Judge Yolanda Orozco, Case 20STCV39045 2023-03-03 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Yolanda Orozco, Case: 20STCV39045, Date: 2023-03-03 Tentative Ruling

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**Tentative rulings on Motions for Summary Judgment will only be available for review in the courtroom on the day of the hearing.

Case Number: 20STCV39045 Hearing Date: March 3, 2023 Dept: 31

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT/SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

On October 13, 2020, Plaintiff Concerned Citizens of South Central Los Angeles (“Plaintiff” or “Concerned Citizens”) initiated this action against Defendants Astroturf Corporation, f/k/a Astro Turf Corporation f/k/a Apt Acquisition Construction Corp.; General Sports Turf, Inc.; Legacy Turf Company, LLC, f/k/a Astroturf, LLC, f/k/a General Sports Venue, LLC, f/k/a General Sports Turf, LLC; Astroturf Construction Corporation; William Heard Smith a/k/a Heard Smith; and Jennifer Young.

On March 29, 2021, Plaintiff dismissed the Complaint without prejudice as to Defendants Legacy Turf Company LLC and General Sports Turf, Inc. only.

The operative First Amended Complaint (FAC) alleges causes of action for:

1) Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations;

2) Inducing Breach of Contract;

3) Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage; and

4) Negligent Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage.

On September 02, 2022 Defendants AstroTurf Corporation; William Heard Smith, and Jennifer Young (collectively “Defendants”) filed a Motion for Summary Judgment or Summary Adjudication in the alternative.

Plaintiff filed opposing papers on January 25, 2023.

Defendant filed a reply on February 03, 2023.

LEGAL STANDARD

The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.”¿ (Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal. 4th 826, 843.) “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)¿¿¿¿¿

“On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) The moving party is entitled to summary judgment if they can show that there is no triable issue of material fact or if they have a complete defense thereto. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal. 4th at 843.)¿ Summary adjudication may be granted as to one or more causes of action within an action, or one or more claims for damages. (Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. §437c(f).)¿¿¿¿¿¿

A defendant moving for summary judgment bears two burdens: (1) the burden of production – presenting admissible evidence, through material facts, sufficient to satisfy a directed verdict standard; and (2) the burden of persuasion – the material facts presented must persuade the court that the plaintiff cannot establish one or more elements of a cause of action, or a complete defense vitiates the cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(2);¿Aguilar,¿supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850-851.) A defendant may satisfy this burden by showing that the claim “cannot be established” because of the lack of evidence on some essential element of the claim.¿¿(Union Bank v. Superior Court (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 574, 590.)¿¿Once the defendant meets this burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a “triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or defense thereto.”¿(Id.)¿¿¿¿¿

“On ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court is to ‘liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.’” (Cheal v. El Camino Hospital¿(2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 736, 760.)¿¿¿

On a summary judgment motion, the court must therefore consider what inferences favoring the opposing party a factfinder could reasonably draw from the evidence. While viewing the evidence in this manner, the court must bear in mind that its primary function is to identify issues rather than to determine issues. [Citation.]” (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.¿(1999) 75 Cal.App.4th¿832, 839.)¿¿

Defeating summary judgment requires only a single disputed material fact. (See CCP § 437c(c) [a motion for summary judgment “shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”] [emphasis added].) Thus, any disputed material fact means the court must deny the motion – the court has no discretion to grant summary judgment. (Zavala v. Arce (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 915, 925, fn. 8; Saldana v. Globe-Weis Systems Co. (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1505, 1511-1512.)¿¿¿

EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

Defendants submitted objections to Plaintiff’s Separate Statement and evidence submitted in Opposition to this Motion.

Defendants allege that Plaintiff failed to comply with the substantive requirements of section 437c, subdivision (b)(3), or the formatting requirements of Rule 3.1350(f)(2).

