Judge: Yolanda Orozco, Case: 21STCV16481, Date: 2022-08-01 Tentative Ruling
Counsel may submit on the tentative ruling by emailing Dept. 31 before 8:30 the morning of the hearing. The email address is smcdept31@lacourt.org. Please do not call the court to submit on the tentative. Please do not submit to the tentative ruling on behalf of the opposing party. Please do not e-mail the Court if you plan to appear and argue.
In deciding whether to submit on the tentative ruling or attend the hearing and present oral argument, please keep the following in mind:
The tentative rulings authored by this court reflect that the court has read and considered all pleadings and evidence timely submitted to the court in connection with the motion, opposition, and reply (if any). Because the pleadings were filed, they are part of the public record.
Oral argument is not an opportunity to simply regurgitate that which a party set forth in its pleadings. Nor, is oral argument an opportunity to "make a record" when there is no court reporter present and the statements and arguments of counsel are already part of the record because they were set forth in the pleadings. Finally, simply because a party or attorney disagrees with the court's analysis and ruling or is not satisfied with it does not necessarily warrant oral argument when no new arguments will be articulated.
If you submit on the tentative, you must immediately notify all other parties email that you will not appear at the hearing. If you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the motions. If all parties to the motion submit, this tentative ruling will become the final ruling after the hearing date and it will be memorialized in a minute order. This tentative ruling is not an invitation, nor an opportunity, to file further documents relative to the hearing in question. No such document will be considered by the Court.
**Tentative rulings on Motions for Summary Judgment will only be available for review in the courtroom on the day of the hearing.
Case Number: 21STCV16481 Hearing Date: August 1, 2022 Dept: 31
DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT IS SUSTAINED, IN PART; MOTION TO STRIKE IS GRANTED
Background
On May 03, 2021, Plaintiff Blanca Nava filed a Complaint against Sun Mar Nursing Centers; North Valley Nursing Center; Jessica Navarro; and Does 1 to 100. The Complaint alleged:
1.
Age Harassment (Gov. Code §§ 12940 et al.)
2.
Actual/Perceived Disability Discrimination (Gov.
Code §§ 12940, et seq.)
3.
Actual/Perceived Disability Retaliation (Gov. Code
§§ 12940, et seq.)
4.
Violation of Cal. Family Rights Act (Gov. Code §§
12945.2)
5.
Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy
6.
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Wyngate Nursing Center filed an Amended Cross Complaint against Plaintiff on August 09, 2021.
On November 4, 2021, Defendant Wyngate’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint was SUSTAINED with leave to amend as to the first, second, third, and sixth causes of action. (Min. Or. 11/04/21.)
Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint on November 23, 2022.
Defendant Wyngate filed a demurrer with a motion to strike Plaintiff’s FAC on December 22, 2022.
Plaintiff filed Opposition papers on July 14, 2022.
Defendant Wyngate filed a Reply on July 25, 2022.
A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.¿When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Wilson v. Transit Authority of City of Sacramento (1962) 199 Cal.App.2d 716, 720-21.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleading alone, and not on the evidence or facts alleged.” (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Servs. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.) As such, the court assumes the truth of the complaint’s properly pleaded or implied factual allegations. (Id.) However, it does not accept as true deductions, contentions, or conclusions of law or fact. (Stonehouse Homes LLC v. City of Sierra Madre (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 531, 538.) A demurrer may be sustained “only¿if the complaint fails to state a cause of action under any possible legal theory.” (Sheehan v. San Francisco 49ers, Ltd.¿(2009) 45 Cal.4th 992, 998.)
Legal Standard on Motion to Strike¿
Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof. (Code of Civ. Proc., § 435(b)(1); Cal. Rules of Court (CRC), Rule 3.1322(b).) The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion and upon terms it deems proper: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code of Civ. Proc., § 436, subds. (a)-(b); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782 [“Matter in a pleading which is not essential to the claim is surplusage; probative facts are surplusage and may be stricken out or disregarded”].)¿¿
Legal Standard on Leave to Amend
¿ “Where
the defect raised by a motion to strike or by demurrer is reasonably capable of
cure, leave to amend is routinely and liberally granted to give the plaintiff a
chance to cure the defect in question.” (CLD Construction, Inc. v. City of
San Ramon (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1141, 1146.)The burden is on the
complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Goodman
v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.)¿
Meet and Confer
Requirement
Counsel for Wyngate Nursing Centers and Jessica Navarro, Keven Khachatryan, emailed Plaintiff’s counsel requesting a telephonic call to discuss the grounds for the demurrer to the FAC and the motion to (Khachatryan ¶2.) Parties spoke the phone on December 20, 201. (Id. ¶ 3.) No agreement was reached. (Id. ¶ 4.) Thus, the meet and confer requirements for filing a demurrer or motion to strike have been met. (Code of Civ. Proc., § 430.41.)
