 18, 2020 Order granting plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees, Costs & Expenses in the lemon law matter of Gonzalez v. MBUSA, (Los Angeles Co. Super. Ct. Civil Case No. SC128379))

Exhibit 20: April 29, 2021 Minute Order granting plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees, Costs & Expenses in the lemon law matter of Jose Medina v. KMA (Los Angeles Co. Super. Ct., Civil Case No. 19STCV02985)

Exhibit 21: May 10, 2021 Tentative Ruling granting plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees, Costs & Expenses in the lemon law matter of Michelle Williams v. KMA (Los Angeles Co. Super. Ct., Civil Case No. BC722351)

Exhibit 22: July 23, 2021, Minute Order granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorney’s Fees, Costs & Expenses in the lemon law matter of Scott Michael Feldman Gregory v. FCA US LLC, (County of Marin Case No. CIV1901820)

Exhibit 23: August 10, 2021 Tentative Ruling granting plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees, Costs & Expenses in the lemon law matter of Covarrubias v. Ford Motor Company, (N.D. Cal. Case No. 19-cv-01832-FMC)

Exhibit 24: June 25, 2018 order granting plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees, Costs & Expenses in the lemon law matter of Hall vs. FCA US LLC, (San Diego Superior Court Case No. 37-2016-00006383)

Exhibit 25: Declaration of Payam Shahian in support of plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees, Costs, and Expenses in the Song Beverly matter of Hall vs. FCA US LLC, (San Diego Superior Court Case No. 37-2016-00006383)

Exhibit 26: March 14, 2022 order granting plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees, Costs & Expenses in the lemon law matter of Oscar Millan vs Kia Motors America, Inc., (Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. BC710535)

Exhibit 27: March 14, 2022 order granting plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees, Costs & Expenses in the lemon law matter of Jason J. Arnold, et al. vs FCA US, LLC. Et al. (Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. 19STCV26274)

Exhibit 28: March 29, 2022 Minute Order granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Costs, and Expenses in the lemon law matter of Mo Rahman v. FCA US LLC, et al. (United States District Court for the Central District of California Case No.: 2:21-cv-02584)

Exhibit 29: Order on attorneys’ fees in Holcomb v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, Case No. 18CV475JM(BGS) 2020 WL 759285 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2020)

Plaintiff’s request for Judicial Notice is GRANTED as indicated above.

Evidentiary Objections

Plaintiff objects to certain exhibits attached to the Declaration of Sharon L. Steward

Objection Nos 1 to 9 are OVERRULED

Discussion

Plaintiff seeks an order awarding $97,261.28 in attorney fees, costs and expenses. This includes $63,977.50 in attorney’s fees for Strategic Legal Practices, APC (“SLP); a 1.35 enhancement on the attorney fees ($22,399.13); $7,364.65 in costs and expense for SLP; and an additional $3,500.00 for Plaintiff’s counsel to review Defendants’ opposition, draft a reply, and attend the hearing on this motion.

Defendants argue that attorney’s fees sought by Plaintiff in this instant action are unreasonable given the lack of novelty of the case, the simplicity of the case, and overstaffing by Plaintiff. “In challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence.” (Lunada¿Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 240 Cal.App.4th 459, 488.)

1. Defendants’ Opposition to SLP’s Attorney Fees

a. Overstaffing

Defendants argue that this case was overstaffed because 10 different attorneys worked on the case, plus one law clerk. (See Shahian Decl. ¶¶ 36-58, Ex. 30 p. 10.) “[I]t is appropriate for a trial court to reduce a fee award based on its reasonable determination that a routine, noncomplex case was overstaffed to a degree that significant inefficiencies and inflated fees resulted. (Morris v. Hyundai Motor America (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 39.)

Plaintiff’s reliance on Holcomb v. BMW of North America, LLC for the proposition that it would be improper for the court to set a limit on the number of attorneys working on a matter is not dispositive as to the issue of overstaffing. ((S.D. Cal., Feb. 14, 2020, No. 18CV475 JM (BGS)) 2020 WL 759285, at *3 [“The court is not in a position, however, to determine the appropriate number of attorneys assigned to this particular case given that it is not privy to the inner workings of Plaintiffs’ counsel's law firm.”].) Ultimately, the party seeking attorney fees has the burden of showing that the fees incurred were allowable, were reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, and were reasonable in amount. (See Levy v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 807, 816.)

Here, Plaintiff argues that just 5 attorneys, Gregory Yu, Kareem Aref, Muky Dai, Regina Lotardo, and Zavigh Mkrdech account for 103.70 hours or 69% of the total hours billed, with the remaining attorneys performing non-duplicative tasks. (Shahian Decl. Ex. 10, p. 10.)