Defendants allege that Plaintiff label certain facts in the separate stated as “undisputed” but then provide lengthy and irrelevant narrative or arguments under the guise that they provide “additional facts” instead of just stating that the fact is “undisputed.” Therefore, Defendant’s 76-page separate statement became a 365-page statement.

Defendants also contend that Plaintiff’s separate statement fails to cite admissible evidence and often cites the FAC or its own discovery response. (See Great Am. Insur. Cos. v. Gordon Trucking, Inc. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 445, 450 [party cannot use his own discovery responses to oppose summary judgment]; Coyne v. Krempels (1950) 36 Cal.2d 257, 262 [party cannot rely on own pleadings]; and D'Amico v. Board of Med. Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 20-22 [“a party cannot create an issue of fact by a declaration which contradicts his prior discovery responses.”].)

“The failure to comply with this requirement of a separate statement may in the court's discretion constitute a sufficient ground for denying the motion.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c subd. (b)(1) However, the Court declines to GRANT the Motion on the basis that Plaintiff filed to comply with the requirements of section 437(c) subdivision (b)(3).

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s response to the separate statement is not so deficient that it fails to state whether the fact is or is not disputed, unlike the plaintiff’s separate statement in Collins v. Hertz Corp. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 64, 73. To the extent that Plaintiff relies on its own discovery responses, pleadings, or where declarations and affidavits are unequivocally contradicted by deposition testimony, that evidence will be disregarded by the Court.

Defendants’ Specific Objections to Plaintiff’s Compendium of Evidence:

Objections Nos. 2-20, 21-28, 30-41, 47-49, 51-54, and 56 - 65 are OVERRULED.

Objections Nos. 1, 29, 42 - 46, 50, and 55 are SUSTAINED.

Plaintiff submitted evidentiary objections to the Defendants’ separate statement.

Defendants submitted a reply to Plaintiff’s evidentiary objections and assert that the Motion should be granted due to Plaintiff’s failure to follow the formatting rules set out in California Rules of Court, rule 3.1354.

Defendants’ reliance on Hodjat v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1, does not support the proposition that summary judgment can be granted due to a plaintiff’s failure to properly format his written objections. Instead, Hodjat stands for the proposition that it is not abuse of discretion to decline to rule on objections that violate rule 3.1354. (Id. at 8.)

Plaintiff’s evidentiary objections refer to specific facts in the Separate Statement without identifying the specific document or exhibit that makes the fact objectionable. The Court is left to guess if Plaintiff finds the entire cited evidence objectionable or just the fact as articulated in the Separate Statement. Moreover, if Plaintiff objects to a fact that is disputed, Plaintiff has the opportunity to respond to the separate statement.

Pursuant to Hodjat, the Court declines to rule on Plaintiff’s evidentiary objections.

DISCUSSION

Factual Background

Plaintiff Concerned Citizens of South Central Los Angeles (“Plaintiff” or “Concern Citizens”) asserts that a Joint Use Agreement (the “JUA”) existed between Plaintiff and the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD). (UMF 2.)

Pursuant to Proposition K grant money from the City of Los Angeles, Plaintiff acquired funds to construct two synthetic turf fields at two LAUSD schools. Under the Joint Use Agreement, Plaintiff was to provide an artificial turf field to Carver Middle School. The Joint Use Agreement also required Plaintiff to provide youth soccer programming using the field at Carver school with the LAUSD. (UMF 39.)

Plaintiff asserts that the JUA required Plaintiff to find a vendor to provide a pre-paid eight (8) year warranty for the field and ensure replacement in case the field deteriorated. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants represented that they would provide an 8-year warranty and promptly replace the field in case of defects not associated with normal wear and tear. (PCOE Ex. 1 [JUA]; Ex. 7 [Warranty].) Plaintiff asserts that Defendants knew about the JUA and that the Proposition K grant award depended on AstroTurf promptly replacing the defective field at Carver Middle School at the request of Plaintiff. (PCOE Ex. 5 [Williams Depo. 333:21-334:4.)