Discussion
1.
Demurrer to Plaintiff’s FAC
Defendant Wyngate and Jessica Navarro (“Defendant” or “Wyngate”) again demur to Plaintiff’s first, second, third, and sixth causes of action and assert Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to support said causes of action. Since Plaintiff has failed to cure the defects in her original Complaint, Wyngate asserts the demurrer should be sustained without leave to amend.
First
COA: Age Harassment in Violation of FEHA
The California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA)
prohibits harassment based on protected categories, including age and mental
disability. (Gov. Code § 12940(j)(1).) To establish a claim for harassment, an employee must
show that he was: (1) subjected to verbal or physical conduct because of the
employee’s protected status; (2) the conduct was unwelcome; and (3) the conduct
was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the employee’s
employment and create an abusive work environment. (Fisher v. San Pedro
Peninsula Hospital (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 590, 609.)
California Courts have been guided in their interpretations
of FEHA by the federal court decisions interpreting Title VII of the federal
Civil Rights Act. (Id.) To prove a claim under Title VII, the
harassment must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of
the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment. (Id.) For conduct to be severe and pervasive it must consist
of more than isolated incidents. (See Faragher v City of Baca Raton
(1998) 524 U.S. 775, 788; Hughes v. Pair (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1035
[pervasive conduct requires a level of egregiousness that would alter the
conditions of the underlying professional relationship].) By definition,
“harassment” includes verbal conduct such as epithets or slurs, physical
conduct such as touching, and visual conduct such as derogatory cartoons. (Cal.
Code Regs., tit. 2, § 11019.)
“The working environment must be evaluated in light of the totality of the circumstances: whether an environment is ‘hostile’ or ‘abusive’ can be determined only by looking at all the circumstances These may include the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance.”¿(Miller v. Dep’t of Corrections (2005) 36 Cal.4th 446,¿462.) However, negative employment decisions, such as termination or demotion, cannot¿form¿the basis of a¿hostile environment claim¿and are suited to a discrimination claim. (Roby v. McKesson Corp.¿(2009) 47 Cal.4th 686, 707-711 [holding the same, however, finding that negative employment actions may be used as evidence to show animus¿in a harassment case.].)
In the FAC Plaintiff alleges the following:
·
Plaintiff was employed by Defendants for about
19 years, with the last 15 years spent working as a Receptionist/Accounts
Payable Personnel/Payroll until her termination on or about November 2, 2020.
(FAC ¶ 8.)
·
Plaintiff alleges that prior to Defendant
Administrator Jessica Navarro’s employment with Defendants, Plaintiff had an
exemplary performance and had received numerous promotions. (FAC ¶¶ 9, 10.)
·
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Navarro, who is
her 30’s, constantly made ageist remarks and comments to Plaintiff who was 47 years
old. (FAC ¶ 11.)
·
On numerous occasions, Defendant Navarro
referred to Plaintiff as “slow” and routinely told her ““Just because you’ve
been here for so long doesn’t mean your job is secure.” (FAC ¶ 12.) Other
comments included telling Plaintiff “You need to do things the new way;”
“That’s the old way. We don’t do things like that anymore” and “That’s the old
system. Get up to date!” (FAC ¶¶ 14, 15.) Plaintiff also asserts that she
observed at least two other employees of Defendants Nursing Center who were
above the age of forty being terminated by Defendant Navarro and replaced by an
employee who was in his/her twenties/thirties. (FAC ¶ 17.)
·
Plaintiff alleges that Navarro would routinely
roll her eyes at Plaintiff and would leer an her, making Plaintiff feel
uncomfortable and unwanted at work. (FAC 42(h).)
·
Plaintiff alleges Defendant Navarro set
Plaintiff up to fail by giving her more work to perform, putting more pressure
on Plaintiff and giving Plaintiff shorter deadlines to complete the tasks. (FAC
¶ 42(j).) Navarro also kept requesting Plaintiff’s file, which created an
intimidating working environment. (FAC ¶ 42(h).)
·
In or around August 2020, Plaintiff was
subjected to biased personnel management decisions as she was issued an unjust
Performance Improvement Plan (“PIP”) by Defendant Navarro based on her age and
disabilities. (FAC ¶ 28.) Plaintiff asserts that the purpose of the PIP was to
subject Plaintiff to harassment and a hostile/offensive work environment. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges the PIP was just a list of job duties that failed to state
what Plaintiff needed to improve her performance on. (Id.)