In Morris, the concern with overstaffing was that “[j]ust as there can be too many cooks in the kitchen, there can be too many lawyers on a case. [Citation]” (Morris, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at 38, as modified (Oct. 11, 2019), citing Donahue v. Donahue (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 259, 273.) In Donahue, the concern with overstaffing was that “simultaneous representation by multiple law firms posed substantial risks of task padding, over-conferencing, attorney stacking (multiple attendances by attorneys at the same court functions), and excessive research.” (Donahue, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at 272.) Therefore, the mere fact Plaintiff, utilized multiple attorneys is not, by itself, sufficient evidence that there were inefficiencies in the billing, excessive research or task padding. Defendant still needs “to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence.” (Lunada¿Biomedical, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at 488.)

A prevailing party’s verified billing invoices are prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses, and services listed were necessarily incurred. (See Hadley v.¿Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, 682.) Without specific references to the items challenged, Defendants’ conclusory allegation that Plaintiff overstaffed the case is inadequate to rebut the presumption that the fees Plaintiff incurred were reasonable and necessary. (See Id. at 684.)

b. Time Spending Opposing MSA Motion

Defendants argue that the costs and fees incurred by Plaintiff in pursuit of his fraud claim are not recoverable under the Song-Beverly Act, and thus, the time spent opposing the MSA motion is not recoverable. Defendants allege that evidence supporting Plaintiff’s fraud claim arises from facts that occurred before the purchase of the subject vehicle and are thus separate and distinct facts from Plaintiff’s Song-Beverly Act claims. Defendants cite Santana v. FCA US LLC (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 334 in support of this proposition.

However, in Santana the Court of Appeal explained that fees “need not be apportioned when incurred for representation on an issue common to both causes of action in which fees are proper and those in which they are not. [Citation].” (Santana, supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at 349; see also Drouin v. Fleetwood Enterprises (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 486, 493 [“Attorneys fees need not be apportioned between distinct causes of action where plaintiff's various claims involve a common core of facts or are based on related legal theories.”] In Santana, the Appeal Court found that “apportionment is not required when the claims for relief are so intertwined that it would be impracticable, if not impossible, to separate the attorney's time into compensable and noncompensable units” such that plaintiff’s fraud and Song-Beverly Act claims encompassed “one set of fact.” (Santana, supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at 349 [internal citation omitted].)

The Court is unpersuaded by Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff’s fraud claim and the Song-Beverly claims arose from a different set of facts such that attorney’s fees should be apportioned. Moreover, as Plaintiff points out, under the terms signed in the 998 agreement “Plaintiff may seek an award of costs and an award of attorneys’ fees recoverable pursuant to Civil Code Section 1794(d) because the 998 offer did not allow for entry of judgement [sic].” (Reply at 2, fn 1.) Therefore, due to the 998 agreement, Plaintiff did not need to file a Memorandum of Costs and Plaintiff can recover attorney fees for the fraud claim. Moreover, a Memorandum of Costs was filed on July 19, 2021.

Defendants argue that $20,535.00 for 40.1 hours spent opposing the MSA is unreasonable. A review of SPC’s billing shows that:

· Gregory Yu spent 24.6 hours at $550.00 per hour drafting the MSA opposition on 9/25/21 and 9/27/21. (Shahian Decl. Ex. 10.)

· Muky Dai spent 3 hours at $495.00 per hour revising the declaration and separate statement in support of the MSA opposition and preparation of supporting exhibits on 8/26/2021. (Id.)

· Tianna Dolin spent .50 hours reviewing D’s MSA and drafting notes regarding Opposition on 6/21/21. 1.50 hours were spent on 09/24/21 reviewing and finalizing the declaration in support of the MSA opposition and conducting legal research. On 9/28/21, Dolin spent 1.40 hours reviewing and finalizing the Dolin Declaration and Separate Statement in support of the MSA opposition. (Id.) In total, T. Dolin spent 5.5 hours at $450.00 per hour on the MSA opposition.

The Court agrees with Defendants’ contention that this case was a simple lemon law case that presented no novel issues, and which includes use of similar briefs and pleadings across the numerous lemon law cases Plaintiff’s firm handles. The Court finds that Yu’s billing for 24.6 hours in drafting opposition to the MSA motion is excessive and therefore unreasonable. Defendants’ Exhibits D and E show that Plaintiff’s opposition to the MSA is a near copy to the opposition submitted in Irma Candanoza v. FCA US LLC, et al., Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. 20STCV13161, pertaining to a similar fraud claim. (Steward Decl. ¶ 8, Ex. D, E.) Given the nearly identical opposition to the MSA involved in this case and Irma Candanoza, the Court deducts 19.6 hours from Yu’s time on the basis that it should not have taken 24.6 hours to draft a 21-page MSA based on similar issues with nearly identical headers as the other opposition. (Id.)