Plaintiff asserts that the field at Carver Middle School began to prematurely deteriorate in 2014, not as a result of ordinary wear and tear but due to damage to the infill. (UMF 1, 4, 34.)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants intentionally induced LAUSD and City of Los Angles to end their contractual and economic relationship with Plaintiff by failing to replace the decorated synthetic turf at Carver Middle School despite Defendants’ representations that they would do so pursuant to the warranty on the field. (UMF 4, 20, 24.)

Due to the Defendants’ actions, Plaintiff alleges that the Joint Use Agreement with LAUSD was terminated on October 15, 2018, and the Proposition K grant was terminated in March 2019. (UMF 28, 29, 31.)

Plaintiff filed this action asserting causes of action for (1) Intentional Interference with

Contractual Relations; (2) Inducing Breach of Contract; (3) Intentional Interference with

Prospective Economic Advantage; and (4) Negligent Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage.

Defendants now move for summary judgment, or summary adjudication in the alternative, as to all of Plaintiff’s causes of action.

Plaintiff’s Claims are not Time-Barred

Defendants move for summary judgment on the basis that Plaintiff’s claims are time-barred.

A two-year statute of limitations applies to Plaintiff’s contract-based causes of action under Code of Civil Procedure section 339 subdivision (1). (See also Knoell v. Petrovich (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 164, 168 [finding that a two-year statute of limitations applies to causes of action for interference with contractual relations and interference with prospective business advantage]; Kiang v. Strycula (1965) 231 Cal.App.2d 809, 811 [a two-year statute of limitations applies to the tort of inducing breach of contract under section 339(1)].)

A cause of action does not begin to run until a cause of action accrues. (See Code of Civ. Proc, § 312; see also Rubenstein v. Doe No. 1 (2017) 3 Cal.5th 903, 911 [“statutes of limitations do not begin to run until a cause of action accrues.”].) The California Supreme Court has stated that a cause of action accrues at the time the cause of action is complete with all its elements. (See Rubenstein, supra, 3 Cal.5th at 911; Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 806.) “‘The cause of action ordinarily accrues when, under the substantive law, the wrongful act is done and the obligation or liability arises....’” (Brisbane Lodging, L.P. v. Webcor Builders, Inc. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1249, 1257.)

Plaintiff asserts that their causes of action did not begin to accrue until October 15, 2018, when LAUSD officially informed Plaintiff that the Joint Use Agreement had been terminated by vote of its Board. (UMF 28.) Therefore, Plaintiff’s action was timely filed on October 13, 2020.

The discovery rule postpones the accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff discovers or has reason to discover the cause of action. (See Rubenstein, supra, 3 Cal.5th at 918.) The discovery rule does not accelerate the accrual of a cause of action. Defendants fail to show that the breach of the JUA and Proposition K grant accrued at an earlier time than October 15, 2018. While Plaintiff may have been aware that it was in default or breach of the JUA, the JUA was not officially terminated until it received notice from the LAUSD Board. (PCOE Ex. 8.) Moreover, the Proposition K grant was not terminated until March 20, 2019.

Defendants fail to rebut Plaintiff’s evidence that it learned the LAUSD Board had voted to terminate the JUA on October 15, 2018 or that LAUSD had informed Plaintiff that it would vote to terminate the JUA. (UMF 28, PCOE Ex. 8.) The fact that Plaintiff may have had prior knowledge that LAUSD might terminate the JUA does not mean that Plaintiff’s causes of action began to accrue at an earlier date. Until the termination of those agreements was official, Plaintiff’s asserted causes of action did not become actionable and remained merely speculative.

Summary judgment is denied on the basis that Plaintiff’s causes of action are time-barred.