· On November 2, 2020, Defendant Navarro told Plaintiff she was being terminated due to purported performance issues. (FAC ¶ 35.) At the termination meeting, Navarro told Plaintiff “You’ve been doing this for so long but things are different now” which Plaintiff took to mean that she was too old for the position. (FAC ¶ 36.) Defendant Navarro also told Plaintiff: “You’ve been here a long time. It’s time for you to go in another direction[.]” (FAC ¶ 37.)
Defendant Wyngate asserts that Plaintiff has failed to show that she suffered harassment due to her age or that the alleged harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive. For purposes of a demurrer, the Court will accept Plaintiff’s assertions that Navarro’s comments were routine, and thus pervasive. Nevertheless, Defendants assert that the comments were not ageist because they referred to Plaintiff’s work performance.
The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to show how references to the “old system,” the “old way, “or getting up to date” or any other comments made by Defendant Navaro were said because of Plaintiff’s age. Moreover, Defendant Navarro’s condescending conduct and alleged eyerolling and leering again fail to show that Plaintiff was being harassed due to her age. “[H]arassment consists of a type of conduct not necessary for performance of a supervisory job. Instead, “harassment consists of conduct outside the scope of necessary job performance, conduct presumably engaged in for personal gratification, because of meanness or bigotry, or for other personal motives. Harassment is not conduct of a type necessary for management of the employer's business or performance of the supervisory employee's job.” (Janken v. GM Hughes Electronics (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 55, 63.)
Plaintiff has failed to show that Navarro’s conduct was outside the scope of conduct necessary for the management of employees or that Navarro engaged in that conduct for personal gratification or for some other personal motive.
Although Plaintiff did allege sufficient facts as to how the conduct increased her anxiety and that Navarro gave her more work with shorter deadlines that resulted in a PIP, Plaintiff fails to show the conduct was harassing under the circumstances and that conduct was due to her age.
Therefore, Defendant Wyngate’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s first
cause of action is SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.
Second COA: Actual/Perceived Disability Discrimination in Violation of FEHA
To establish a¿prima facie¿case of disability discrimination, a plaintiff must present evidence that demonstrates, even circumstantially or by inference, that he or she (1) suffered from a disability, or was regarded as suffering from a disability; (2) could perform the essential duties of the job with or without reasonable accommodations, and (3) was subjected to an adverse employment action because of the disability or perceived disability.¿(Jensen v. Wells Fargo Bank¿(2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 245, 254.)¿ “The prima facie burden is light; the evidence necessary to sustain the burden is minimal.” (Sandell v. Taylor-Listug, Inc. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 297, 310.)
Plaintiff alleges that “[o]n numerous occasions in 2020, Plaintiff informed numerous administrators and supervisors at Defendant Nursing Center of her disabilities, specifically about her depression and anxiety, including to Yadira Isiorzia, Malu Lim, and Ermine Vardumova.” (FAC ¶ 11.) Plaintiff also told the Business Office Manager, Ermine Vardumova, about her disabilities. (Id. ¶ 23.) Plaintiff further alleges that during her medical leave, she sent Navarro “text messages from on or about October 23, 2020, until on or about October 27, 2020, stating she still did not feel well enough to return to work.” (FAC ¶ 61(n).) Plaintiff’s medical leave was extended until on or about November 2, 2020. (Id. ¶61(o).)
Depression is a recognized disability under FEHA. (See Auburn Woods Homeowners Ass’n v. FEHC (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1578, 1592.) Thus, Plaintiff has presented sufficient facts to show she was disabled. However, Wyngate asserts that it had no notice of Plaintiff’s disability because Plaintiff never informed, Navarro, who was the decision maker in terminating Plaintiff, that suffered from anxiety or depression.
In Avila v. Continental Airlines, Inc. (2008), the Court of Appeal stated in order for plaintiff to show that the defendant-employer acted with discriminatory intent, plaintiff was required to produce evidence that the defendant-employees who discharged the plaintiff knew of plaintiff’s disability. (Avila v. Continental Airlines, Inc. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1237, 1248, as modified on denial of reh'g (Aug. 28, 2008).) The Appeal Court in Avila explained that while the plaintiff had told others why he was sick, the plaintiff had failed to submit evidence that those to whom he had disclosed his disability had actually relayed or had a duty to relay that information to persons involved in the decision to discharge the plaintiff. (Id. at 1250.)