The Court finds that Dai’s 3 hours spent drafting the declaration and separate statement in support of the MSA opposition and preparing the supporting exhibits is reasonable. (Shahian Decl. Ex. 10.) No deductions will be made.

The Court deducts the entire time billed by Dolin, 5.5 hours. Dolin’s work is largely duplicative of the work done by Yu and Dai. In addition, the worked performed by Dolin is more in line with paralegal or clerical work rendering the $450.00 per hour billing rate excessive. The MSA opposition motion did not present novel issues that required three attorneys with high hourly rates to prepare a response limited to the fraud claim. (See Steward Decl. ¶ 8, Ex. D, E.)

c. Drafting Meet and Confer Letters

Defendants assert that the fees incurred by SLP attorney Regina Lotardo of 1.5 hours billed at a rate of $435.00 per hour for meeting and conferring and reviewing supplemental responses to Defendants’ special interrogatories and form interrogatives is unreasonable. The unreasonableness is based on the fact that neither the objections nor the responses were tailored to the discovery request and the responses lacked any substantive information and were not Code-compliant. (Stewart Decl., ¶ 10.) The Court notes that boilerplate general objections are sanctionable in California under Korea Data Systems Co. v. Superior Court (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1513.

Nevertheless, Defendants have failed to cite the evidence, meaning that Plaintiff’s boilerplate objection to Defendants’ interrogatories are not cited in Defendants’ opposition to this motion and the Court is unable to assess the validity of Defendants’ contention. Thus, the Court can accept Plaintiff’s prima facie evidence that Lotardo’s billing was reasonable and necessary regarding the meet and confer efforts. (See Hadley, supra, 167 Cal.App.3d at 682.)

Defendants also assert that the time Aaina Duggal spent drafting a further meet and confer letter is unreasonable. Duggal billing rate is $350.00 per hour and 3.50 hours were spent on 5/3/21 drafting the further meet and confer letter and 5.80 hours on 5/5/21 in continuing to draft the meet and confer letter. (Shahian Decl. Ex. 10 at p. 2,3.) Plaintiff asserts the time spent was reasonable because FCA had not provided code-compliant discovery responses, Ms. Otardo had to go through all of Defendants’ discovery responses and 22,000 pages of document production to determine whether Defendants’ complied with its discovery obligations. (Reply at 8:17-24.) Defendants argue that the letter at issue was a boilerplate letter dealing with routine discovery issues that arise in every case SLP files against Defendants and should have taken 2 hours rather than 9.3 hours to draft. (Opp. at 9:10-14.) The Court agrees that 9.3 hours for a meet and confer letter is excessive and therefore unreasonable given the routine and virtually identical discovery issues that come up in every lemon law case. The Court will allow 1.0 hour for this task; thus, a total of 8.3 hours will be deducted.

d. Fee for Preparing Motions in Limine

Defendants assert that SLP utilized the same template motions in limine that requires minimal tailoring to the facts of the case. Therefore, the 2.5 hours billed by Eve Canton at a rate of $285.00 per hour is unreasonable as well as the 3.6 hours spent by Kareem Aref, billed a rate of 390.00 per hour, spent reviewing and revising the motions in limine on 10/25/21, 10/28/21, and 11/10/21. (Shahian Decl. Ex. 10.) Defendants request the amount be reduced by 50%. Plaintiff argues that the motions in limine “were tailored to the facts of this case—the specific vehicle, defect, and its symptoms and turn on specific facts, including the type of vehicle at issue, the type of defect, the symptoms arising from that defect, the vehicle’s idiosyncratic and unique repair history. FCA also ignores that the use of exemplars ultimately reduced time spent on various tasks.” (Reply at 9:2-6.)

Given that filing motions in limine is routine in lemon law cases, and these are indeed similar, if not identical from case to case, and not so dissimilar here to other lemon law cases SLP has filed against Defendants, the Court agrees with Defendant’s suggested reduction in the amount billed by Canton and Aref by 30%, with Canton being credited for 1.75 hours of work at rate of $285.00 and Aref with 2.52 hours billed at a rate of $390.00.