1st and 2nd COA: Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations and Inducing Breach of Contract

“The elements of a cause of action for intentional interference with contractual relations are ‘(1) the existence of a valid contract between the plaintiff and a third party; (2) the defendant’s knowledge of that contract; (3) the defendant’s intentional acts designed to induce a breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; (4) actual breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; and (5) resulting damage.’” (Redfearn v. Trader Joe's Co. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 989, 997, citing Reeves v. Hanlon (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1140, 1148.)

To state a cause of action for inducing a breach of contract the plaintiff must (1) allege the existence of a valid contract; (2) that defendant had knowledge of the existence of the contract and intended to induce a breach thereof; (3) that the contract was in fact breached resulting in injury to plaintiff; and (4) the breach and resulting injury must have been proximately caused by defendant’s unjustified or wrongful conduct. (See Freed v. Manchester Service, Inc. (1958) 165 Cal.App.2d 186, 189.)

A party can be held liable for inducing a breach of contract if the breach is induced by unlawful means or by lawful means without justification. (See Imperial Ice Co. v. Rossier (1941) 18 Cal.2d 33, 35.) “Justification was said to exist where the person inducing the breach is protecting an interest of greater social value than contractual stability.” (Aalgaard v. Merchants Nat. Bank, Inc. (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 674, 684.) The defendant’s state of mind or absence of ill-will is immaterial, “except as it indicates whether or not an interest is actually being protected.” (Id. at 684, citing Imperial Ice Co., supra, 18 Cal.2d at 36.)

It is undisputed that LAUSD closed the Carver Middle School turf field in August of 2016 due to its deteriorated condition. (UMF 4.) In late 2014, Plaintiff had requested the field be replaced, pursuant to the warranty with Defendants because the TPE infill was melting. (UMF 34.) Defendants state that in August of 2014, Defendant Jennifer Young refused to do a turf replacement because the replacement was not covered under the warranty. (UMF 35.)

Plaintiff disputes this by asserting that under the warranty, Defendant was obligated to replace the filed at no charge to Plaintiff because the field deteriorated due to problems with the infill and not normal wear and tear.

The JUA explicitly provided that the cost of turf field maintenance or repair, or replacement caused by normal wear and tear was to be split between Plaintiff and LAUSD. (PCOE Ex. 1 at CC0000209.) Moreover, the warranty Defendant had with the owner/LAUSD provided the following:

“AstroTurf ® LLC, warrants the synthetic grass surface at Carver Middle School (the “Project") for a period of eight (8) years from the date of substantial completion of product installation against defects in materials and/or workmanship, including ultraviolet degradation, excessive fading, seam rupture or dislodgment. AstroTurf will repair or replace, as it deems necessary, those materials that exhibit such defects resulting from materials or workmanship, at no cost to the Owner. . .

“Astroturf does not warrant against normal wear and tear, as determined by an independent lab specializing in synthetic grass . . . .”

(PCOE Ex. 7 [bold original].)

Plaintiff asserts that because the defect in the field was caused by issues with the infill, AstroTurf represented that it would cover the costs of replacement at no cost to Plaintiff.

Defendant Heard Smith is alleged to have made the following representation to Mark Williams, an employee of Plaintiff’s:

“He said AstroTurf and the L.A. Unified School District would replace the lion share of the field. But if Concern Citizens wanted the updated latest version of it, we could pay the difference between what the MT45 cost and what the updated infill-less product would cost.”

(PCOE Ex. 6 [Williams Depo. at 186:18-24].)

Plaintiff is not specific as to what other representations Defendant Heard Smith is alleged to have made. However, Plaintiff is explicit that Defendant Jennifer Young made the representation on or about November of 2016 that the field would be replaced at no cost to Plaintiff. (PCOE Ex. 6 (Williams Depo at 184:1-5; 188:5-7: 203:15-20; 264:7-8; 264:16-18:307:21-25-308:1-3.) Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Young stated that Defendant “would fix the field at no charge to Concerned Citizens, and that we didn’t have to worry . . . LAUSD had indemnified them in writing for the infill and that we had nothing to worry about that they would take care of the field.” (PCOE Ex. 5 [Plaintiff MPQ Depo. at 142:14-24; see also 221:3-5; 110:11-18].)