Here, Plaintiff alleges that because she told her supervisors and administrators about her depression and anxiety, under agency principals, they had a duty to communicate the information to their principal. “The rule rests on the premise that the agent has acquired knowledge which it was his duty to communicate to his principal, and the presumption is that he has performed that duty.” (Freeman v. Superior Court, San Diego County (1955) 44 Cal.2d 533, 538.) Therefore, Plaintiff states Wyngate and Navarro did have notice of her disability.
In support of applying agency principles and imputing knowledge on Wyngate about Plaintiff’s disability, Plaintiff cites Renoa v. Baird (1998) in which the California Supreme Court explained that the definition of “employer” under Gov. Code Section 12926.26(d), includes the word “agent” because “the Legislature intended only to ensure that employers will be held liable for discriminatory actions of their supervisory employees.” (Reno v. Baird (1998) 18 Cal.4th 640.) In this manner, Plaintiff’s case is different from Avila because Plaintiff has alleged facts to show Wyngate and Navarro had constructive notice of her disability through the knowledge of Wyngate’s managers and supervisors. This is sufficient to sustain the cause of action on demurrer.
Lastly, though not raised as a separate cause of action, Plaintiff alleges Defendant failed to provide a reasonable accommodation and engage in the interactive process. “Two principles underlie a cause of action for failure to provide a reasonable accommodation. First, the employee must request an accommodation. [Citation.] Second, the parties must engage in an interactive process regarding the requested accommodation and, if the process fails, responsibility for the failure rests with the party who failed to participate in good faith. [Citation.]” (Avila, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th 1237, 1252 [internal citation omitted].)
Although Plaintiff asserts that Wyngate had constructive notice of her disability through agency law, Plaintiff fails to state facts to show that she requested an accommodation from her employer and none was provided. However, since this cause of action is not directly claimed in the FAC, it will not be addressed by the Court.
Accordingly, Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s second cause of action is OVERRULED.
Third COA: Actual/Perceived Disability Retaliation in Violation of FEHA
FEHA prohibits an employer from discharging, expelling, or otherwise discriminating against a person who has opposed an unlawful employment practice or who has filed a complaint, testified, or assisted in a proceeding under FEHA. (Gov. Code § 12940(h).) “[I]n order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the FEHA, a plaintiff must show (1) he or she engaged in a “protected activity,” (2) the employer subjected the employee to an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link existed between the protected activity and¿the employer's action.”¿(Yanowitz¿v.¿L'Oreal¿USA, Inc.¿(2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1042.)¿¿
Plaintiff alleges that she engaged in a protected activity
by notifying Wyngate’s supervisors or managers of her disabilities. (FAC ¶
74(b).) Moreover, Plaintiff was discharged after she returned from continued
medical leave on or about November 2, 2020. (FAC ¶¶ 73, 74(n).)
Plaintiff further alleges that within close temporal proximity of informing Wyngate’s supervisors and managers of her disability, she was subjected to retaliation when she was terminated by Navarro. (FAC ¶ 74.)
In its demurrer, Defendant Wyngate does not address whether Plaintiff’s actions did in fact constitute a protected activity. Instead, Wyngate argues that because it had no notice of Plaintiff’s disability, Plaintiff cannot show she was retaliated against due to the actual or perceived disability.
However, to sustain a cause of action for retaliation under FEHA, all Plaintiff needs to allege is that (1) she engaged in a protected activity, here that she notified Wyngate’s supervisors and managers of her disability and took legally protected medical leave; (2) that Wyngate subjected her to an adverse employment action when she was discharged after her return from leave; and (3) that a causal link exists between the protected activity and Wyngate’s actions.
Therefore, the Court finds Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to support a cause of action for retaliation under FEHA. Accordingly, Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiffs’ third cause of action is OVERRULED.
Sixth COA: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
To establish a prima facie cause of action for¿intentional¿infliction¿of emotional distress, plaintiff must show: (1) outrageous conduct by defendant; (2) defendant’s intention of causing or reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress; (3) plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (4) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by defendant’s outrageous conduct.¿(Vasquez v. Franklin Management Real Estate Fund, Inc.¿(2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 819, 832.)
For conduct to be “outrageous,” it must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized society.¿(Hughes v. Pair¿(2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050-1051.) And the defendant must either intend his or her conduct to inflict injury or engaged in it with the realization that injury will result.¿(Id.)¿Liability for¿intentional¿infliction¿of emotional distress does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities. (Id.)
