Judge: Yolanda Orozco, Case: 20STCV42516, Date: 2023-01-10 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20STCV42516 Hearing Date: January 10, 2023 Dept: 31
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
TENTATIVE RULING
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
On November 05, 2022, Plaintiff Nina Menkes filed a Complaint against Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club (“Defendant”) for Declaratory Relief.
On September 28, 2022, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff filed opposing papers on November 29, 2022. Defendant filed a reply on December 09, 2022.
LEGAL STANDARD
The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.”¿(Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal. 4th 826, 843.) “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)¿¿¿¿¿
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“On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) The moving party is entitled to summary judgment if they can show that there is no triable issue of material fact or if they have a complete defense thereto. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal. 4th at 843.)¿ Summary adjudication may be granted as to one or more causes of action within an action, or one or more claims for damages. (Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. §437c(f).)¿¿¿¿¿¿
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A defendant moving for summary judgment bears two burdens: (1) the burden of production – presenting admissible evidence, through material facts, sufficient to satisfy a directed verdict standard; and (2) the burden of persuasion – the material facts presented must persuade the court that the plaintiff cannot establish one or more elements of a cause of action, or a complete defense vitiates the cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(2);¿Aguilar,¿supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850-851.) A defendant may satisfy this burden by showing that the claim “cannot be established” because of the lack of evidence on some essential element of the claim.¿¿(Union Bank v. Superior Court (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 574, 590.)¿¿Once the defendant meets this burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a “triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or defense thereto.”¿(Id.)¿¿¿¿¿
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“On ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court is to ‘liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.’” (Cheal v. El Camino Hospital¿(2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 736, 760.)¿¿¿
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On a summary judgment motion, the court must therefore consider what inferences favoring the opposing party a factfinder could reasonably draw from the evidence. While viewing the evidence in this manner, the court must bear in mind that its primary function is to identify issues rather than to determine issues. [Citation.]” (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.¿(1999) 75 Cal.App.4th¿832, 839.)¿¿
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Defeating summary judgment requires only a single disputed material fact. (See CCP § 437c(c) [a motion for summary judgment “shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”] [emphasis added].) Thus, any disputed material fact means the court must deny the motion – the court has no discretion to grant summary judgment. (Zavala v. Arce (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 915, 925, fn. 8; Saldana v. Globe-Weis Systems Co. (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1505, 1511-1512.)¿¿¿
REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
The Court may take judicial notice of records of any court of record of the United States. (Evid. Code t § 452(d)(2).) However, the court may only judicially notice the existence of the record, not that its contents are the truth. (Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1565.)
Defendant requests Judicial Notice of the following:
Exhibit 1: Copy of the Complaint filed by Plaintiff on November 5, 2020, entitled Nina Menkes v. Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club, et al., Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. 20STCV42516.
Defendant’s request is GRANTED pursuant to Evidence Code section 352(d)
EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS
Plaintiff filed Evidentiary Objections to Exhibits B, C, D, E, and F in the Declaration of Barbra J. Mandell.
Plaintiff’s Objections to Exhibits B is SUSTAINED, the objections to Exhibits C, and D are OVERRULED. Objections to E and F are OVERRULED.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff alleges that on or about April 4, 2019, in the City of New York, State of New York, Plaintiff was a passenger in a taxicab. (Compl. ¶ 4.) The taxi driver was unable to break before colliding with the rear of the vehicle ahead and Plaintiff sustained injuries as a result. (Id. ¶ 5.) The taxicab was insured by American Transit Insurance (ATI) Company. (Id. ¶ 6.)
New York is a No-Fault State, wherein an insured party must file a claim with one’s own insurance company unless the claimant sustains a permanent injury, which Plaintiff admits she did not. (Id. ¶ 7.) Therefore, under New York’s No-Fault law, the Plaintiff is barred from recovering any damages for pain and suffering. (Id. ¶ 8.) The taxi’s insurer is not reimbursing Plaintiff for any damages. (Id. ¶ 9.) However, ATI did pay some of Plaintiff’s medical expenses. (UMF No. 26.)
Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief regarding her right to make a claim with her insurer, Defendant, under the Uninsured Motorist (UM) Policy. (Compl. ¶ 10.) Defendant disclaims Plaintiff’s right to coverage under the Uninsured Motorist (UM) coverage. Defendant now moves for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s right to recover under the UM policy.