The alleged representations made to Plaintiff are admissible as party admissions under Evidence Code section 1220 because what Defendant Heard Smith and Defendant Jennifer Young said to Plaintiff is now being offered against them. Moreover, the fact that representations were made regarding a disputed fact is admissible under the operative facts doctrine to prove the statement was made but not the truth of the statement. (See Russell v. Geis (1967) 251 Cal.App.2d 560, 571 [“There is a well-established exception or departure from the hearsay rule applying to cases in which the very fact in controversy is whether certain things were said or done and not as to whether these things were true or false, and in these cases the words or acts are admissible not as hearsay but as original evidence.”] [internal citations and quotations omitted].)

Plaintiff also offers evidence of AstroTurf’s Corporate witness who states Defendant AstroTurf had no basis to deny that it represented to Plaintiff that if there were any problems with the field, Astroturf would replace or repair the turf promptly at no cost to Plaintiff. (PCOE Ex. 4 [86:15-87:6].) This admission is also admissible as a party admission.

Defendants fail to present evidence that no representations about AstroTurf’s warranty were ever made to Plaintiffs or that the warranty expressly states that defects with the infill of the turf are not covered by the warranty or presented evidence that a separate warranty covers the infill. Defendants provide evidence that in an email by LAUSD personnel, LAUSD asserted “that CCSCLA, as the entity who procured the material through a purchase order which included a warranty, is the entity that should pursue a warranty claim against Astroturf.” (DCOE Ex. L.) Moreover, Defendants also offer no evidence to rebut the fact that Defendants knew that the failure to properly repair the field would result in the termination of the JSA or the Proposition K grant. (PCOE Ex. 5, [333:21-334:4]; PCOE Ex. 4 [179:7-17]; PCOE Ex. 6 [179:7-17]; UMF 44, 45.)

On April 12, 2018, LAUSD informed Plaintiff that it was in breach of the JUA. (UMF 30.) In August of 2017, LAUSD demanded that Plaintiff take corrective action by paying for the artificial turf replacement as required by JUA. (UMF 23.) Plaintiffs point to language in the JUA that only requires Plaintiff to share costs of replacing the turf field if the damage is “from the reasonable use, wear and tear of the Joint Use Areas . . .” (PCOE Ex. 1 at p. CC0000209.) Around October 20, 2017, LAUSD threatened to declare Plaintiff in default of the JUA due to Plaintiff’s refusal to share the costs of replacing the field. (UMF 25.) On October 15, 2018, by certified mail, LAUSD informed Plaintiff that at a board meeting on June 12, 2018, the LAUSD Board had authorized the termination of the JUA. (PCOE Ex. 8.)

It is undisputed that the LAUSD terminated the JUA due to Plaintiff’s alleged breach of the JUA. Whether Plaintiff was required to contribute costs to replace the deteriorated field remains a disputed issue of fact. Whether the warranty provided by Defendants required Defendants to repair the field remains a disputed issue of fact. Defendants have offered no evidence to rebut Plaintiff’s assertion that Defendants had represented that it would repair the field at no cost to Plaintiff.

“The courts provide a damage remedy against third party conduct intended to disrupt an existing contract precisely because the exchange of promises resulting in such a formally cemented economic relationship is deemed worthy of protection from interference by a stranger to the agreement.” (Della Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 376, 392.) Plaintiff’s first and second causes of action require the breach of a contract. It is immaterial that Defendants assert neither the LAUSD nor the City of Los Angeles breached the JUA because per LAUSD, Plaintiff breached the JUA by failing to pay for a portion of the costs. (PCOE Ex. 8.) A question of fact exists as to whether LAUSD was justified in terminating the JUA or whether it breached the JUA by requiring Plaintiff to pay for replacing or repairing the turf due to conditions not caused by normal wear and tear.