Employment actions can involve outrageous conduct.¿(Murray v. Oceanside¿Unif. Sch. Dist. (2000)¿79 Cal.App.4th 1338, 1362-1363;¿Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hosp.¿(1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 590, 618.) However, personnel management decisions, even motivated by wrongful intent, are not outrageous conduct as to individual¿supervisors who discriminate.¿(Janken¿v. GM Hughes Electronics¿(1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 55, 80 [“Managing personnel is not outrageous conduct….”];¿see also¿Shoemaker v. Myers¿(1990) 52 Cal.3d 1, 25¿[determining applicability of Workers’ Compensation preemption, discipline and criticism, that¿is¿independent¿of a “violation of an express statute or violation of fundamental public policy,”¿is¿not outrageous conduct].)
Plaintiff argues that the harassment, disability discrimination, and retaliation constitute outrageous conduct. Specifically, that Navarro’s ageist comments constitute outrageous conduct. The Court is not persuaded. Plaintiff has failed to show how Navarro’s comments are ageist or amount to more than “mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.” (Hughes, supra, 46 Cal.4th at 1050-1051.) Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to allege other specific facts that show Wyngate’s conduct was “outrageous” such that it was extreme beyond all bounds tolerated by civil society. (Id.) Moreover, despite Plaintiff’s assertion that the question of whether the conduct is “outrageous” remains a question of fact, “many cases have dismissed intentional infliction of emotional distress cases on demurrer, concluding that the facts alleged do not amount to outrageous conduct as a matter of law.” (Bock v. Hansen (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 215, 235; see also Mintz v. Blue Cross of California (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1594, 1608–1609; Ricard v. Pacific Indemnity (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 886, 895.)
Since the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts to show Wyngate or Navarro’s conduct was “outrageous” as a matter of law, Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s sixth cause of action is SUSTAINED without leave to amend.
2.
Motion to Strike
Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof. (Code of Civ. Proc., § 435(b)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1322(b).) The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion and upon terms it deems proper: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code of Civ. Proc., § 436(a)-(b); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782 [“Matter in a pleading which is not essential to the claim is surplusage; probative facts are surplusage and may be stricken out or disregarded”].)
Punitive Damages
Defendant Wyngate moves to strike punitive damages from Plaintiff’s FAC because it fails to state sufficient facts to support the recovery of punitive damages.
To state a claim for punitive damages under Civil Code section 3294, a plaintiff must allege specific facts showing that the defendant has been guilty of malice, oppression or fraud. (Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal. App. 4th 1033, 1042.) The basis for punitive damages must be pled with specificity; conclusory allegations devoid of any factual assertions are insufficient. (Ibid.)
“Malice” is defined in section 3294(c)(1) as “conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury” or “despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” “Oppression” is defined in section 3294(c)(2) as “despicable conduct subjecting a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” The term “despicable” has been defined in the case law as actions that are “base,” “vile,” or “contemptible.” (Shade Foods, Inc. v. Innovative Products Sales & Marketing, Inc. (2000) 78 Cal. App. 4th 847, 891.)
“An employer shall not be liable for [punitive] damages pursuant to subdivision (a), based upon acts of an employee of the employer, unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.” (Civ. Code, § 3294(b).)
Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations that Defendant Wyngate and Navarro acted with malice or oppression are insufficient to support a prayer for punitive damages. First, Navarro’s comments have been found to not constitute harassment. Secondly, Plaintiff has not offered any other facts, apart from Navarro’s comments, to support the inference that Defendant Wyngate is guilty of oppression, fraud, or malicious conduct.
Though argued in Plaintiff’s opposition, the FAC on its face does not allege with any specificity that Wyngate or Navarro acted with “a willful and conscious disregard of the rights” of Plaintiff when they terminated her after her return from medical leave or when they placed her on a PIP. Therefore, Plaintiff has not shown she should be entitled to punitive damages.
Accordingly, Defendant Wyngate’s Motion to Strike punitive damages from Plaintiff’s FAC is GRANTED with leave to amend.
Conclusion
Defendant’s demurrer as to second cause of action for Actual/Perceived Discrimination and third cause of action for Retaliation are OVERRULED.
Defendant’s Motion to Strike Punitive Damages is GRANTED with leave to amend.
Defendant to give notice.
The
parties are strongly encouraged to attend all scheduled hearings virtually or
by audio. Effective July 20, 2020, all matters will be scheduled virtually
and/or with audio through the Court’s LACourtConnect technology. The parties
are strongly encouraged to use LACourtConnect for all their matters. All social
distancing protocols will be observed at the Courthouse and in the courtrooms.