“Uninsured and underinsured motorist policies are governed generally by section 11580.2, which requires automobile liability insurers to offer insurance for damages or wrongful death caused by both uninsured and underinsured motorists.” (Quintano v. Mercury Casualty Co. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1049, 1053; see also Ins. Code, § 11580.2, subs. (a)(1) & (p)(7).) “As used in section 11580.2, the term ‘uninsured motor vehicle’ generally includes ‘underinsured motor vehicle.’” (Id.; see also Ins. Code, § 11580.2, subd. (b).)
Courts have found that underinsured motorist (UMI) coverage is included in uninsured motorist (UM) coverage when the vehicle responsible for the accident is insured for an amount less than the minimum required by California law. (See Kirkley v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 1078, 1080–1081 [“The statutory scheme contemplates that once the uninsured motorist coverage comes into play, the injured insured has resort to the full coverage for which he has paid.”]; see also Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 871, 875, fn. 3.)
Plaintiff’s opposition appears to concede that it is seeking UM coverage under the uninsured motor (UM) vehicle provision of her policy rather than the UMI provision. (See Opp. at 1:24-26-2:1-4; 2:12:18) Plaintiff cites “Part IV – Uninsured Motorist” provisions that defines “Uninsured motor vehicle” rather than citing the definition for “underinsured motor vehicle.” (Mandell Decl. Ex. A at p. 14-15.) Therefore, the Court is not asked to decide if the taxicab was underinsured under California Law, but if the taxicab was uninsured under California Law. Moreover, Plaintiff has not shown she has complied with the conditions precedent to recover under the UMI policy. (UMF No. 7.)
Effect of No-Fault Insurance Law
In State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Crockett (1980), the plaintiffs filed an uninsured motorist claim against an insured Hawaiian driver because, under Hawaii’s “no-fault” insurance law, the plaintiff could not sue for damages where medical expenses were less than $1,500.00. (See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Crockett (1980) 103 Cal.App.3d 652, 658 (Crockett).) In concluding that the plaintiffs could not recover under their uninsured motorist coverage, the First District Appellate Court found the vehicle was in fact insured because “the Hawaiian policy provides liability limits in excess of California requirements” and because Hawaii’s no-fault system abolished liability, plaintiffs could not show they were legally entitled to recover damages against the Hawaiian vehicle as required by section 11580.2. (Id. at 656, 658 [“We therefore conclude that appellants cannot recover under their uninsured motorist coverage both because the Hamblin vehicle was insured, and because Hamblin had no legal liability toward appellants-the no-fault system having abolished tort liability where, as here, the medical expenses of an injured party do not exceed $1,500.”].)
The Appellate Court also looked to Hawaiian Law to determine if the Hawaiian driver could be legally liable to the California plaintiffs since liability is a prerequisite for recovery under California’s uninsured motorist coverage. The Appellate Court determined that Hawaii’s no-faulty system meant that the Hawaiian driver was not liable to the plaintiffs. (Crockett, supra, 103 Cal.App.3d at 658 [“A claimant must establish the legal liability of the uninsured motorist before he can recover. It is beyond dispute that Hamblin bore no such liability to the Crocketts in the case at bar.”]; see also California Casualty Indemnity Exchange v. Pettis (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 1597, 1608, fn. 7.)
Similarly, Plaintiff here has failed to show the taxicab driver is liable for Plaintiff’s injuries under New York’s “no-fault” insurance law. (See The Laws Of New York/Consolidated Laws/Insurance/Article 51, Comprehensive Motor Vehicle Insurance Reparations, § 5101 et seq.)
Defendant has met its burden of showing that no triable issues of fact exist. The burden is on Plaintiff to show that a triable issue of fact exists. Plaintiff has failed to show that she is entitled to recover under her UM policy because she cannot establish that the taxicab is liable for her injuries due to New York’s no-fault insurance law. “New York's ‘no-fault’ insurance law was created to remedy ‘the inability of the tort system to rapidly, adequately and fairly compensate victims of automobile accidents’ by, among other things, ‘removing minor claims from the courts.’” (Meyer v. AFGD, Inc. (N.D.N.Y. 2001) 140 F.Supp.2d 179, 182.) “As a result, plaintiffs are required to satisfy a “serious injury” threshold before any non-economic recovery may be had.” (Id. see also N.Y. Ins. Law § 5102 subd. (d).)
Plaintiff has failed to cite any case finding that another state’s no-fault insurance law has been applied in California to impose legal liability by a California court under section 11580.2. Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to cite any case holding that an insured vehicle that limits recovery for certain personal injuries is an uninsured vehicle as a matter of law under section 11580.2.
Having failed to show that a triable issue of fact exists, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s request for Summary Judgment.
CONCLUSION
Defendant’s Motion of Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
Defendant to give notice.