Defendants also allege that JUA and the Proposition K funds do not provide Plaintiff with an economic interest sufficient to sustain the first and second cause of action. Plaintiff asserts that they are a non-profit, community-based organization. Defendants do not dispute this. Although the JUA was not entered into a for-profit scheme, Plaintiff is allowed to recover for the loss of benefits of or to the relation of the contract. (Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774A.) Plaintiff is not required to run a for-profit enterprise in order to allege damages due to the Defendants’ interference with its contractual relationships. Plaintiff offers testimony that due to the end of the JUA, Plaintiff could not afford the salaries of its staff. (DCOE Ex. A. [44:11-14].) Plaintiff also offers expert testimony that alleges Plaintiff lost revenue and suffered increased expenses due to the termination of the JUA and the Proposition K grant money. (Schulze Decl. ¶ 10.) Therefore, Defendants have failed to show no material question of fact exists regarding Plaintiff’s damages or of Plaintiff’s economic relationship with LAUSD and the City of Los Angeles.

Based on the foregoing, summary adjudication is DENIED as to the first and second causes of action.

3rd and 4th COA: Intentional & Negligent Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage

To state a claim for the tort of intentional interference with prospective economic advantage (IIPEA), the claimant must allege: (1) an economic relationship between the claimant and some third party, with the probability of future economic benefit to the claimant; (2) the defendant or cross-defendant’s knowledge of the relationship; (3) intentional acts on the part of the defendant or cross-defendant designed to disrupt the relationship; (4) actual disruption of the relationship; and (5) economic harm to the claimant proximately caused by the acts of the defendant.¿(Marsh v. Anesthesia Services Medical Group, Inc. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 480, 504.)¿

To state a claim for the tort of negligent interference with prospective economic advantage (NIPEA), the plaintiff must allege that: (1) an economic relationship existed between the plaintiff and a third party which contained a reasonably probable future economic benefit or advantage to plaintiff; (2) the defendant knew of the existence of the relationship and was aware or should have been aware that if it did not act with due care its actions would interfere with this relationship and caused plaintiff to lose in whole or in part the probable future economic benefit or advantage of the relationship; (3) the defendant was negligent; and (4) such negligence caused damage to plaintiff in that the relationship was actually interfered with or disrupted and plaintiff lost in whole or in part the economic benefit or advantage reasonably expected from the relationship. (North American Chemical Co. v. Sup. Ct. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 764, 788.)

For both IIPEA and NIPEA, the interference must be wrongful by some legal measure other than the fact of the interference itself. (Della Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 376, 378. “[A]n act is independently wrongful if it is unlawful, that is, if it is proscribed by some constitutional, statutory, regulatory, common law, or other determinable legal standard.” (Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.¿(2003) 29 Cal.4th 1134, 1159.) “[A]s our Supreme Court has said time and again, an actor’s breach of contract, without more, is not ‘wrongful conduct’ capable of supporting a tort (Citations), including the tort of intentional interference with a prospective economic advantage.” (Drink Tank Ventures LLC v. Real Soda in Real Bottles, Ltd.¿(2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 528, 533.”

Defendants move for summary adjudication as to the third and fourth cause of action on the basis that Plaintiff does not have an “economic relationship” with LAUSD and the City that allowed Plaintiff to profit from the JUA, the Proposition K grant, or the Carver Middle School soccer field.

As explained above, Plaintiff has sufficiently presented facts that an economic relationship existed between Plaintiff, LAUSD, and the City of Los Angeles due to the JUA and the grant money provided by Proposition K. (DCOE Ex. A. [44:11-14]; Schulze Decl. ¶10.) The JUA would have allowed Plaintiff to use the field until March 2028, access to the Proposition K grant until then, and provide youth soccer programming. (UMF 2; PCOE Ex. 1.)