e. Excessive and Uncertain Fees Sought for Preparation of Fee Motion Reply

Plaintiff anticipates it will incur over $3,500 in attorney fees in reviewing and replying to opposition on this motion as well as attending the hearing on this motion. (Shahian Decl. ¶ 61.) Defendants argue the amount sought is speculative because no attorney has been identified who is expected to complete the work or how much time will be spent on the task. Plaintiff provided the Declaration of Zavig Mkrdeck, Plaintiff’s counsel of record, who asserts having spent 12 hours drafting and reviewing the Reply brief and preparing the associated documents at a billing rate of $350.00 per hour. (Mkrdeck Decl. ¶ 3). This included drafting the Memorandum of Costs and Evidentiary Objections to the Declaration of Sharon L. Stewart. However, Mkrdeck requests only the $3,500.00 as outlined in the motion. The $3,500.00 would represent 10 hours of work, including appearing at the hearing. The Court finds this amount excessive and therefore unreasonable. The Court will allow .5 hours to review the opposition; 2 hours to prepare the reply and 1 hour to prepare for and appear at the hearing, for a total of 3.5 hours at the hourly rate of $350.00.

f. Hourly Rate Request by Plaintiff’s Counsels

Defendants argue that the hourly rates for SLP ranging from $285.00 for a law clerk to $550 for lemon law litigation are unreasonable and unsupported by the evidence. Payam Shahian, the managing partner of SLP provided a declaration and selected orders from other courts that found that the hourly rates sought by SLP were reasonable. (See generally Shahian Decl.) Without more evidence supporting Defendants’ contention that the SLP’s hourly rates are unreasonable, the Court declines to find the hourly rate charged by SLP to be unreasonable.

2. Adjusted Lodestar for SLP

The unadjusted lodestar for SLP is $63, 977.50.

· 19.6 hours of work are reduced from Yu, whose billing rate is $550.00 per hour, for drafting the MSA opposition. Therefore, $10,780.00 is to be subtracted from the SLP’s lodestar amount.

· 5.5 hour of work are reduced from Dolin’s work in opposing to the MSA motion and research on the MSA, billed at a rate of $450.00 per hour. The total to be subtracted is $2,475.00.

· 8.3 hour of work are reduced from Dugal’s time spent drafting the meet and confer letter, billed at a rate of $350.00 per hour. The total to be subtracted is $2,905.00.

· .75 hours are reduced from Canton for the work on the motions in limine, billed at a rate of $285.00. Accordingly, $213.75 is to be subtracted from the lodestar.

· 1.08 hours are reduced from Aref for work on the motions in limine, billed at a rate of $390.00 per hour. Therefore, $422.50 is to be subtracted from the lodestar.

The total to be subtracted is $16,796.25 from SLP’s lodestar. The adjusted lodestar is $47,181.25.

3. No Multiplier is Warranted

Plaintiff requests a 1.35 multiplier. Plaintiff’s asset they are entitled to a multiplier due to obtaining $141,000 for Plaintiff, which is nearly three times the total price paid for the vehicle and SLP litigated the case for over a year without compensation against a multi-billion-dollar company. Defendants argue no multiplier is warranted beaus this case was a common lemon law case that presented no novel issues.

The lodestar amount “may be adjusted by the court based on factors including (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, [and] (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.”¿ (Bernardiv. County of Monterey(2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1399 [citing Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132].)¿ The purpose of any lodestar and the increase thereto “is intended to approximate market-level compensation for such services” and is entirely discretionary.¿ (Id.)¿ “The purpose of a fee enhancement is not to reward attorneys for litigating certain kinds of cases, but to fix a reasonable fee in a particular action.”¿ (Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie(1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1171-72.)

Plaintiff’s request to award a multiplier is DENIED. The Court finds there is no basis to award a multiplier because the time and skill of counsel, as well as, the contingent nature of the representation, are compensated with fees. Also, there is nothing before the Court to suggest this relatively straightforward case required extraordinary legal skill and/or required counsel to bear unnecessary risk. Nothing before this Court suggests that special skill was displayed, or an extraordinary result was obtained by Plaintiff’s counsel.

Conclusion

The court calculates Plaintiff’s reasonable attorney fees and costs as follows:

The adjusted lodestar is: $47,181.25.

Multiplier Enhancement N/A

Anticipated fees for Reply and attendance: $1,225.00

Costs and Expenses: $7,364.65

Total: $55,770.90

Plaintiff’s motion for Attorney Fees is GRANTED, in part. The court award Plaintiff a reduced amount of $55,770.90 in fees and costs. Plaintiff’s request for multiplier is DENIED.

Moving Party to give notice.

The parties are strongly encouraged to attend all scheduled hearings virtually or by audio. Effective July 20, 2020, all matters will be scheduled virtually and/or with audio through the Court’s LACourtConnect technology. The parties are strongly encouraged to use LACourtConnect for all their matters. All social distancing protocols will be observed at the Courthouse and in the courtrooms.