The language of the JUA sufficiently states Plaintiff’s economic relationship with LUSD and the City of Los Angeles:

“WHEREAS, CCSCLA has acquired a Proposition K grant from the City of Los Angeles in the amount of $760,054 towards the development of a Joint Use soccer field at the School;

WHEREAS, in addition to the Proposition K grant funds, CCSCLA has agreed to provide youth soccer programming for the students of the School as part of their contribution towards the Joint Use project, valued at $2,781,200 over ten years;

WHEREAS, DISTRICT has agreed to match the capital and programmatic contribution from CCSCLA in the form of Measure K, R and Y Joint Use bond funding in the amount of $2,836,502, and $1,140,225 in State Modernization matching funds to develop the Joint Use Areas[.]”

(PCOE Ex. A at p. CC0000205.)

Accordingly, Defendants have failed to show that no triable issues of fact exist regarding the economic relationship between Plaintiff, LAUSD, and the City of Los Angles.

Moreover, Defendants have failed to show no triable issue of fact exists regarding its interference with the JUA due to its refusal to repair the field at Carver Middle School.

Accordingly, summary adjudication as to the second and third cause of action is DENIED.

Summary Judgment as to Defendant Heard Smith

Defendants assert Defendant Smith is entitled to Summary Judgment because there is no evidence he made misrepresentations or interfered with Plaintiff’s contracts.

Mark Williams’s deposition testimony asserts that Heard Smith made representations that Defendants and LAUSD “would replace the lion share of the field” and Plaintiff would only pay the cost difference if it selected a new product. (PCOE Ex. 6 [188:5-7].) Mr. Williams asserts that he “spoke with Mr. Smith only one time verbally in person” and fails to state if Mr. Williams made other representations to Plaintiff other than Mr. Smith’s desire to “keep the lawyers out of this.” (PCOE Ex. 6 [184:10-11; 186:9:10].) Plaintiff also fails to allege Mr. Smith was present when Jennifer Young represented that the field with be replaced at no cost to Plaintiff. At issue is whether Defendant Heard Smith’s statement that AstroTurf and LAUSD would pay the “lion share of the field” was a representation that Plaintiff would only pay costs of replacement if it selected a new turf product or that Plaintiff would still pay for the replacement just not the “lion share” of cost.

“The relevant question is whether the underlying facts—the events or conditions witnesses say they perceived—are established without substantial controversy.” (See Reeves v. Safeway Stores, Inc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 95, 106.) Defeating summary judgment requires only a single disputed material fact. (See CCP § 437c(c) [a motion for summary judgment “shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”] [italics added].)

Since a triable issue of material fact exists as to whether Defendant Heard Smiths’ statements were a misrepresentation of fact, summary judgment as to Defendant Smith is DENIED.

Summary Judgment as to Request for Punitive Damages

Defendants assert they are entitled to summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages because there is no evidence that Defendants acted with malice.

“Malice may be proved either expressly through direct evidence or by implication through indirect evidence from which the jury draws inferences.” (Angie M. v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1228.)

Plaintiff offers evidence in the form of deposition testimony that the Defendants profited from its alleged interference since Defendants entered into a business relationship with LAUSD at the expense of Plaintiff. (PCOE Ex. 6 [175:11-1]; UMF 44, 45.) Plaintiff also alleges Defendants threatened to terminate the JUA if Plaintiff did not sign a legal release. (PCOE Ex. 6 [281:4-8]; PSDF 44, 45.) Defendants failed to rebut this evidence. It is also disputed whether Defendant engaged in wrongful conduct in refusing to replace the field at Carver Middle School despite making representations to Plaintiff that it would.

Accordingly, whether Plaintiff’s evidence is sufficient to show malice and support an award for punitive damages remains a question for the trier of fact.

Defendants’ request for summary adjudication as to Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages is DENIED.

CONCLUSION

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment OR FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION is DENIED.

Defendants to give notice.